Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp.
| Decision Date | 03 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. SC15–124.,SC15–124. |
| Citation | Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 202 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 2016) |
| Parties | Troy ANDERSON, Petitioner, v. HILTON HOTELS CORPORATION, etc., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Barbara A. Eagan of Eagan Appellate Law, PLLC, Orlando, FL; Thomas D. Hall and John S. Mills of The Mills Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, FL; W. Riley Allen of Riley Allen Law; Simon L. Wiseman of The Wiseman Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, FL; and Margaret E. Kozan of Margaret E. Kozan, P.A., Winter Park, FL, for Petitioner.
Pamela A. Chamberlin of Mitrani, Rynor, Adamsky & Toland, P.A., Miami Beach; and Michael R. D'Lugo of Wicker, Smith, O'Hara, McCoy & Ford, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Respondent.
PetitionerTroy Anderson seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Anderson,153 So.3d 412(Fla. 5th DCA2014), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal on a question of law.We have jurisdiction.Seeart. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
On September 26, 2008, Anderson was the victim of an armed robbery, carjacking, and shooting that occurred in the parking lot of an Embassy Suites hotel in Orlando.Anderson filed an action against RespondentsHilton Hotels Corporation(Hilton), W2007 Equity Inns Realty, LLC(W2007), Interstate Management Company, LLC(Interstate), and SecurAmerica, LLC for negligence.Hilton was the parent company of the Embassy Suites franchise; W2007, an investment fund, owned the Embassy Suites hotel where Anderson was attacked; Interstate was the management company that oversaw daily operations of the hotel and hired SecurAmerica to provide security services for the hotel.Anderson's wife, Paula Anderson, also sought damages from the Respondents for loss of consortium.
In October 2011, Anderson proposed separate offers of settlement to Hilton, W2007, and Interstate.He made a separate offer to SecurAmerica in March 2012.Anderson offered to settle his claims with Hilton for $650,000, W2007 for $100,000, Interstate for $650,000, and SecurAmerica for $300,000.The offer made to Hilton, in its entirety, stated:
Other than the specifically designated Respondent and the specific amount proposed, the offers to Hilton, W2007, Interstate, and SecurAmerica were identical.
Additionally, in October 2011, Paula Anderson made separate offers to each of the Respondents to settle her loss of consortium claim.Her offers were $15,000 from Hilton, $15,000 from W2007, $25,000 from Interstate, and $25,000 from SecurAmerica.Her offers were identical to those of Anderson, other than the name of the specifically identified Plaintiff, the specifically identified Respondent, and the specific amount proposed.Prior to trial, however, Paula voluntarily dismissed her cause of action without prejudice, and Anderson proceeded against each of the respective Respondents alone.
Following one mistrial, the parties commenced a second trial in October 2012.Attorneys from a single legal firm represented Hilton, W2007, and Interstate, while attorneys from a separate firm represented SecurAmerica.Throughout both trials, for ease of reference, Hilton, W2007, and Interstate were collectively referred to as “Embassy Suites.”For example, following jury selection, the jury was informed that the defendants were “Embassy Suites” and SecurAmerica, despite the fact that “Embassy Suites” was not specifically named as a party in Anderson's amended complaint upon which the parties proceeded to trial.At one point during trial, the jury even submitted a question to the court, asking, “What is Interstate?”The parties submitted testimony from witnesses who explained the relationships between Hilton, W2007, Interstate, and SecurAmerica.
Near the close of the trial, when discussing jury instructions and closing statements, an attorney from the single firm representing Hilton, W2007, and Interstate stated: “[W]e believe it would be appropriate, and certainly less cumbersome throughout the instructions to simply talk about our client as Embassy Suites, rather than the larger definition that they use, or reference they use throughout their instructions,” referring to the three defendants as one and the same.Anderson's attorneys agreed to use that term.Anderson's attorney also proposed instructions pertaining to agency or vicarious liability, but counsel for Hilton, W2007, and Interstate objected to that instruction: Anderson's counsel agreed collectively to refer to those defendants as “Embassy Suites” without further instructing the jury on agency or vicarious liability.The court read the jury the following instruction:
Members of the jury, you can assume, for purposes of your deliberation, that Interstate Hotel and Resorts, Inc., Hilton Hotels Corporation, and W2007 Equity Inns Realty, LLC, are considered one and the same.These defendants will be referred to in the jury instructions and verdict form as Embassy Suites.
The jury found “Embassy Suites” and SecurAmerica to be negligent for Anderson's injuries and that Anderson was not comparatively negligent.The jury further found that “Embassy Suites” was 72% negligent, and SecurAmerica was 28% negligent.Ultimately, the jury found that Anderson sustained a total of $1,702,066 in damages.The trial court entered judgment in favor of Anderson and against Hilton, W2007, and Interstate “collectively hereinafter referred to as EMBASSY SUITES pursuant to the Verdict form agreed to by Plaintiff and all Defendants” in the amount of $1,225,487.52, and against SecurAmerica in the amount of $476,578.48.
Anderson then sought attorneys' fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, andFlorida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.The trial court denied Anderson's motion, finding that Anderson failed to request a verdict assigning separate findings of fault among Hilton, W2007, and Interstate.Respondents appealed the award of damages to Anderson, and Anderson separately appealed the trial court's denial of attorneys' fees.Hilton Hotels,153 So.3d at 414.The Fifth District consolidated the appeals and affirmed the decisions of the trial court; however, the district court's opinion only addressed Anderson's appeal of the denial of attorneys' fees.Id.Anderson argued that he was entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to section 768.79andRule 1.442 because his offers of settlement satisfied the requirements of the statute and rule.Id. at 415–16.However, both the trial court and the district court disagreed, concluding that the term “PLAINTIFF” in Anderson's offer could reasonably be interpreted to include both Anderson and his wife, Paula.
The Fifth District relied on its earlier decision, Hibbard ex rel. Carr v. McGraw,918 So.2d 967(Fla. 5th DCA2005), for support.Hilton Hotels,153 So.3d at 416.In Hibbard,Amanda Carr was a minor who was involved in an automobile accident with Michael McGraw.Hilton,153 So.3d at 416.Carr's mother, Faith Hibbard, sued McGraw and his employer, Dual Incorporated, on Carr's behalf.Id.The defendants jointly offered a proposal of settlement in favor of Carr to settle “all claims against Defendants, MICHAEL MCGRAW and DUAL INCORPORATED.”Id.(citingHibbard,918 So.2d at 969 ).The Fifth District ultimately determined that this proposal was ambiguous because it could have been reasonably construed to settle either Carr's claim separately or the claims of both Carr and Hibbard.Id.(citingHibbard,918 So.2d at 971–72 ).Likewise, the Fifth District below determined that Anderson's proposal lacked sufficient clarity regarding whether it settled only Anderson's claim or both Anderson's and Paula's claims.Id.
Finally, the district court cursorily agreed with the trial court that Anderson's separate proposals were unenforceable for the purpose of obtaining attorneys' fees:
Because Anderson requested to have these three entities treated as one by the jury, and given that the judgment obtained against the “Embassy Suites”defendants was actually less than the sum of the demands for judgment made against them, the purpose behind the enactment of section 768.79(...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial
-
Ruiz v. Policlinica Metropolitana, C.A.
...v. Certified Lower Keys Plumbing, Inc., 208 So.3d 718, 720 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (citations omitted); see also Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 202 So.3d 846, 852 (Fla. 2016) ; Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co., 202 So.3d 391, 394 (Fla. 2016) (citation omitted).3 IV. ANALYSISThe issue before us ......
-
Allen v. Nunez
...a nearly identical settlement proposal was ambiguous and therefore unenforceable on the matter of attorney's fees. Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp. , 202 So.3d 846 (Fla. 2016). Anderson involved an armed robbery, carjacking, and shooting that occurred in the parking lot of an Embassy Suites ......
-
Nunez v. Allen
...entitlement to attorney's fees "cannot be tolerated under a strict construction of section 768.79." See Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp. , 202 So. 3d 846, 858 (Fla. 2016) ; accord Cassedy v. Wood , 263 So. 3d 300, 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). IS APPELLEE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES F......
-
Diecidue v. Lewis
...ambiguities" and has discouraged courts from nitpicking a proposal for inconsequential ambiguities. Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp. , 202 So.3d 846, 852–53 (Fla. 2016). That said, because section 768.79 and rule 1.442 are in derogation of common law, they demand strict construction and comp......
-
Chapter § 4.04 LIABILITY OF HOTELS AND RESORTS FOR COMMON TRAVEL PROBLEMS
...compartment; hotel liability limiting statute pertaining to loss of other property applied). Florida: Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 202 So. 3d 846 (Fla. Sup. 2016) (criminal attack on guest in hotel parking lot; jury verdict for victim against hotel); Hardy v. Pier 99 Motor Inn, 664 So. ......