Anderson v. Lewter

• Decision Date: 14 May 1936
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 707
• Citation: 168 So. 171,232 Ala. 375
• Parties: ANDERSON v. LEWTER.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

168 So. 171

232 Ala. 375

ANDERSON v. LEWTER.

8 Div. 707

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 14, 1936

Appeal from Circuit Court, Madison County; Paul Speake, Judge.

Suit in equity by Mrs. Jimmie A. Anderson against J. Malcolm Lewter. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

Watts &amp White, of Huntsville, for appellant.

Taylor Richardson & Sparkman, of Huntsville, for appellee.

BOULDIN Justice.

The bill was filed by the widow of a decedent with the ultimate purpose of assigning dower and homestead in lands owned by the decedent prior to the marriage. To this end the amended bill sought to cancel deeds to such lands alleged to have been executed by decedent before marriage, in so far as such deeds cut off such dower and homestead rights, because the deeds were made in contemplation of marriage with complainant, and in fraud of her prospective marital rights in such lands.

Three deeds were executed by decedent, D.A. Lewter, to his son, J Malcolm Lewter, the appellee. One deed, executed December 2 1922, conveyed 200 acres of farm lands, on a recited consideration of $2,000 cash. A second deed, executed December 4, 1922, conveyed 398 acres of farm lands on a recited consideration of $1, and the assumption of an outstanding mortgage of $2,000. The third deed, executed also on December 4, 1922, conveyed certain adjoining lots in the city of Huntsville on a recited consideration of $700.

Complainant, Jimmie A. Anderson, and D.A. Lewter were married March, 1924. They lived together as husband and wife until July, 1926, when they separate, and so continued until the husband's death June 21, 1934.

The original bill was filed July 14, 1934, charging these deeds were really executed after marriage and antedated to defeat complainant's dower and homestead rights. The bill was amended May 23, 1935, charging the deeds bear their true dates, but were made pending courtship in which the grantor claimed to own the properties, showed them to complainant as his farm, leading plaintiff to believe he owned them, and while both were contemplating marriage, executed the deeds in anticipation of marriage and with the intent to defraud her of marital rights in the lands. The amended bill further charges that the grantee, the son of the grantor, knew that negotiations were in progress looking to marriage when the deeds were made, and that they were made for the purpose of depriving the intended wife of her rights in the property to accrue on her marriage; that the deeds were withheld from the record for purposes of concealment; that complainant knew nothing of such deeds until after the husband's death. In the alternative, the bill avers the conveyances were voluntary, or for merely nominal value.

The answer put in issue all these allegations.

The evidence was addressed to three issues of fact: First, whether, in fact, courtship and contemplated marriage were in progress at the time these deeds were made. Second, whether the grantee had knowledge of such courtship and contemplated marriage at the time the deeds were executed, or at any time before the marriage was consummated. Third, whether there was a bona fide valuable consideration for the deeds.

The testimony was taken orally before the trial court, sitting without a jury. He denied complainant relief. His findings, for reasons ofttimes stated, are to be accorded the same presumptions as the verdict of a jury.

We have carefully considered the evidence, its several tendencies, and reasonable inferences. A detailed recital or discussion would serve no good purpose.

Applying the rules of review in such cases, we conclude the finding of the trial judge should not be disturbed.

This decision might end here, but we are impressed that certain facts, in pleading and evidence, call for discussion of certain legal principles, lest our decision be misleading.

The leading case in Alabama on bills in equity attacking conveyances made in contemplation of marriage with intent to defeat the prospective rights of the intended wife in the property of the husband is Kelly v. McGrath, 70 Ala 75, 45 Am.Rep. 75, wherein Chief Justice Brickell discussed, with his usual learning and sound reasoning, the legal principles involved. Other later cases are: Nelson v. Brown, 164 Ala. 397, 51 So. 360, 137 Am.St.Rep. 61; Cannon v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co., 194 Ala. 469, 69 So. 934; Lewis et al....