ANDERSON v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.

Decision Date04 April 2011
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 10-153
PartiesEUGENE ANDERSON, et al. v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

EUGENE ANDERSON, et al.
v.
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY

CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-153

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Dated: April 4, 2011


ORDER AND REASONS

SECTION "N" (1)

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company ("IC"). (Rec. Doc. 29). This motion is opposed by Plaintiffs Shannon and Eugene ("Gene") Anderson and their minor son, "JA". (See Rec. Doc. 52). The Court heard oral argument on this motion on Wednesday, March 23, 2011. While the Minute Entry from this argument reflects that the motion was ordered submitted (see Rec. Doc. 63), the Court actually partially granted summary judgment on the argument of "attractive nuisance", finding that doctrine inapplicable to the facts of this case.1 (See Transcript, pp. 40-41). The remaining arguments made in the motion

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will be addressed herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. and Mrs. Anderson, JA (who had just turned 10 years old at the time of the injury that it the subject of this lawsuit), and JA's two sisters live in a neighborhood located on the south side of the railroad tracks near IC's Harahan, Louisiana switching yard (hereinafter "Mays Yard"). Behind the Andersons' house is a large, concrete-lined drainage canal (see Exhibit A to Rec. Doc. 29) bordered on the west side by a fenced servitude area. That grassy right-of-way and drainage

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canal runs perpendicular to IC's east-west right-of-way and tracks about 2000 feet west of the entrance to Mays Yard. At the point where the canal and servitude area abut the southern boundary of IC's railroad right-of-way, a chain link fence has been erected across the entire width of the grassy right-of-way. (Exhibit B to Rec. Doc. 29). The chain link fence does not span the width of the drainage canal itself. (Exhibit C to Rec. Doc. 29).

On January 26, 2009, JA and 2 other boys (all minors) accessed the grassy right-of-way area by squeezing through a gap between an entirely separate chain link fence located at the end of Stephen Street and an adjacent wooden fence running along the property line of a residence located on that corner. (Exhibit C to Rec. Doc. 29; Exhibit D to Rec. Doc. 29, p. 22). Once through that fence and onto the servitude property, the 3 boys then walked until they encountered the other chain link fence that spans the width of the right-of-way area near the IC right-of-way. The boys gained access to IC's right-of-way by walking on the top of the concrete side of the drainage canal and around that chain link fence. (Exhibit D to Rec. Doc. 29, p. 26). Once on the tracks, the boys began looking for "black, shiny rocks" for approximately 45 minutes. (Id. at p. 27). (The boys, who had just recently been to the "train tracks" and had found shiny rocks, decided to go back to the train tracks to look for more shiny rocks. (Exhibit A to Rec. Doc. 52, pp. 21-22)).

In his deposition, JA admitted that he did not inform his parents that he was going to the railroad tracks to look for rocks because he knew his parents "would have never let [him] go." (Exhibit D to Rec. Doc. 29, p. 27). He admitted that although his parents never explicitly told him not to play by the railroad tracks, he knew that doing so was dangerous and not a "good thing for [him] to be doing." (Id. at pp. 27-28). He admitted that he knew trying to climb on a train was both

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"dangerous" and "stupid". (Id. at p. 47).

According to JA, at approximately 5:00 p.m., he was walking along side a stationary IC train when the train began to abruptly move, making a loud "kaboom" noise and startling him. (Id. at p. 47). As he attempted to jump away from the train, he claims that he slipped on the rocks alongside the railroad track. His foot became caught underneath the adjacent railcar and atop the rail beneath the wheel of that freight car, causing injuries to his 4th and 5th toes on his right foot. Id.

On the day of the alleged accident, IC train R98971-26, en route from Destrehan to Mays Yard, was being operated by locomotive engineer J.C. Toben ("Toben") and conductor Shawn McRea ("McRea"). (Exhibit E to Rec. Doc. 29, pp. 17-18). According to the crewmembers, at approximately 5:00 p.m., as the inbound train was pulling into Mays Yard traveling approximately 10 miles per hour, the crew stopped the lead locomotive at the yard crossing to allow McRea to dismount the locomotive and to line the #6 switch to allow the train to be brought completely within the yard on the #6 track. (Exhibit E to Rec. Doc. 29, pp. 26-28, 30; Exhibit F to Rec. Doc. 29, pp. 13-16). The crew then completely yarded the train, dismounted and proceeded inside the Yard office to complete paperwork. At that time, the crew members were told by the yardmaster on duty that an incident involving a pedestrian had occurred. (Exhibit E to Rec. Doc. 29, pp. 65-69). It was only then that the IC crewmembers became aware of the incident. Neither of IC's crewmembers observed children playing on or around the tracks as they approached Mays Yard on the afternoon of January 26, 2009. (Exhibit E to Rec. Doc. 29, p. 66; Exhibit F to Rec. Doc. 29, pp. 29-30). Notably, JA was injured on the train tracks leading to Mays Yard, not in Mays Yard itself.

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IC asserts in the instant motion that it owed no duty to protect JA from the harm that he encountered in knowingly and illegally trespassing upon the train tracks.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The materiality of facts is determined by the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its summary judgment burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Lavespere v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.1990). Once the moving party carries its burden pursuant to Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2553; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

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Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Auguster v. Vermillion Parish School Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir.2001).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir.2002), and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, L.L.C., 277 F.3d 757, 764 (2001). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). The Court will not, "in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." See id. (emphasis in original) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)).

Although the Court is to consider the full record in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56 does not obligate it to search for evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment. Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir.2003) ("When evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court."). Thus, the nonmoving party should "identify specific evidence in the record, and articulate" precisely how that evidence supports his claims. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994).

The nonmovant's burden of demonstrating a genuine issue is not satisfied merely by creating "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," "by conclusory allegations," by "unsubstantiated

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assertions," or "by only a scintilla of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Rather a factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment only if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir.2002).

B. Discussion and Analysis

The pivotal issue in this case boils down to whether IC owed a duty to Plaintiffs in this particular instance to prevent the harm that befell JA. First, this Court disagrees with Plaintiffs that this is a case to be analyzed under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317.1 (liability of a premises owner for injuries caused by a vice, defect, or ruin). This is not a case where a vice, defect or ruin in or on IC's property caused the injury. The injury occurred as the train was proceeding as only it could -on the tracks themselves. There has been no allegation that the train or train tracks contained any vice or defect. Instead, this case presents general negligence claims against the IC...

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