Anderson v. Gerwen

• Decision Date: 22 December 2022
• Docket Number: 2:20-cv-00246 KJM DB P
• Citation: Anderson v. Gerwen, 2:20-cv-00246 KJM DB P (E.D. Cal. Dec 22, 2022)
• Parties: RYAN DAVID ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. VAN GERWEN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

RYAN DAVID ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. VAN GERWEN, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-00246 KJM DB P

United States District Court, E.D. California

December 22, 2022

ORDER

DEBOFAH BARNES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Plaintiff an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims defendants violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Before the court is plaintiff's third amended complaint (“TAC”) for screening. (ECF No. 21.) For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff will be given the option of proceeding on his cognizable claims or filing an amended complaint.

SCREENING

I. Legal Standards

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

II. Linkage Requirement

Under Section 1983, a plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (stating vicarious liability is inapplicable in Section 1983 suits). Since a government official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability in Section 1983 actions, plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has violated the Constitution through his own individual actions by linking each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiffs federal rights. Id. at 676.

III. Allegations in the Complaint

In the TAC, plaintiff states that, at all relevant times, he was an inmate at the Shasta County Jail in Redding, California. (ECF No. 21 at 1.) Plaintiff names as defendants the County of Shasta, the Shasta County Sheriff's Office (“SCSO”), Former Shasta County Sheriff Tom Bosenko, SCSO Captain David M. Kent, and ADA Coordinator SheyeAnne N. Bailey. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff also names as defendants SCSO correctional deputies Robert M. Van Gerwen, Andrew D. Page, Zachary S. Jurkiewicz, William J. Decker, Brandon L. Brown, Wyatt L. Mason, Joshua P. Dorstad, Kirk E. Schritter, Devin K. Hurte, and Joshua R. Millis. (Id. at 2.)

The claims raised in the TAC relate to three events that occurred on February 1, 2019; February 22, 2019; and March 7, 2019. Plaintiff's allegations related to these incidents are separated below.

A. February 1, 2019 Incident

On February 1, 2019, plaintiff was removed from his cell for a cell search. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff was removed without his hand and foot casts that he otherwise wore due to a broken hand and foot. (Id.) While plaintiff was handcuffed, defendant Van Gerwen “wrenched” on plaintiff's broken hand using a wrist lock and said “[h]old still, so I can break your hand.” (Id.) Defendant Van Gerwen later “tossed [plaintiff's] food cast/boot towards [him]” where it slid and hit his broken foot. (Id. at 8.)

Following the cell search, plaintiff discovered that his hand cast and extra blanket were missing. (Id. at 7.) The incident report prepared by defendant Mason stated that he had removed the blanket and “excessive gauze” from plaintiff's cell. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff believes the gauze was actually his hand cast. (Id.) Defendant Van Gerwen also “announced to the pod, ‘I will shred any grievance submitted.'” (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff subsequently had difficulty submitting ADA grievance forms regarding the incident. (Id. at 12.) In addition to tablets with grievance forms being removed, defendants Mason and Brown refused to provide plaintiff with grievance forms. (Id.) Defendant Bailey met with plaintiff in her role as ADA Coordinator on February 8, 2019. (Id.) “[Defendant] Bailey would only address the hand/half-arm cast.. .[and] would not allow [plaintiff] to talk about the jails' failure to follow its ADA policy.” (Id.)

B. February 22, 2019 Incident

On February 22, 2019, defendant Page led plaintiff into an elevator. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff was handcuffed at the time and requested defendant Page “be careful of [his] broken hand.” (Id.)

After entering the elevator, defendant Page yelled “Quit resisting! Quit resisting!” though plaintiff was not resisting. (Id.) In response, defendants Van Gerwen, Dorstad, Schritter, Hurte, Jurkiewicz, and Mason rushed onto the elevator. (Id.) “[Defendant] Page used an extremely painful maneuver, lifting [plaintiff] on [his] tiptoes and shoving [him] hard into the corner of the elevator under the camera.” while the other defendants crushed plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff was in pain due to the fact that he was not wearing his hand cast as well as his face being “smashed into the wall” and his body being under the weight of the defendants. (Id.) Defendant Page then threatened plaintiff, telling him “you better not submit another fucking grievance or ADA form.” (Id.)

Following this incident, defendant Page returned plaintiff to his cell and, once there, removed the handcuffs from plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant Page then “used his full weight and violently pushed himself up and off of me, with all of that force intentionally crushing my broken hand.” (Id.)

Defendant Decker generated an incident report in connection with this incident. (Id. at 15.) This report “contained fabricated statements that were repeatedly used against me.. .to the point of [plaintiff] being legally charged for crimes misrepresented by [defendant Decker's] words.” (Id.) This included that plaintiff used the metal support in his cast to hit another inmate and that plaintiff kicked the inmate with his foot cast/boot. (Id. at 15-16.) Plaintiff eventually plead guilty to reduced charges for his involvement in the fight. (Id.)

On ...