Anderson v. Jones

• Decision Date: 13 February 1894
• Citation: 14 So. 871,102 Ala. 537
• Parties: ANDERSON ET AL. v. JONES.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

14 So. 871

102 Ala. 537

ANDERSON ET AL. v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 13, 1894

Appeal from city court of Montgomery; T. M. Arrington, Judge.

Action by S. J. Anderson & Co. against James Otey and C. F. Harmon garnishee. F. M. Jones appeared, and claimed the funds in the garnishee's hands. From a judgment denying plaintiff's motion for judgment, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

E. P Morrisett, for appellant.

Arrington & Graham, for appellees.

COLEMAN J.

Anderson & Co. having sued James Otey, upon a demand for $186 garnished C. F. Harmon. The garnishee answered indebtedness to Otey in the sum of $72, but, by his answer, gave notice that F. M. Jones claimed to be the owner of the debt or demand. Notice issued to Jones to appear and contest with plaintiff the right to the debt or demand, as provided in the statute. Code, § 2984. In accordance with the notice, Jones appeared, and propounded his claim in writing, under section 2985 of the Code. The plaintiff demurred to the claim as propounded by Jones, which demurrer was overruled by the court, and, the plaintiff declining to take issue, judgment was rendered, discharging the garnishee. The appeal is prosecuted from the judgment of the court.

The only question for review is as to the sufficiency of the claim propounded by Jones, the claimant. It is as follows "That the said Otey, previous to the commencement of the garnishment proceedings herein, and previous to the service of the writ of garnishment, gave him [claimant] a written order on the garnishee for two hundred dollars, which said order was presented to garnishee, and which was left with him for payment, and which he agreed to pay after he had paid out other orders which had been given to other persons in advance of that given to him, but his said agreement to pay was not in writing," etc. This order, as here described, was not upon any special fund, but was for the payment of $200 generally. It is not distinguishable from any other written order given by one person upon another for the payment generally of a definite amount of money. Section 1766 of the Code is as follows: "No person within this state must be charged as the acceptor of a bill of exchange, unless his acceptance is in writing, signed by himself or agent." It is contended by appellees that the order for the payment of the money shows that it was not a "bill of exchange," within the meaning of the statute. Neither the authorities cited nor the argument made sustains the...