Anderson v. Hicks, Case No. 1:21-cv-220

• Decision Date: 16 April 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:21-cv-220
• Parties: MICHAEL LYNN ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. TIMOTHY G. HICKS et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

MICHAEL LYNN ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. TIMOTHY G. HICKS et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:21-cv-220

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

April 16, 2021

Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on grounds of immunity and failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. Factual allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Muskegon County Circuit Judges Timothy G. Hicks and William C. Marietti, as well as Muskegon County Clerk Nancy Waters.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to defame him, deny him access to the courts, and deprive him of his liberty by refusing to allow him to file additional pleadings in his case. He asserts that, on June 4, 2018, Defendants Hicks and Marietti produced a fraudulent memo, barring Plaintiff, as well as eight other individuals, from filing any further motions in their criminal cases. (Attach. to Compl., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.18.) The memo discussed Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(1), which permits felons from filing more than one motion for relief from judgment, absent limited circumstances that rarely apply, and mandates the return of improper successive motions without filing. (Id.) Defendants Hicks and Marietti concluded that the ban on further motions was appropriate because Plaintiff, like the other listed litigants, routinely attempted to avoid the rule by creatively, but improperly, naming their motions as something other than motions for relief from judgment.

Plaintiff attempted to file a motion for writ of habeas corpus, to challenge his conviction and detention. Acting in accordance with the memo, Defendant Waters apparently returned the motion to Plaintiff without filing.

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants defamed him and assaulted his character, denied him due process, violated their oaths of office, denied him access to the courts, and worked to conceal his ostensibly illegal restraint. Plaintiff also seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages.

II. Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails "'to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Whilea complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

III. Judicial immunity

Plaintiff sues Muskegon County Circuit Judges Hicks and Marietti, contending that, by placing a restriction on Plaintiff's filing of additional challenges to his conviction, they have deprived him of due process and access to the courts and have defamed him and violated their oaths of office.

Generally, a judge is absolutely immune from a suit for monetary damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) ("[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.") (internal quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial immunity may be overcome in only two instances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (noting that immunity is grounded in "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it"). Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 12.

Plaintiff's allegations clearly fail to implicate either of the exceptions to judicial immunity. There is no doubt that Defendants Hicks and Marietti were acting within their jurisdiction to evaluate Plaintiff's multiple collateral attacks on his judgment and to determine that no further challenges to the conviction would be permitted. Accordingly, Judges Hicks and Marietti are absolutely immune from damages, and Plaintiff therefore is not entitled to damages against them. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

Similarly, Defendant County Clerk Waters is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for carrying out the judges' directive. Absolute judicial immunity is extended to non-judicial officers who perform "quasi-judicial" duties. "Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune." Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 1994) (probate court administrator entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for his role in carrying out the orders of the court) (citing Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 1997) (one who acts as a judge's designee in carrying out a function for which the judge is immune is also protected from suit seeking monetary damages); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988) (clerk of court was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for issuing a warrant as directed by the court); accord Carlton v. Baird, No. 03-1294, 2003 WL 21920023, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 2003) (state court clerk's office employees were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from state prison inmate's § 1983 claim); Lyle v. Jackson, No. 02-1323, 2002 WL 31085181, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2002) (quasi-judicial immunity applied to claims against state court clerks who allegedly failed to provide prisoner with requested copies of previous filings and transcripts); Bradley v. United States, 84 F. App'x 492 (6th Cir. 2003) (federal court clerk). Cf. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 437 & n.11 (1993) (court reporter not entitled to absolute immunity for preparing transcripts because that function is ministerial; it does not exercise the kind of judgment protected by judicial immunity). Defendant Waters was clearly performing a quasi-judicial function and is entitled to immunity. Plaintiff therefore may not maintain an action against her for monetary damages.

In addition to damages, however, Plaintiff also seeks prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. Injunctive relief is not available under § 1983, because, under the 1996amendments to that statute, injunctive relief "shall not be granted" in an action against "a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Consequently, his claim for injunctive relief is barred. Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief. A request for declaratory relief, by itself, does not present a justiciable controversy. Where there is no claimed continuing violation of...