Anderson v. Hubble

• Decision Date: 05 January 1884
• Docket Number: 10,860
• Citation: 93 Ind. 570
• Parties: Anderson et al. v. Hubble
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

93 Ind. 570

Anderson et al. v. Hubble

No. 10,860

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 5, 1884

Petition for a Rehearing Overruled March 5, 1884.

From the Elkhart Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

J. H Baker and J. A. S. Mitchell, for appellants.

J. D Ferrall, R. M. Johnson and E. G. Herr, for appellee.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

It is alleged in the first paragraph of the appellee's complaint, that the appellant, without right, increased the height of a dam across the Elkhart river, and thereby flooded her land. In the second paragraph a like allegation is made, and it is also charged that the land of the appellee was rendered useless, and that the stagnant water caused an injury to the public health and comfort. It is not necessary to give a more extended synopsis of the complaint as no question is made upon it.

We think the third paragraph of the answer did not set forth any facts not admissible under other paragraphs of the answer which were left standing, and, consequently, that there was no available error in sustaining the demurrer.

The fifth paragraph of the answer of the appellant Scott is, omitting the formal parts, as follows: "That said plaintiff had full knowledge of the height of said dam and of the manner and extent to which the said dam set the water back on her land; that in the year 1879, the defendant, desiring to purchase said mill, made inquiries concerning the dam and the right of the then owners to maintain said dam at the height at which it was then erected, which was the same height which said dam now is; that this defendant was a stranger in the locality of said mill and resided in the State of Michigan, which plaintiff well knew; that defendant was ignorant concerning the rights of the then owners of said mill and was seeking for information upon which to act in the purchase of said mill, as the plaintiff well knew; that he was informed before he purchased, that the said dam as then constructed was at the same height at which it has stood for more than twenty years, and that the owners of the mill had the lawful right against the plaintiff and all others, to maintain said dam at its then height; that plaintiff knew that he was about to purchase said mill and dam and knew that he was inquiring concerning the right of the owners to maintain the dam at the height it then was, and knew that he had been informed that the dam was at the height at which the then owners had the lawful right to maintain it, and no more, and knew that the defendant was ignorant of the truth in the matter of the height of the dam, and that he was inquiring for the purpose of purchasing and was about to purchase, relying on the information above set out, which he had received concerning the rights of the owners of the mill to maintain said dam at its then height, and yet she stood by well knowing of said facts, and permitted the defendant to purchase said mill for the sum of $ 8,000, without in any manner disclosing to the defendant that said dam raised the water on her land to any greater height than the old dam did."

If this answer pleads facts constituting an estoppel there must be a reversal.

The term "standing by," so often used in the books and reports in discussing cases of estoppel, does not mean actual presence or actual participation in the transaction, but it means silence where there is knowledge and a duty to make a disclosure. In Gatling v. Rodman, 6 Ind. 289, it was held that the phrase "standing by" does not import an actual presence, but implies knowledge under such circumstances as renders it the duty of the possessor to communicate it. The cases of State v. Holloway, 8 Blackf. 45, Ellis v. Diddy, 1 Ind. 561, Catherwood v. Watson, 65 Ind. 576, and other cases, approve this definition. In Richardson v. Chickering, 41 N.H. 380, the definition is accepted as the correct one, and the doctrine of Gatling v. Rodman, supra, expressly approved.

Knowledge is essential on the part of the person sought to be estopped. Where a party is ignorant of his rights, and is free from actual fraud or culpable negligence, silence will not estop him, although he may have knowledge of what another is about to do. Robbins v. Magee, 76 Ind. 381; Lash v. Rendell, 72 Ind. 475; Hudson v. Densmore, 68 Ind. 391; Stewart v. Hartman, 46 Ind. 331; Greensburgh, etc., T. P. Co. v. Sidener, 40 Ind. 424; Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458.

If the person about to act has knowledge, then there can be no estoppel in pais. Robbins v. Magee, supra; Cole v. Lafontaine, 84 Ind. 446.

In the answer before us there is shown knowledge on the one part and ignorance on the other, and in these particulars the pleading is undoubtedly good. It is not proper to plead evidence, and in the particular named the answer could not well have been more specific without violating this rule of pleading.

Although the appellant may have been ignorant and the appellee fully informed, still, if she was under no duty to disclose her rights, then there is no estoppel. The question, therefore, which next presents itself, is whether there rested on the appellee a duty to make known her rights.

The right to maintain a dam at a given height is an incorporeal hereditament, and may, and usually does, form a very material part of the value of mill property. Scheible v. Slagle, 89 Ind. 323. The appellee knew, in legal contemplation at least, that the easement of flooding lands lying on the stream above the dam depended for its extent upon the height of the dam, and that this easement formed an important and valuable part of the property. This being true, it follows that the appellee knew that the appellant was about to buy property, the value of which depended in a great measure upon the right to enjoy the easement of flooding her lands.

Knowing all the facts, as the plea avers she did, the appellee was, as against the appellant, who was ignorant that the rights of the mill-owners were other than the appearance of the dam indicated, bound to know how far her own legal rights were affected, and she can not be heard to aver ignorance on this point. One who has full and complete knowledge of all the facts, can not, as against an innocent third person, afterwards assert that he was ignorant of the extent of the legal rights which arose out of the facts. Where there is full knowledge of the facts, a person who acts in good faith on the facts, as they are known, can not be deprived of his rights upon the ground that there was ignorance of the full extent of those legal rights. It is knowledge of the facts that controls in such cases, for, where there is full and complete knowledge of the facts on the one side, and honesty and lack of knowledge on the other, there may be an estoppel, although one of the parties may have misconceived his legal rights. Barnes v. McKay, 7 Ind. 301.

We have shown that the right to maintain the dam at a given height was a valuable property right, and that where there is full knowledge of all the facts there may be an estoppel, although there may be a mistake as to the law, and we inquire whether the appellee had, under the facts pleaded, a right "in equity and good conscience" to be silent. In the American notes to the Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith Lead. Cas. (7 Am. ed.) 737, it is said: "It has, in like manner, been long and well established in equity, and is now held in most courts of law, that every one who encourages, or stands by and sanctions the acquisition of land by another, will not only be estopped from invalidating the interest thus acquired, by the subsequent assertion of any title which he held with full knowledge at the time, but may be compelled to execute a conveyance to the purchaser." In our own case of Fletcher v. Holmes, supra, the rule is more broadly stated, but not more broadly than the authorities warrant. The language of the court in that case was this: "A mere failure to give notice of a right, where another, without knowledge of the facts, is investing his money, and where it may be fairly concluded that he would not do so if informed of the facts, will generally preclude a subsequent setting up of the claim thus concealed." The opinion in Junction R. R. Co. v. Harpold, 19 Ind. 347, quotes with approval the following: "If a man, having title to an estate, which is offered for sale, * stands by and encourages the sale, or does not forbid it, and thereby another person is induced to purchase the estate, under the supposition that the title is good, the former, so standing by, and being silent, shall be bound by the sale; and neither he, nor his privies, shall be allowed to dispute the purchase." 1 Story Eq., sec. 185. It was said in Gregg v. Von Phul, 68 U.S. 274, 1 Wall. 274, 17 L.Ed. 536, that "No one is permitted to keep silent when he should speak, and thereby mislead another to his injury. If one has a claim against an estate and does not disclose it, but stands by and suffers the estate to be sold and improved, with knowledge that the title has been mistaken, he will not be allowed afterwards to assert his claim against the purchaser." There are many cases sustaining this general doctrine, among them: Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U.S. 716, 24 L.Ed. 743; Breeding v. Stamper, 57 Ky. 175, 18 B. Mon. 175; Hill v. Epley, 31 Pa. 331; Thompson v. Sanborn, 11 N.H. 201; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. 344; Parkhurst v. Van Cortland, 14 Johns. 15; Buckingham v. Smith, 10 Ohio 288; Gregg v. Wells, 10 Ad. & El. 90. In the case last cited it was said: "A party who negligently or culpably stands by and allows another to contract on the faith and understanding of a fact which he can contradict, can not afterwards dispute that fact in an action against the person whom he has himself assisted in deceiving." We...