Anderson v. Ken Kauffman & Sons Excavating

• Decision Date: 19 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. WD 66777.,WD 66777.
• Parties: Nicholas ANDERSON by his Next Friend, Crystal ANDERSON, Appellant, v. KEN KAUFFMAN & SONS EXCAVATING, L.L.C., Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

248 S.W.3d 101

Nicholas ANDERSON by his Next Friend, Crystal ANDERSON, Appellant, v. KEN KAUFFMAN & SONS EXCAVATING, L.L.C., Respondent.

No. WD 66777.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

February 19, 2008.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied March 25, 2008.

Daniel C. Mizell, Esq., Lebanon, Daniel E. Hunt, Esq., Jefferson City, MO, for Appellant.

Scott R. Pool, Esq., Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

Before, HOWARD, C.J., LOWENSTEIN, ULRICH,¹

BRECKENRIDGE,² SPINDEN, SMART, ELLIS, NEWTON, HOLLIGER, HARDWICK, JJ., and MARTIN, S.J.

PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, Judge.

Nicholas Anderson, by and through his mother as next friend, Crystal Anderson, appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing his claim for wrongful death for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the trial court found that Nicholas's petition alleged facts that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division of Workers' Compensation. In his sole point on appeal, Nicholas asserts that the trial court erroneously declared the law by construing the version of section 287.110.1 in effect from August 28, 2005, through December 14, 2005, as a bar to his wrongful death claim. He claims that the legislature eliminated the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act in that version of section 287.110.1. Finding no error, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 14, 2005, Brian Reeves was employed by Ken Kauffman & Sons Excavating. On that date, he was digging a trench when the trench collapsed and buried him under several feet of dirt. Mr. Reeves died as a result of the accident. He was survived by a son, Nicholas. On November 20, 2005, Nicholas, by and through his mother as next friend, Crystal Anderson, filed a wrongful death claim against Kauffman, alleging that Kauffman's failure to provide proper safety precautions for bracing the trench wall resulted in Mr. Reeves's death.

On December 30, 2005, Kauffman filed a motion to dismiss Nicholas's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Kauffman asserted that it was immune from civil liability because the Workers' Compensation Act, section 287.010 et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for a work-related injury or death. Following briefing and a hearing on Kauffman's motion, the trial court entered a final judgment dismissing Nicholas's petition on the grounds that the petition alleged facts within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division of Workers' Compensation. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

"Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is proper whenever it appears, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court is without jurisdiction." Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Mo. banc 2003). "[W]hether the subject matter of an action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission is a question of fact, resolution of which is left to the sound discretion of the trial court." Crow v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 174 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Mo.App. W.D.2005). Nevertheless, when the facts are uncontested, as here, the question whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Mo. Soybean Ass'n, 102 S.W.3d at 22.

No Error in Dismissing Petition for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In his sole point on appeal, Nicholas asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because it erroneously declared the law by construing the version of section 287.110.1 that was in effect from August 28, 2005, through December 14, 2005, as a bar to his wrongful death claim. Specifically, Nicholas claims that his wrongful death claim arose during this 108-day period when the workers' compensation exclusivity requirement was not in effect, due to an amendment to section 287.110.1. He argues that the statutory amendment repealed the exclusivity requirement, so he could elect to pursue a wrongful death claim, rather than a workers' compensation claim. Nicholas contends that the trial court engaged in unnecessary statutory construction and failed to apply the plain language of the amended statute when it found that the legislature did not intend to eliminate the exclusivity requirement.

Missouri's Workers' Compensation Act states, in section 287.120.1,³ that employers shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to provide compensation for the personal injury or death of an employee arising out of or in the course of employment. The Act further provides that employers shall be released of all other liability for such work-related incidents. Id. Thus, the Act provides the exclusive rights and remedies of injured employees against their employers. State ex rel. Tri-County Elec. Coop. Ass'n v. Dial, 192 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Mo. banc 2006).

Before August 28, 2005, the scope of the Act was established by section 287.110.1, which read:

This chapter shall apply to all cases within its provisions except those exclusively covered by any federal law.

Senate Bill 1, as originally introduced in the 2005 legislative session, did not contain any change to section 287.110.1. The House Committee Substitute, however, proposed the following amendment to section 287.110.1:

This chapter shall apply to all cases within its provisions except those exclusively covered by any federal law and those addressed in subsection 11 of section 287.120.

(Emphasized language added.) In addition, an amendment to section 287.120 was proposed to add a new subsection, i.e., subsection 11, which would have exempted the Workers' Compensation Act from being applicable in those cases where an employee accepted workers' compensation benefits from another state.

The actual version of section 287.110.1 enacted and effective as of August 28, 2005, however, provided:

This chapter shall apply to all cases within its provisions except those exclusively covered by any federal law and those addressed in section 287.120.

In other words, in the final version of section 287.110.1 enacted, the legislature removed the phrase "subsection 11 of" from the statute. The legislature also deleted subsection 11 from the final version of section 287.120 enacted.

During a special session in September 2005, the legislature again amended subsection 1 of section 287.110. With the amendment during the special session, the legislature changed the language back to its original version as first enacted in 1939 and unchanged until the 2005 amendment, i.e.:

This chapter shall apply to all cases within its provisions except those exclusively covered by any federal law.

The amendment did not contain an emergency clause, so the effective date of the amended version of section 287.110.1 was December 14, 2005, under section 1.130, which provides that a law passed by the legislature takes effect ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was enacted. Consequently, the originally amended version of section 287.110.1, which contained the language "and those addressed in section 287.120," was in effect from August 28, 2005, through December 14, 2005. Nicholas claims that because his claim arose and was filed during this time period, under the plain language of the statute, his claim for wrongful death is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division of Workers' Compensation, and the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for wrongful death.

Nicholas's appeal requires a determination of the effect of the language in the amendment to section 287.110.1, which states that Chapter 287 does not apply to those cases addressed in section 287.120. "Construction of a statute is a question of law," which an appellate court reviews de novo. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 908 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Mo. banc 1995). The primary object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used. United Pharmacal Co. of Mo., Inc. v. Mo. Bd. of Pharmacy, 208 S.W.3d 907, 909 (Mo. banc 2006). In doing so, a court considers the words used in the statute in their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 910. Only in those cases "[w]here the language of the statute is ambiguous or where `its plain meaning would lead to an illogical result,'" will this court "`look past the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute.'" Nichols v. Dir. of Revenue, 116 S.W.3d 583, 586 (Mo.App. W.D.2003) (citation omitted).

As noted previously, the version of section 287.110.1 that was in effect from August 28, 2005, until December 14, 2005, provided:

This chapter [287, Workers' Compensation Law] shall apply to all cases within its provisions except those exclusively covered by any federal law and those addressed in section 287.120.

Thus, under the plain and ordinary meaning of this statute, those cases covered by federal law or addressed in section 287.120 are expressly excluded from the Workers' Compensation Law. Read in isolation, the language in the version of section 287.110.1 in effect during this time period is unambiguous. Nevertheless, that does not end the analysis. Because the exclusion of cases in section 287.110.1 incorporates the cases "addressed in section 287.120," the language of section 287.120 must also be examined to determine the legislature's intent.

"Section 287.120 governs the determination of when an injury falls under the Workers' Compensation Law. . . ." State ex rel. MW Builders, Inc. v. Midkiff, 222 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2007). Subsection 1 of section 287.120, provides:

Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other...