Anderson v. Ludgin
| Citation | 175 Conn. 545,400 A.2d 712 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Decision Date | 01 August 1978 |
| Parties | Jacqueline J. ANDERSON v. Robert F. LUDGIN et al. |
Allan B. Taylor, with whom was Sharon S. Tisher, New Britain, for appellant-appellee (plaintiff).
David T. Ryan, Hartford, with whom was Lawrence A. Cox, Norwich, for appellee-appellant (named defendant).
Richard M. Cosgrove, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Hartford, for appellees-appellants (defendants George A. Athanson et al.).
Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, SPEZIALE and PETERS, JJ.
The primary issues raised on this appeal are whether the minority representation statute, General Statutes § 9-167a, 1 applies to local legislative bodies such as the Hartford city council, and, if so, whether the statute, as applied, is unconstitutional.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. At the November 8, 1977 election, the voters of the city of Hartford elected, on an at-large basis, all nine members of the city council. The plaintiff Jacqueline J. Anderson, an enrolled Republican, appeared on the ballot as a nominee of the Republican party for the position of member of the council. The defendant Robert F. Ludgin, an enrolled Democrat, appeared on the ballot as a petitioning candidate running without party designation for the position of member of the council.
COLUMN I COLUMN II
Total Membership Maximum from one Party
3 ................... 2
4 ................... 3
5 ................... 4
6 ................... 4
7 ................... 5
8 ................... 5
9 ................... 6
More than 9 ........... Two-thirds of
total Membership
The six nominees of the Democratic party, all enrolled members of that party, received the six highest vote totals at the election. The two candidates who received the seventh and eighth greatest number of votes were enrolled members and nominees of the Republican party. The defendant Ludgin received the ninth greatest number, and the plaintiff received the tenth greatest number. The defendants George A. Athanson, mayor of the city of Hartford, Robert J. Gallivan, city and town clerk of the city of Hartford, and John T. Walsh, director of finance of the city of Hartford, acting collectively in their capacity as board of canvassers of the city of Hartford, and Salvatore Bramante, head moderator of the city of Hartford for the election, hereinafter city defendants, declared and certified the nine candidates with the greatest number of votes, including the defendant Ludgin, to have been elected to the city council. The city defendants did not declare and certify the plaintiff to have been so elected. The plaintiff thereupon filed a petition in the Superior Court to compel the city defendants to declare and certify her election, pursuant to General Statutes § 9-328. 2
The trial court concluded that § 9-167a was applicable to legislative bodies such as the council, but that it was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant Ludgin. Accordingly, the plaintiff's petition was dismissed.
The parties, on appeal, have challenged the trial court's conclusions as follows: The plaintiff has appealed from the court's determination that the statute is unconstitutional. The city defendants have cross-appealed from the court's conclusion that the statute applies to legislative bodies such as the Hartford city council. The defendant Ludgin has cross-appealed claiming that the statute did not apply to him or, if it did, that it violated the constitutional rights to equal protection of the law and to freedom of speech and association. 3
We first consider whether § 9-167a applies to the election of members to the Hartford city council. In 1966, seven years after the passage of the statute, 4 the attorney general issued an opinion stating that § 9-167a was not applicable to legislative bodies. Opinion of Attorney General, October 11, 1966. But the issue has never been decided by this court. Connecticut cases that have analyzed § 9-167a have not decided whether the statute applies to municipal legislative bodies elected on a partisan, at-large basis, and they are therefore of limited value. 5 In Montano v. Lee, 401 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1968), that precise question was met. 6 In deciding that § 9-167a did not apply to legislative bodies, the Second Circuit reasoned: Id., 217-18.
The Montano court had no Connecticut cases on which to rely, and turned to the quoted sources to interpret § 9-167a. Our examination of the legislative history and of the practical construction given the statute must likewise guide our determination of the question of applicability.
Statutes are to be construed by considering City Savings Bank v. Lawler, 163 Conn. 149, 157, 302 A.2d 252, 257 (1972).
If the language of the statute is clear, it is assumed that the words themselves express the intent of the legislature; Houston v. Warden, 169 Conn. 247, 251, 363 A.2d 121 (1975); Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 73, 230 A.2d 36 (1967); and thus there is no need to construe the statute. Bell v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 173 Conn. 223, 226, 377 A.2d 299 (1977); Houston v. Warden, supra, 169 Conn. 251, 363 A.2d 121; Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 375-76, 279 A.2d 561 (1971). The language of § 9-167a 7 appears to be clear on its face, but when considered in light of the differing vocabulary used by the state's 169 municipalities for their local legislative bodies, it is ambiguous. For example, many localities use the word "council" to designate their legislative bodies. The phrase "board, commission, committee or similar body" might be interpreted to include a council if we were to read it expansively. But Houston v. Warden, supra, 169 Conn. 251, 363 A.2d 123. International Business Machines Corporation v. Brown, 167 Conn. 123, 134, 355 A.2d 236 (1974). Although the phrase "similar body" may be read to allow for some variation; see Proctor v. Sachner, 143 Conn. 9, 14, 118 A.2d 621 (1955); it may not be used to expand the general area set out by the enumerated category. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. 1973) § 47.18. Because there is no specific reference to "council" or "legislative body" in the statute, it must be read to exclude such bodies from its scope.
Furthermore, § 1-1(m) of the General Statutes provides: "(T)he words 'legislative body,' as applied to unconsolidated towns, shall mean the town meeting; as applied to cities and consolidated towns and cities, shall mean the board of aldermen, council or other body charged with the duty of making annual appropriations; as applied to boroughs and consolidated towns and boroughs, shall mean the board of burgesses; as applied to all other districts and associations, shall mean the district committee or association committee or other body charged with the duty of making annual appropriations." The statute was obviously available as a referent, if the legislature had meant to include bodies such as the Hartford city council in § 9-167a. It is difficult to understand why the drafters of the minority representation law did not simply use the term "legislative body" if that was their intent.
Where, as here, the language of a statute is not Absolutely clear, its meaning can often be determined by referring to the legislative history of its enactment. Wilson v. West Haven, 142 Conn. 646, 654, 116 A.2d 420, 424 (1955).
Although the debate surrounding passage of a law may be an aid to statutory construction, the discussion that occurred when § 9-167a was enacted sheds no light on the legislature's purpose; it is too brief and ambiguous to offer guidance. 8 The title and stated purpose of the legislation are, however, also valid aids to construction; Miller v. Board of Education, 166 Conn. 189, 194, 348 A.2d 584 (1974); Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 162 Conn. 50, 55, 291 A.2d 204 (1971); and in this instance are clear directives. The title and purpose of § 9-167a indicate that the statute is not...
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