Anderson v. Longmont Toyota, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03SC450, No. 04SC22. |
| Citation | 102 P.3d 323 |
| Parties | Andrew ANDERSON and Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Petitioners, v. LONGMONT TOYOTA, INC.; HIH Insurance; and Western Guaranty Fund Services, Respondents. Timothy Krause and Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Petitioners, v. Sorter Construction, Inc.; and Pinnacol Assurance, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Jean E. Dubofsky, P.C., Jean E. Dubofsky, Boulder, Pepe J. Mendez & Associates, P.C., Pepe J. Mendez, Denver, for Petitioner Andrew Anderson.
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Laurie Rottersman, Assistant Attorney General, State Services Section, Denver, for Petitioner Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
Clifton, Hook & Bovarnick, P.C., Richard A. Bovarnick, Harvey D. Flewelling, Denver, for Respondents Longmont Toyota, Inc.; HIH Insurance; and Western Guaranty Fund Services.
Clisham, Satriana & Biscan, L.L.C., Patricia Jean Clisham, Keith E. Mottram, Denver, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Self Insurers Association.
Pinnacol Assurance, Brandee DeFalco Galvin, Michael J. Steiner, Denver, for Amicus Curiae Pinnacol Assurance.
Eley & Eley, LLC, Craig C. Eley, Douglas R. Phillips, P.C., Douglas R. Phillips, O'Toole & Sbarbaro, PC, Neil D. O'Toole, Denver, for Amicus Curiae Worker's Compensation Education Association.
Withers Seidman Rice & Mueller, P.C., Christopher Seidman, Grand Junction, for Petitioner Timothy Krause. HOBBS, Justice.
In these workers' compensation cases, we address two certiorari issues involving temporary total disability (TTD) benefit provisions in section 8-42-105(4) of the Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado, sections 8-40-101 to 8-47-209, C.R.S. (2004)("Act").1 At issue are competing constructions of this section by the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) and the Colorado Court of Appeals.
The statute recites that, "[i]n cases where it is determined that a temporarily disabled employee is responsible for termination of employment, the resulting wage loss shall not be attributable to the on-the-job injury." § 8-42-105(4), C.R.S. (2004)(emphasis added).
This provision applies to employee TTD claims made after an injured worker returns to modified employment and subsequently quits the employment or is fired for cause.2
The ICAO construed section 8-42-105(4) as barring TTD wage loss claims when the voluntary or for-cause termination of the modified employment causes the wage loss, but not when the worsening of a prior work-related injury causes the wage loss.
The court of appeals construed this provision as an absolute bar to all subsequent TTD claims involving the employer and the employee. Accordingly, it ordered denial of the worsening condition TTD benefits to the employees in the two cases before us, Longmont Toyota v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 85 P.3d 548 (Colo.App.2003) ("Longmont Toyota") and Sorter Constr. Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, No. 03CA0279, slip op., 2003 WL 22967373 (Colo.App., Dec. 18, 2003) () ("Sorter Construction").
We agree with the ICAO and reverse the judgments of the court of appeals. We hold that section 8-42-105(4) bars TTD wage loss claims when the voluntary or for-cause termination of the modified employment causes the wage loss, but not when the worsening of a prior work-related injury causes the wage loss.
Longmont Toyota involves a workers' compensation claim for a worsened condition that arose subsequent to claimant's voluntary resignation from the injury-related employment. Claimant, Andrew Anderson, sustained a low-back injury on June 5, 2000 while employed as a mechanic at Longmont Toyota, Inc. He was restricted from work by his authorized physician and returned to modified light duty at Longmont Toyota with full salary on July 26, 2000. Shortly afterwards, Anderson had a dispute with his employer and voluntarily resigned.
One week later, Anderson obtained employment with Century Chevrolet under the same restrictions to which he was subject at Longmont Toyota. He performed his duties until September 13, 2000 when his condition worsened. Anderson saw an authorized physician who increased his physical restrictions to "seated position only with no bending, twisting or lifting activities." Because a mechanic cannot perform his job in this manner, Anderson could no longer continue his job at Century Chevrolet. He resigned and sought temporary total disability benefits from Longmont Toyota commencing September 13, 2000. Although the doctor concluded Anderson would not have been able to work at modified employment had he still been at Longmont Toyota, Longmont Toyota refused to pay for TTD benefits or medical treatment.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Anderson was responsible for terminating his Longmont Toyota employment; his worsened condition was due to the natural progression of his industrial injury incurred at Longmont Toyota; and there was no intervening cause of the back pain. Despite the relationship between the back pain and the original injury, the ALJ ruled that Anderson's resignation from Longmont Toyota was a volitional act that severed the causal relationship between his wage loss and the work injury. The ALJ found section 82-42-105(4) barred him from receiving TTD benefits for the worsening condition.
On review, the ICAO concluded that the ALJ had misconstrued section 8-42-105(4) as a permanent bar to all temporary disability benefits where the claimant is determined to be "responsible" for the loss of employment. Determining that Anderson's wage loss after September 13, 2000 resulted from his worsened condition, not his voluntary resignation from Longmont Toyota, the ICAO held that the petitioner could claim TTD benefits.
Longmont Toyota appealed the ICAO ruling to the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that " § 8-42-105(4) is to be construed as a permanent bar to receipt of temporary disability benefits when a claimant is responsible for his or her separation from employment and the separation is for causes within the employee's control, but unrelated to the industrial injury." Longmont Toyota, 85 P.3d at 551. Anderson and the ICAO then filed their certiorari petitions.
Sorter Construction involves a workers' compensation claim for a worsened condition that arose after claimant's termination for cause. Timothy Krause was working for Sorter Construction when he sustained a work-related injury. The company offered him modified duties, which he performed until February 22, 2002 when he walked off the job following a heated argument with his supervisor. Sorter Construction terminated Krause later that day for failing to obey instructions. On March 27, 2002, Krause underwent surgery to treat the work-related injury. As a result of this surgery, he was medically restricted from returning to all work.
When Krause sought TTD benefits, Sorter Construction asserted that section 8-42-105(4) prevented Krause from receiving benefits because it had terminated him for cause. The ALJ and the ICAO reasoned that the wage loss did not result from the employee's termination of employment; rather, his worsened condition resulted from the prior industrial injury at Sorter Construction and the wage loss would have occurred whether or not Krause was responsible for terminating the employment.
Relying on Longmont Toyota, the court of appeals again ruled that section 8-42-105(4) is an absolute bar to any subsequent claim, including a worsening condition claim. As with Longmont Toyota, the court of appeals set aside the ICAO order and remanded the case for the ALJ's entry of a new order denying claimant TTD benefits. We granted the ICAO's and Krause's petitions for certiorari.
We hold that section 8-42-105(4) bars TTD wage loss claims when the voluntary or for-cause termination of the modified employment causes the wage loss, but not when the worsening of a prior work-related injury incurred during that employment causes the wage loss.
The proper construction of section 8-42-105 of the Act is a question of law we review de novo. In conducting our analysis, we give considerable weight to an agency's interpretation of its own enabling statute, but we are not bound by the agency's legal interpretations. Colorado Dep't of Labor and Employment v. Esser, 30 P.3d 189, 193 (Colo.2001).
Our duty is to effectuate the intent and purpose of the General Assembly. Weld County School Dist. RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550, 554 (Colo.1998). We apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, if clear. Davison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 84 P.3d 1023, 1029 (Colo.2004); see also Vigil v. Franklin, No. 03SC479, slip op. at 11-12, ___ P.3d ___ (Colo. Nov. 30, 2004). If the statutory provision is unclear, we look to a variety of sources of legislative intent, including the object the legislature sought to obtain by the enactment, the circumstances under which it was adopted, and the consequences of a particular construction. § 2-4-203(1), C.R.S. (2004); Bymer, 955 P.2d at 554.
In construing provisions of the Act, we read the statute as a whole and, if possible, construe its terms harmoniously, reconciling conflicts where necessary. Esser, 30 P.3d at 195. If the wording of the statutory provision is ambiguous, we examine the impacts of alternative constructions and presume that the General Assembly intended a just and reasonable result. Bymer, 955 P.2d at 554. We consider the Act's legislative policy declaration, Mountain City Meat Co. v. Oqueda, 919 P.2d 246, 252 (Colo.1996), and the legislative history accompanying the provision's enactment, Bymer, 955 P.2d at 554.
As a general principle, workers' compensation benefits are designed to prevent destitution of an injured worker. Arthur Larson, 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §...
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