Anderson v. J.A. Piper Roofing Co.

• Decision Date: 29 December 2022
• Docket Number: 6:21-cv-02901-DCC-JDA
• Parties: Rufus J. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. J.A. Piper Roofing Co. Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

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Rufus J. Anderson, Plaintiff, v. J.A. Piper Roofing Co. Defendant.

No. 6:21-cv-02901-DCC-JDA

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Greenville Division

December 29, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant. [Doc. 24.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in this employment discrimination case were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration.

Plaintiff proceeding pro se, brings this civil action alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). [Doc. 1 at 3.] Specifically Plaintiff alleges race discrimination based on termination failure to promote and retaliation, and discrimination based on disability or perceived disability. [Id. at 4-5] On June 20, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 24.] On June 23, 2022, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 26.] The Clerk docketed Plaintiff's response in opposition on July 27, 2022. [Doc. 35.] On August 3, 2022, Defendant filed a reply in support of its motion. [Doc. 37.] Accordingly, Defendant's summary judgment motion is ripe for review.

BACKGROUND^[1]

Plaintiff alleges that, while employed with Defendant, he was denied a promotion to the foreman position due to his “engagement in a protected activity according to ADA and Title VII.” [Doc. 1-1 at 1.] Plaintiff alleges that he initiated “the statutory grievance phase” with Defendant on July 24, 2020, by “communicating to them that [his] work conditions were hostile and [he] believe[d] their actions to be unlawful and discriminatory. [He] further alleged a violation of the anti retaliation provisions governed by the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)].” [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the grievance process was cut short on July 29, 2020, and that he was terminated and was denied re-hire by the head decisionmaker on August 3, 2020. [Id.] He asserts that he was discriminated against based on his race in violation of Title VII and was subjected to retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ADA. [Id.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.

DISCUSSION

Race and Disability Discrimination

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to . . . compensation terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may ultimately prove a race-discrimination claim under Title VII through direct evidence that racial discrimination motivated an employer's adverse employment action, see, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005), or, if a plaintiff lacks direct evidence (as in this case), a plaintiff can alternatively proceed under the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to both discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII. See, e.g., Beall v. Abbott Labs, 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gilliam v. S.C. Dep't Of Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2007). “Absent direct evidence, the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.”^[2] Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII).^[3]

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, Plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered from an adverse employment action; (3) at the time the employer took the adverse employment action he was performing at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) that the position remained open or was filled by a similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class. See King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that when the claim is discriminatory termination, instead of race discrimination based on disparate treatment, the elements are altered slightly); see also Jones, 324 F.Supp.2d at 781; Moore v. Penfed Title, LLC, 2021 WL 2004785, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 18, 2021) (noting similar elements for a prima facie case for wrongful termination in violation of Title VII).

The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees.”

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2016). A person has a disability under the ADA if he has “a physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” or if he is “regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Plaintiffs can prove an ADA claim by direct or indirect evidence or by use of the burden-shifting scheme established in McDonnell Douglas. See Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that he has a disability or was regarded by his employer as having a disability, (2) that he is a qualified individual for the employment in question, and (3) that he was discharged because of his disability. See McLeod Health, 914 F.3d at 883. If he does so, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. Leonard, 36 F.Supp.3d at 688 (citing Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995)). If the employer produces enough evidence on this point, the Plaintiff must then show why the employer's asserted justification is a pretext for discrimination. Id.

Lack of Performance and No Identified Medical Condition

Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment on both Plaintiff's race and disability discrimination claims because, while Plaintiff can establish that he is a member of a protected class with respect to his race discrimination claim, and that he suffered an adverse employment action-termination-he cannot...