Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp.
| Decision Date | 24 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98 Civ. 5174(LMS).,98 Civ. 5174(LMS). |
| Citation | 76 F.Supp.2d 422 |
| Parties | Joseph C. ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. HEDSTROM CORPORATION and Bradlees Stores, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Raymond J. Keegan, Raymond J. Keegan & Assoc., LLP, White Plains, NY, for plaintiff.
Michael J. Venditto, Kensington & Ressler, L.L.C., New York City, for defendants.
Plaintiff Joseph C. Anderson ("plaintiff" or "plaintiff Anderson") brings this action against defendants Hedstrom Corporation ("Hedstrom") and Bradlees Stores, Inc. ("Bradlees"), to recover for personal injuries he suffered when he fell from a trampoline that was manufactured by Hedstrom and sold by Bradlees. Plaintiff alleges causes of action against both defendants sounding in negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranties. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to conduct all proceedings in this case before me.
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, asking for dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against both defendants under all causes of action. Defendants argue that plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries he suffered, thereby precluding his causes of action; that he has failed to establish a triable issue as to either a failure to warn by the defendants, or a design defect in the trampoline; and that even if he did arguably establish a triable issue as to either a failure to warn or a design defect, neither of those alleged deficiencies proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety.
In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), "[a] motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgement for the moving party as a matter of law." Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.1995); see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 320-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for summary judgment "provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The Court's responsibility is to perform "the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." McNeil v. Aguilos, 831 F.Supp. 1079, 1082 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505). The moving party may rely on the evidence in the record to point out the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The responding party must set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by speculation or conjecture. See Pollis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 829 F.Supp. 584, 586 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (quoting Western World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir.1990)). Rather, the responding party must show the existence of a disputed material fact in light of the substantive law. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
"In evaluating whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, `[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed.'" Sim v. New York Mailers' Union Number 6, 166 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505), and "a court must resolve all ambiguities, and draw all reasonable inferences, against the moving party." McNeil, 831 F.Supp. at 1082 (). "Only when no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party should summary judgment be granted." Cruden v. Bank of New York, 957 F.2d 961, 975 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting H.L. Hayden Co. of New York, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1011 (2d Cir.1989)).
On or about May 20, 1998, plaintiff's father, Joseph E. Anderson (referred to herein as "Anderson, Sr.," to distinguish father from son), bought from the Bradlees store in Ramsey, New Jersey, a circular trampoline, thirteen feet in diameter, which was manufactured by Hedstrom. (Complaint at 2; Deposition of Joseph E. Anderson ("Anderson, Sr.Dep."), attached to Affirmation of David L. Lewittes ("Lewittes Aff."), Ex. 2 at 5-15.) Anderson, Sr brought the trampoline to his home in Rockland County, New York, (Complaint at 2, ¶ 6.) After reading the manual that came with the trampoline, Anderson, Sr. assembled the trampoline according to the instructions contained therein. (Anderson, Sr. Dep. at 17.) At one point plaintiff, who was twenty-four years old and who lived in his father's house, watched part of the assembly process briefly before leaving to go to work. (Id. at 32; Plaintiff's Dep. at 24). Plaintiff remembers putting some bolts together (Plaintiff's Dep. at 23), though his father only remembers plaintiff watching the process for a while. (Anderson, Sr. Dep. at 32.) Anderson, Sr. then let his three other children, ages 5, 8, and 14, and two or three other young neighborhood children use the trampoline. (Id. at 19-20, 23.) Before the first child got on the trampoline, Anderson, Sr. cautioned her not to do any somersaults (id. at 21), because "that was one of the things in the cautions that [it] said not to do." (Id. at 22.) The children stayed on the trampoline for fifteen or twenty minutes before getting off (id. at 23); during that time Anderson, Sr. stayed right next to the trampoline. (Id. at 27.) Then Anderson, Sr. told the children to get off the trampoline so he could go inside. (Id. at 28-29.) He told the children to stay off the trampoline while he was gone, and told them that no one was allowed to use it unless he or his wife was there. (Id. at 29.)
Shortly thereafter plaintiff returned home, and talked his father into going out with him to jump on the trampoline. (Id. at 34.) Plaintiff had never been on a trampoline before, with the possible exception of one time, which may or may not have been a dream, when he was less than five years old. (Deposition of [Plaintiff] Joseph C. Anderson ("Plaintiff's Dep."), attached to Lewittes Aff. Ex. 1 at 14; Affidavit of [Plaintiff] Joseph C. Anderson ("Plaintiff's Aff.") at 1.) Plaintiff had a vague memory that his parents had previously refused to get a trampoline for his sister because they thought it was dangerous (Plaintiff's Dep. at 19), but plaintiff's "notion about the dangers of the trampoline," according to his affidavit submitted with this motion, "was that they could be dangerous if you did somersaults or flips." (Plaintiff's Aff. at 4.) Plaintiff testified in his affidavit that when he decided to jump on the trampoline, he thought of it as a toy to be used by his younger brother and sisters. (Plaintiff's Aff. at 2.)
Anderson, Sr. jumped on the trampoline for about a minute and then got off. (Id. at 34-37.) After that, Anderson, Sr. recalls, plaintiff got on the trampoline, bounced a few times, and then got off by sitting down on the edge and reaching his feet to the ground. (Id. at 37-39). Plaintiff's father remembers staying next to the trampoline while plaintiff was on it. (Id. at 40.) There is some uncertainty in Anderson, Sr.'s mind as to whether plaintiff's first use of the trampoline actually occurred immediately after Anderson, Sr.'s own use of the trampoline — and therefore before neighbor Katherine Flagg ("Flagg") came over and jumped on it — or just after Flagg's first session on the trampoline; but Anderson, Sr.'s best recollection is that plaintiff used the trampoline before Flagg used it. (See Anderson, Sr. Dep. at 37-39). An acquaintance named Kevin Barrett, who came to the Anderson residence with Flagg, does recall seeing plaintiff on the trampoline as they approached the house (Deposition of Kevin Barrett ("Barrett Dep."), attached to Lewittes Aff., Ex. 4 at 11), but Barrett testified in his deposition that he believes that, as a result of a past bout of encephalitis, he may have a memory condition that affects his ability to remember fine detail. (Id. at 6-8.) Flagg did not see plaintiff jump on the trampoline before she got on. (Deposition of Katherine Flagg ("Flagg Dep"), attached to Lewittes, Aff., Ex. 3 at 9, 11, 15). As for plaintiff,1 he only remembers jumping on the trampoline once that evening, and does not remember seeing either his father or Flagg jumping on it. (Plaintiff Aff. at 2.)2
In any event, while plaintiff and his father were at the trampoline, Katherine Flagg, a woman in her thirties or forties, stopped by to talk. Flagg used the trampoline for a short time (between two and five minutes) and then got off, and plaintiff got on. (Anderson, Sr. Dep. at 37-38, 41-42; Flagg Dep. at 16-17.)
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