Anderson v. Middlebrooks
| Decision Date | 24 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-00680-TSL-RPM |
| Parties | DERIAS PAGE ANDERSON, PETITIONER v. SCOTT MIDDLEBROOKS, RESPONDENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
On October 21, 2020, petitioner Derias Page Anderson ("Anderson") filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Section 2254"), seeking for two state court convictions to be set aside and his respective sentences to be vacated. Doc. [1]. On January 26, 2021, respondent Scott Middlebrooks ("respondent") filed the present motion to dismiss Anderson's habeas petition on grounds that it is time-barred. See Doc. [5].
In his habeas petition, Anderson challenges two state-court convictions: (i) felony escape and (ii) manslaughter. First, on May 5, 2015, Anderson was indicted on one charge of felony escape, docketed as Cause No. 15-CR-0028-NS-G. Doc. [6], Ex. 1, at 2, 4. On June 22, 2015, Anderson petitioned the Neshoba County Circuit Court ("circuit court") to enter a plea of guilty; his guilty plea was entered on that same day. Id., Ex. 1, at 1. His final judgment of conviction for felony escape was entered on June 25, 2015. Id., Ex. 1, at 7-8. Anderson was sentenced to three years imprisonment, a $2,000.00 fine, and assessed $383.50 in court costs. Ibid. Anderson did not attempt to directly appeal this conviction or seek collateral review, via a motion for postconviction review ("PCR motion"), thereof. Doc. [1], at 2-3.
Second, on October 12, 2014, Anderson was indicted on one count of first-degree murder, docketed as Cause No. 15-CR-0101-NS-C. Doc. [6], Ex. 2, at 2. On March 14, 2016, Anderson petitioned the circuit court to plead guilty to a lesser charge of manslaughter. Id., Ex. 2, at 15-16. On March 21, 2016, his final judgment of conviction for manslaughter was entered. Id., Ex. 2, at 17-18. Anderson was sentenced to 20-years imprisonment to run consecutively to any other sentence that Anderson was serving, assessed $383.50 in court costs, and ordered to receive long-term alcohol and drug treatment as well as any other "necessary" therapy for his propensity for violence. Ibid., Ex. 2, at 17-18. Anderson did not attempt to directly appeal his manslaughter conviction or seek collateral review, via a PCR motion, thereof. Doc. [1], at 2-3.
While Anderson never appealed or sought postconviction relief, he did continue to show a level of continued interest in his cases. On March 27, 2017, he sent a letter to the Neshoba County court clerk requesting any "motions of discovery/discovery disclosure" filed by his appointed counsel or the State in his cases, which prompted a quick response by the court clerk that no such motions were filed in either case. Doc. [6], Ex. 1, at 18; Ex. 2, at 20.1 Later, on June 2, 2018, presumably unhappy with the court clerk's response, Anderson attempted to file a civil suit against her on the manslaughter docket—this "suit" was docketed as "Other" on that docket. Id., Ex. 1, at 20-21; Ex. 2, at 1. Anderson did not take any further action until August of 2020 when he sent more letters and requests to the court clerk. Id., Ex. 1, at 22-26; Ex. 2, 24-26.
On October 21, 2020,2 Anderson filed the present habeas petition.
In support of his motion to dismiss, the respondent argues that Anderson failed to file his habeas petition within Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's one-year limitation period, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) ("Section 2244(d)(1)"). Doc. [5]. Under Section 2244(d)(1), the respondent argues, Anderson's respective convictions became final on June 27, 2015 (felony escape) and March 21, 2016 (manslaughter). Id., at 5-6. These are the starting dates, the respondent argues, because he was barred from directly appealing by state statute and Section 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), and (D) are inapplicable here. Id., at 2, 4. Since Anderson did not file a PCR motion, the respondent continues, he is foreclosed from any statutory tolling. Doc. [5], at 6-7. Finally, the respondent argues that Anderson's argument, arising from a liberal reading of his habeas petition, that he is entitled to equitable tolling because his sentence is "illegal" is not an "extraordinary circumstance" and Anderson has not, in any case, shown reasonable diligence in pursuing his rights. Id., at 7-11. For these reasons, the respondent concludes, Anderson's habeas petition should be dismissed as time-barred. Id., at 13.
Anderson did not file formal opposition to the respondent's motion. However, in his habeas petition, Anderson explained that his filing was late because he "just find out [he] been illegally sentence and [he] haven't had any legal assistance." Doc. [1], at 13. Liberally construing his habeas petition, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007), the Court understands Anderson to raise two equitable tolling arguments. Doc. [1], at 13. First,Anderson argues that his sentence is "illegal" so he was entitled to file a late habeas petition. Ibid. Second, he argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he did not have assistance of counsel in pursuing habeas relief. Ibid.
Since the present motion addresses the timeliness of Anderson's federal habeas petition, Section 2244(d) is applicable. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In full, Section 2244(d) states:
Under the statute, the one-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition begins to run "from the latest of several start dates." Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 692 (5th Cir. 2003). Under Section 2244(d)(1)(A), a prisoner has "one year to file a federal petition for habeas corpus relief," starting from the "date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of directreview or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). "[T]he expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review," 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), is measured from the date "when the time for seeking further direct review in the state court expires[,]" Erickson v. Davis, 895 F.3d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Roberts, 319 F.3d at 394). As such, Mississippi law is applicable here. See, e.g., Keel v. Davis, No. 3:19-CV-125-GHD-RP, 2020 WL 5732620, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 24, 2020).
In Mississippi, a state prisoner cannot directly appeal a guilty plea. Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-35-101. See also Wrenn v. State, 121 So.3d 913, 914-15 (Miss. 2013) (); Spraggins v. State, 231 So.3d 1021, 1023-24 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) ( . Instead, following a guilty plea, a Mississippi state prisoner's only state-law avenue to postconviction relief is via a PCR motion. Wrenn, 121 So.3d at 914-15. See also Bibbs v. Hall, No. 1:19-CV-632-HSO-LRA, 2020 WL 4572923, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 2020). Thus, if a Mississippi state prisoner pleads guilty, his one-year limitation period begins to run upon entry of his final judgment of conviction unless Section 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), or (D) applies. See, e.g., Green v. Banks, No. 1:18-CV-180-HSO-LRA, 2019 WL 1167809, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 13, 2019).
Here, since the challenged convictions arose from guilty pleas, Anderson was foreclosed from directly appealing those convictions. Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-35-101. In turn, for purposes of Section 2244(d)(1)(A), Anderson's one-year limitation periods began on the dates that his respective final judgments of conviction were entered. Doc. [6]; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Turning to Section 2244(d)(1)(B), Anderson has not shown an impediment created by the state government that violated the Constitution or federal law which prevented Anderson from filing a timely petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). Similarly, Anderson has not shown a newly-recognizedconstitutional right upon which his petition is based. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Finally, there is no indication that his claims could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).
Since Section 2244(d)(1)(B), (C) and (D) are inapplicable, the "latest" date that Anderson's one-year limitation period began is the date that his respective guilty pleas were entered as final judgments of conviction. Roberts, 319 F.3d at 692. Thus, the one-year clock on Anderson's respective convictions began to run on (i) June 25, 2015 (felony escape) and (ii) March 21, 2016 (manslaughter). See Doc. [6], Ex. 1, at 7-8; Ex. 2, at 17-18. Properly calculated, June 27, 2016 (felony escape)3 and (ii) March 21, 2017 (manslaughter) are one year from his respective starting dates.
The Court turns to whether...
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