Anderson v. Housing Authority of Atlanta

Decision Date12 July 1984
Docket NumberNo. 67926,67926
Citation321 S.E.2d 378,171 Ga.App. 841
PartiesANDERSON v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ATLANTA et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Jerry B. Hatcher, Atlanta, for appellant.

Bernard Parks, Atlanta, for appellees.

McMURRAY, Chief Judge.

This case involves slander or defamation in imputing to another a crime punishable by law.

On January 22, 1981, Horace D. Anderson and E. Van Geter were employed in supervisory capacities in the central maintenance facilities of the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, Georgia, and in said capacity Anderson supervised the motor vehicle services operation. His immediate supervisor was E. Van Geter. Samuel A. Hider was the acting director of the housing authority. After being advised by several employees that gasoline was being stolen from the service pumps of the authority Hider, as the acting executive director, initiated an investigation of the reported gasoline thefts by and through its in-house security agent, a sworn police officer of the City of Atlanta assigned to the authority. From this report Hider learned that Anderson was alleged to have placed into his private automobile approximately 15-20 gallons of gasoline a week during the year 1980. Anderson and his supervisor Van Geter were suspended for violation of a rule or policy concerning the use of the housing authority gasoline at the central maintenance facility. One of Hider's duties was to speak with the press, and he did so from time to time. He spoke to a reporter for the Atlanta Journal with reference to the supervisors (Anderson and Van Geter) being put on suspension.

On the date in question (January 22, 1981) an article was published in the Atlanta Journal with reference to these two department personnel being placed on indefinite suspension "following the theft of gasoline from Atlanta Housing Authority service pumps" as advised to the reporter by the acting executive director Hider that the supervisors were suspended after a two-week investigation by the housing authority's security staff. The article also stated that the investigation began after several employees in the maintenance office had alerted the management of the authority. The article expressly stated that according to Hider "the men did fill their personal vehicles with gas from the service pumps. A check of invoices [for a considerable length of time] indicate the men may have removed an average of 60 gallons of gas a month from the AHA's [authority's] pumps." Prior to the suspension Hider had met with the two supervisors who freely admitted to the use of gasoline in their personal vehicles when the vehicles were used on the job, the reason for the use of the gasoline being for reimbursement. There was a supervisor's directive not to submit mileage vouchers but to use gasoline as reimbursement for the use of a personal vehicle on the job.

Van Geter brought an action for defamation, and in Van Geter v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 167 Ga.App. 432, 306 S.E.2d 707, we affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff resulting from a jury verdict for $100,000. In Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Geter, 252 Ga. 196, 312 S.E.2d 309, the Supreme Court affirmed in its consideration of procedural grounds only but not upon the merits. Thus, in the case sub judice we are controlled only as to the rulings made in Van Geter v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 167 Ga.App. 432, 306 S.E.2d 707, supra, as a result of a trial involving the identical facts.

Anderson filed a similar defamation or slander action under OCGA § 51-5-4 (formerly Code § 105-702) against The Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta and Samuel A. Hider seeking vindictive damages under OCGA § 51-12-6 (formerly Code § 105-2003).

Both the defendants jointly answered admitting only jurisdiction and Hider's status as employee of the housing authority but denied that he made the statement to the reporter accusing the defendants of theft or that such statements were made to the reporter for the purpose of improving the public image of The Housing Authority of Atlanta and Hider, or that said statements were made with the approval and knowledge of the housing authority with malice, knowledge of the falsity of the statements and in reckless disregard of whether they were true or false on the facts available to defendant Hider.

The case proceeded to trial based solely on the publication of the above article and based on the vindictive damages statute (OCGA § 51-12-6). At the conclusion of plaintiff's presentation of his case the defendants moved for and the court granted a directed verdict because no evidence was offered that the authority as a public body corporate and politic as contemplated by the terms of OCGA § 8-3-30 had through its board of commissioners either authorized, approved or ratified the alleged slanderous statements, and as to defendant Hider because no evidence was offered from which the jury could conclude that the alleged statements were made with actual malice. Plaintiff appeals. Held :

1. In order to recover against the defendants it was necessary that plaintiff prove the slanderous statement was made in violation of OCGA § 51-5-4. Plaintiff's evidence shows that the statement was made to the newspaper reporter, that is, that the plaintiff had been placed on indefinite suspension "following the theft of gasoline" from the gas pumps, i.e., suspended for "theft of gasoline."

We next proceed to the issue of whether the plaintiff submitted sufficient testimony to show that the statement was made with malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. See OCGA § 51-5-7; Goolsby v. Wilson, 146 Ga.App. 288, 289(2), 246 S.E.2d 371...

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7 cases
  • Farrior v. H.J. Russell & Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • April 19, 1999
    ...201 Ga.App. 41, 42, 410 S.E.2d 160 (1991); Chambers v. Gap Stores, 180 Ga.App. 233, 348 S.E.2d 592 (1986); Anderson v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 171 Ga.App. 841, 321 S.E.2d 378 (1984). There is no evidence in the record that the Defendant affirmatively authorized or directed Ms. Baker to sl......
  • Davis v. Copelan
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 5, 1994
    ...evidence as to whether there was malice by reckless disregard and exaggeration of the truth. Anderson v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 171 Ga.App. 841, 842(1), 843, 321 S.E.2d 378. In this regard, we find no definitive evidence that plaintiffs Floyd and Getter were actually involved in illegal ......
  • Stringfield v. Iap World Serv. Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
    • March 28, 2011
    ...‘no such presumption exists in favor of any other official.’ ” (quoted source omitted)). For example, in Anderson v. Hous. Auth. of Atlanta, 171 Ga.App. 841, 841, 321 S.E.2d 378 (1984), an employee of the central maintenance facilities of the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta accused......
  • Dougherty v. Harvey
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • July 31, 2018
    ...ego theory does not require that the company authorize or direct the statement. Defendants' citation of Anderson v. Housing Authority of Atlanta , 171 Ga.App. 841, 321 S.E.2d 378 (1984), does not require a different result.In Anderson , the Georgia Court of Appeals did not analyze whether t......
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