Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch Co.

• Decision Date: 02 July 1924
• Docket Number: 4112
• Citation: 228 P. 184,63 Utah 551
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: ANDERSON v. LAST CHANCE RANCH CO. et al

228 P. 184

63 Utah 551

ANDERSON v. LAST CHANCE RANCH CO. et al

No. 4112

Supreme Court of Utah

July 2, 1924

Petition for compensation, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, by C. T. Anderson, opposed by the Last Chance Ranch Company and others. The industrial Commission denied the petition, and claimant applies for writ of certiorari.

AFFIRMED.

Willard Hanson and A. H. Hougaard, both of Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Harvey H. Cluff, Atty. Gen., and J. Robert Robinson, Asst. Atty Gen., for defendants.

THURMAN J. WEBER, C. J., and GIDEON, CHERRY, and FRICK, JJ., concur.

OPINION

THURMAN, J.

This is an application for a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings of the Utah Industrial Commission, denying plaintiff's petition for compensation under the Utah Industrial Act (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 3061-3165). Upon the evidence submitted to the Commission, it found the following facts:

"(1) That the defendant, Last Chance Ranch Company, is a corporation in the state of Utah, and that its general business is that of agriculture; that W. A. Dunlap is the principal stockholder in said corporation; that said defendant owns about 640 acres of land in the western portion of Tooele county; that on the 4th day of August, 1923, the said defendant company employed a number of men on its ranch, varying from three to fifteen; that in the month of May the said defendant company concluded to build a house upon its ranch, to be occupied by Mr. W. A. Dunlap, general manager of said ranch, and for that purpose employed in addition to the regular farm hands, three men to work upon the construction of the house; that these three men were H. P. Anderson, a skilled carpenter, Mr. C. T. Anderson, the applicant, as a carpenter's helper, and Mr. Oscar Anderson, a skilled carpenter; that the said C. T. Anderson, the applicant, during all the time he was employed by said defendant company, worked exclusively upon said house, and that Oscar Anderson worked exclusively upon said house; and that H. P. Anderson, while confining his work almost exclusively on the house, did on one or two occasions work in the hay fields, and also performed work in removing certain fences and outbuildings upon the ranch.

"(2) That on the 4th day of August, 1923, C. T. Anderson was injured while carrying a box of groceries into the basement of the house; the applicant started to work on the morning of the 4th on the house, and was requested by some one in authority to discontinue work for a short time to assist in carrying certain boxes of groceries into the basement of the house, and while carrying said box of groceries he sustained the injury complained of, namely, his finger coming in contact with a nail protruding from the doorway of the basement, scratching, bruising, and lacerating the same, as a result of which infection took place; that by reason of said injury the applicant has been temporarily totally disabled up to the present time, and required medical aid and attention; that the said boxes of groceries were placed in the basement by the applicant, and several farm hands were assisting him in that work; said groceries were for use and consumption upon said farm by the various workmen thereon, including the applicant; that at the time of said injury Mr. W. A. Dunlap, general manager of the ranch, and his family, occupied the building upon which the applicant was working."

Upon the foregoing findings the Commission entered conclusions to the effect that plaintiff at the time of his injury was engaged in agricultural labor, and upon that ground held that his claim for compensation should be denied.

The findings of fact are not in dispute; the conclusions therefrom are vigorously challenged. The contention of plaintiff seems to be that it is the character of the work in which the employee is engaged as the time of his injury that determines his right to compensation, and not the general or usual business of the employer. Whether the right to compensation is determined by the general or usual business of the employer, or by the character of business in which the employee is engaged at the time of the injury, depends entirely upon the intent of the statute which determines the right. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 3110, subd. 2, as amended in Sess. Laws 1919, at pages 155, 156, reads:

"Every person, firm, and private corporation, including every public utility, that has in service three or more workmen or operatives regularly employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except agricultural laborers and domestic servants: Provided, that employers who have in service less than three employees and employers of agricultural laborers and domestic servants shall have the right to come under the terms of this title by complying with the provisions thereof and all rules and regulations of the Commission.

"The term 'regularly,' as herein used, shall include all employments, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. It means all employments in the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of an employer.

"Where any employer procures any work to be done, wholly or in part, for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and the work so procured to be done is a part or process in the trade or business of said employer, then such contractor and all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the performance of work as an independent contractor, shall be deemed an employer within the meaning of this section. The words 'independent contractor' as herein used, are defined to be any person, association or corporation engaged in the performance of any work for another, and while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work is not subject to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's design."

It appears from the record that the Commission was of opinion that the general business of the employer was the controlling factor in determining the nature of the employment and the right to compensation. The statute is clearly susceptible of that interpretation. Indeed, the language is plain and unambiguous. It will be noted that, in the statute quoted, in determining who are employers and defining the term "regular" the following language is used:

"It means all employments in the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of an employer."

Again in section 3111, in determining who are employees, after enumerating the classes included, the statute reads:

"But not including any person whose employment is but casual and is not in the usual course of trade, business, or occupation of his employer." (Italics supplied.)

The Commission found that the general business of the defendant Ranch Company was "that of agriculture." By the term "general business" we are forced to conclude that the Commission meant "usual course of business, trade, or occupation," thereby bringing the case within the exclusion provisions of the statute.

As before stated, the findings are not challenged. The only question is: Do the findings warrant the conclusion that plaintiff at "the date of the injury was engaged in agricultural labor?" In a narrow and restricted view of the transaction, plaintiff at the very moment of his injury was an agricultural laborer. He was assisting farm laborers in moving boxes containing groceries for use on the farm. In the broader sense he was a carpenter's helper, for that was the work he had been doing all the time from the date of his employment down to the moment he stepped aside, at the request of his employer, to assist in removing the boxes. We are not inclined to dispose of the case upon the narrow view above referred to. If, for instance, it could be determined from the record that the defendant was carrying on two different kinds of business, each independent of the other, one agricultural and the other the construction of buildings, the writer would find his way clear to hold that plaintiff was injured while engaged as an assistant in the construction of buildings, notwithstanding the injury occurred while momentarily engaged in removing boxes containing groceries for use on the farm. In the case supposed, the construction of buildings would have been his regular employment, and also the regular business of his employer. The authorities are uniform, as far as I am advised, in holding that the same employer can be engaged in two or more different kinds of business, trade, or occupation unconnected with one another, and all or some of them, nevertheless, be within the provisions of the Industrial Act.

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