Anderson v. Goeke

• Decision Date: 15 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-1813,94-1813
• Citation: 44 F.3d 675
• Parties: Lana L. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. Bryan GOEKE, Superintendent of Renz Correctional Institution, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 675

44 F.3d 675

Lana L. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. Bryan GOEKE, Superintendent of Renz Correctional Institution, Appellee.

No. 94-1813.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 17, 1994.

Decided Jan. 11, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 15, 1995.

Robert B. Ramsey, St. Louis, MO, argued, for appellant.

Frank A. Jung, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, argued (Michael Spillane, on the brief), for appellee.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Lana Anderson appeals the district court's ¹ denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Anderson was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for the contract killing of her husband, John Anderson. Anderson raises three issues on appeal: (1) the prosecutor denied her due process by introducing allegedly irrelevant, inflammatory and overly prejudicial evidence of bad character and uncharged crimes and commenting thereon; (2) her trial counsel violated her sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the admission of this alleged inflammatory and irrelevant evidence; and (3) the trial court denied her due process by refusing to allow expert testimony and a jury instruction on whether Anderson's actions constituted self-defense for purposes of the statutorily-defined Battered Spouse Syndrome defense. We affirm the denial of habeas relief.

II. BACKGROUND

Sometime between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on March 14, 1987, John Anderson was brutally murdered at his own home in Pettis County, Missouri. The evidence presented at Lana Anderson's trial indicated that co-defendants James Quick, Joe Corpier and Rick Miller had driven to the Andersons' home that morning and had shot John Anderson four times (once in the chest, and three times in the buttocks) with Anderson's own shotgun. At the time of the murder, Lana Anderson had entered the emergency room of a local hospital for treatment of an alleged illness. She returned at 4:30 a.m. to find her husband dead.

Lana Anderson was charged by information in the Circuit Court of Pettis County, Missouri, with first degree murder, in violation of Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 565.020 (Supp.1994). The information alleged that on or about March 14, 1987, Anderson, acting with others, caused the death of her husband, John Anderson, at their residence in Pettis County. Appellant's jury trial began on January 11, 1988 and lasted for five days.

At trial, Anderson did admit to having discussed with various people, including co-defendants James Quick, Elaine Schultz, Joe Corpier and Rick Miller, a plot to kill her husband. Additional evidence strongly suggested that she had offered these individuals compensation from either an expected inheritance or the proceeds from her husband's life insurance policy. The defendant also admitted having been involved sexually with at least one of the co-defendants, and to having given another co-defendant her husband's shotgun to commit the murder.

Anderson's trial defense, however, focused on establishing that she was never serious about killing her husband, and, alternatively, that even if she were serious, she had abandoned any such plans prior to March 14, 1987. According to Anderson, because she had attempted to contact several of the co-defendants in the hours immediately preceding the murder, had left the lights on in her house as a signal not to go through with the murder, and had left before the murder took place, she had clearly evidenced a desire not to go through with the plan. During cross-examination, however, Anderson's own testimony suggested that while she may have abandoned the original plan, she had only abandoned the part that most directly involved herself.

Initially, the planners conceived the murder as a robbery and rape gone awry. The culprits planned to slap around and beat Lana to protect her from suspicions that she had collaborated in the murder. However, in a statement given to the police and during her own testimony at trial, Anderson admitted that she feared being beaten, and did not want to participate in this part of the plan. Less than an hour before the murder, the defendant went to the emergency room at the local hospital, complaining of abdominal pains. The treating physician did not find anything medically wrong with her. An hour after the murder, the defendant returned home. Thus, Anderson's defense presented equivocal evidence of abandonment.

Anderson's second defense focused on contentions that her husband had physically and emotionally abused both her and her children, and on several occasions had threatened her life. Anderson offered testimony that she could no longer take the abuse and believed that to end this abuse required the death of her husband. Some witnesses testified that they had seen Anderson with a black eye and had observed her oldest son with rug burns. Additionally, a psychologist testified at trial that the defendant suffered from a form of post-traumatic stress disorder, known as Battered Spouse Syndrome. According to the psychologist, years of abuse had so grossly impaired Lana Anderson's mental functioning that she could no longer recognize the wrongfulness of her actions.

The State, however, painted a very different picture. Although the State accepted some of Anderson's contentions of physical abuse, they sought to characterize the defendant as a woman motivated by greed and lust. The State presented the testimony of several men with whom the defendant had had extramarital affairs, including James Quick--one of the three men directly implicated in the murder, and Bobby Thompson--with whom she had two of her children. The State also established that Mrs. Anderson stood to gain close to $100,000 in life insurance benefits from her husband's death, and that only weeks before the murder sought to purchase a new vehicle and a new home.

On January 15, 1988, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of murder in the first degree. On January 16, the jury recommended that Anderson be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial judge sentenced Anderson in accordance with the jury's recommendation.

Anderson thereafter filed an appeal concerning the conviction and sentence to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District of Missouri. In addition, Anderson filed an unsuccessful motion seeking post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15, which was denied by the Adair County Circuit Court. The Missouri Court of Appeals issued an opinion on the combined appeal from the conviction and denial of post-conviction relief, rejecting all of Anderson's claims. State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo.Ct.App.1990). Anderson's request for a rehearing and/or transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court was denied.

Having exhausted all of her state remedies, Anderson then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to Sec. 2254, with the United States District Court, Western District of Missouri. With the exception of some additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the petition restated Anderson's claims made in the state courts. Relying heavily on the Missouri Appellate Court's decision, the district court denied each of Anderson's claims for relief. Anderson v. Goeke, No. 91-0214-CV-W-1 (W.D.Mo. Jan. 25, 1994) (Order of District Court Judge). Anderson brings this appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct and Violation of Due Process

Anderson's first claim on appeal alleges nine instances of prosecutorial misconduct, stemming from references throughout the trial to Anderson's sexual conduct, including (1) sexual affairs with other men while she was still married to the victim; (2) a pair of panties owned by Anderson with a slit in the crotch; (3) her watching pornographic movies with a man with whom Anderson was having a sexual affair; (4) nude photographs of her taken by her husband; and (5) the uncharged statutory rape of a sixteen-year-old boy. Anderson argues that such evidence and references were irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and therefore improperly admitted, and its admission denied her due process. ² We reject this constitutional claim.

The claims raised here are exactly the same claims submitted earlier by the petitioner to the Missouri Court of Appeals. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d at 596. That court reviewed the trial record and concluded that no prosecutorial misconduct had occurred: While some of the statements "toe[d] the line [of relevancy], the prosecutor did not cross it." Id. at 598.

In reviewing the state court's order and the cases cited therein, the federal district court borrowed heavily from what it characterized as the "well-reasoned and well-supported opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals," and summarized that court's conclusions as follows:

Concerning the admission of evidence of Petitioner's extramarital affairs prior to the death of Petitioner's husband, such evidence would tend to establish motive because if the victim was dead, there would be no restraint on Petitioner's extramarital lovelife. State v. Kurtz, 564 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Mo. banc 1978); State v. Prewitt, 714 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo.Ct.App.1986). As to Petitioner's panties and her watching pornographic movies, "wide latitude is generally allowed in the development of evidence of motive." State v. Mallet[t], 732 S.W.2d 527, 535 (Mo. banc 1987) [, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933 [108 S.Ct. 309, 98 L.Ed.2d 267] (1987) ]; State v. Smith, 772 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Mo.Ct.App.1989). Regarding the repeated questioning about nude photographs taken by her husband, Petitioner herself raised the issue on direct and the trial court is given wide discretion to determine the permissible scope of cross-examination. State v. McClintic, 731 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). Finally, as to the statements...