Anderson v. Huss
| Decision Date | 22 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-123 |
| Parties | JERRY ANDERSON II et al., Plaintiffs, v. ERICA HUSS et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
This is a civil rights action brought by two state prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiffs' pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiffs' allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Washington, Whitmer, Russell, and the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). The Court will also dismiss Plaintiff Anderson's First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendant Huss. Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims against Defendant Huss remain.
Plaintiff Jerry Anderson is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Macomb Correctional Facility (MRF) in New Haven, Macomb County, Michigan. Plaintiff LaDontae McKinley is presently incarcerated at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County Michigan. The events of which Plaintiffs complain took place at MBP. Plaintiffs sue MBP Warden Erica Huss, MDOC Director Heidi Washington, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer, MDOC Grievance Manager Richard Russell, and the MDOC.
Plaintiff Anderson alleges that Defendant Huss was deliberately indifferent to his health and safety when she refused to separate him from COVID-19-positive prisoners during September and October of 2020. Anderson filed a grievance against Defendant Huss. MBP Assistant Deputy Warden Clouse rejected the grievance. Defendant Huss upheld the rejection on November 6, 2020, and Defendant Russell upheld the decisions of Huss and Clouse on March 8, 2021.
Plaintiff Anderson grieved Defendant Huss again during December of 2020, claiming that she should not have participated in rejecting a grievance filed against her. MBP Grievance Coordinator Glenn Caron rejected the grievance. Defendant Huss upheld the grievance rejection. Just a few days later Anderson contends that Huss retaliated against him for filing the grievance by placing more COVID-19 positive prisoners into his cell block.
Plaintiff Anderson further claims that Defendant Huss disregarded the mandates of Defendant Washington to maintain social distancing among prisoners and to maintain separation between four categories of prisoners: positive prisoners, close contacts of positive prisoners, prisoners under investigation for COVID-19 infection, and negative prisoners. Anderson reports that Huss told him that (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.)
Plaintiff Anderson claims that Defendant Washington failed to enforce the mandates regarding social distancing and separation and failed to supervise Defendant Huss. Anderson claims that the MDOC failed to protect him because its prisons do not allow for social distancing and they are too crowded. Anderson claims that Defendant Whitmer is responsible for the actions of Defendants Russell, Huss, Washington, and the MDOC.
Plaintiff LaDontae McKinley reports that his “story is almost identical and runs in stride with Anderson's.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) McKinley adds that the cell block windows were routinely left open so that the wind would circulate the airborne virus. McKinley also notes that, as a food porter, he was forced to come “face to face with the contagious prisoners 6 (six) times a day . . . .” (Id.)
Plaintiffs seek release to home confinement. They also ask the Court to enter an injunction compelling Defendants to separate the four different prisoner classes-positive, negative, close contacts, and prisoners under investigation. Finally, Plaintiffs ask for hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) ().
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to their health and safety which implicates Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff Anderson also alleges that Defendant Huss retaliated against him for filing his second grievance. Such a claim implicates Plaintiff Anderson's rights under the First Amendment.[1]
Plaintiffs may not maintain a § 1983 action against the MDOC. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O'Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013); Diaz v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 Fed.Appx. 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010).
In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771.
Therefore, for both reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' complaint against the MDOC.
Plaintiff Anderson's retaliation claim against Defendant Huss similarly fails.
Retaliation based upon a prisoner's exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
Anderson alleges that he engaged in protected conduct when he filed administrative grievances. The filing of a nonfrivolous prison grievance is constitutionally protected conduct for...
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