Anderson v. Miller
| Decision Date | 13 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-CV-1187 (FB).,99-CV-1187 (FB). |
| Citation | 206 F.Supp.2d 352 |
| Parties | Henry ANDERSON, Petitioner, v. David MILLER, Superintendent, Eastern Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Barry D. Leiwant, The Legal Aid Society, Federal Defender Division, Appeal Bureau, by Edward S. Zas, New York, NY, for the Petitioner.
Charles Hynes, District Attorney, Kings County by Thomas Ross, Assistant District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY, for the Respondent.
Petitioner, Henry Anderson ("Anderson"), brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Anderson claims that he was deprived of a fair trial because two jurors were coerced by their fellow jurors into rendering guilty verdicts.1
On March 13, 1996, after a second jury trial in New York Supreme Court, Kings County, Anderson was found guilty of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree. The State presented evidence that on May 7, 1995, at 3:45 p.m., outside 266 Kosciusko Street in Brooklyn, Anderson sold an envelope containing heroin to an undercover officer in exchange for a ten-dollar bill of pre-recorded "buy" money. Trial Tr. at 607, 608, 722.
Anderson's first trial ended in a hung jury after the jury had deliberated four days. At the second trial, the subject of Anderson's petition, the jury deliberated three days, March 11-13, 1996.
On the second day of deliberations, March 12, Juror 5 sent a note to the court requesting to be discharged. The note stated: See Trial Tr. at 1019 (emphasis in original). With the consent of both sides, the court discharged Juror 5. An alternate was designated and the jury was instructed "to begin deliberations anew." Id. at 1025.
Later that day, the jury sent a deadlock note to the court. The judge told the jury that he believed they had not spent "a significant amount of time ... on deliberations," id. at 1036, ordered that the jury be sequestered for the night, and instructed them to continue deliberations in the morning. The next morning, the jury announced that it had reached a verdict: the foreperson stated that Anderson was guilty of counts one and two (third degree sale and third degree possession of drugs), but not guilty of count three (seventh degree drug possession). The jury was polled, at which time Juror 11 repeatedly refused to answer the court clerk's question as to whether the verdict was hers.
Thirty minutes later, the jury again sent the court a note that it had reached a verdict. The jury returned the same verdict as it had before, after which the court again polled the jury, this time without incident. The court, however, concluded that the verdict as to counts two and three was inconsistent:
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, the third count only requires possession. The second count requires possession with the intent to sell. You found the defendant not guilty of the third count, which only charges him with possession. You found him guilty of the second count, which requires you to find him guilty of possession with the intent to sell. You should understand that those verdicts are inconsistent.
Trial Tr. at 1061. The court sent the jury back for further deliberations.
After another thirty minutes of deliberating, the jury announced, for the third time, that it had reached a verdict: guilty on all three counts. Id. at 1065-66. The court once again polled the jury, accepted the verdict, and discharged the jury. Immediately afterwards, Anderson's trial counsel objected to the verdict because he believed Jurors 11 and 2 had hesitated and cried during polling. See id. at 1069 ( ).
Soon after the jury had been discharged, Jurors 11 and 2 independently approached the defendant's attorney in the hallway outside the courtroom and told him that they had been coerced and intimidated into giving their guilty verdicts by their fellow jurors. Jurors 11 and 2 also told a court officer that they wished to speak to the court.
At an impromptu court inquiry held later that day, Juror 11 testified as follows:
THE COURT: [Y]ou served as a juror in the case which we just completed; that being the People of the State of New York against Henry Anderson. And I received word that you wanted to speak with me.
....
JUROR 11: I feel that I was pushed into the [verdict] that I gave.
....
....
....
THE COURT: Mr. Mullady, maybe you wish to talk with that juror and make any motion you deem is appropriate under the circumstances. The Court will take no further action. Okay? Thank you.
Trial Tr. at 1078-82. The letter Juror 11 referred to was dated March 12, 1996, and was addressed to "Hon. George." It stated:
I would like to go home[.] I feel that I'm no[t] going to change my min[d] ... I live within 3 blocks of the crime. My life might be in a major danger if I don't give the correct [verdict]. Also, I have 2 children the ages [of] 5[and] 11 at home whom I have not contacted [and] have [no] idea where they are located.
Pet'r's Ex. B. Juror 11 was the only juror to testify. Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that the inquiry was hastily arranged in a chaotic environment, and that the other jurors, including Juror 2, had left the courthouse. The record does not reveal whether defense counsel informed the trial court of Juror 2's allegations. See Hr'g Tr. at 35 (Feb. 15, 2002).
Anderson thereafter moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30.2 The motion was supported by affidavits from Jurors 11 and 2. Juror 11's affidavit stated, inter alia, that: Pet'r's Ex. B. Juror 2's affidavit stated, inter alia, that:
I ... was pressured into saying guilty. ... [There] were people arguing in the jury room [as] if they wanted to hit each other, [s]aying they don't want to stay in a hotel, that they got li[v]es[, and] have better things to do. ...
I was getting afraid because they were getting angry that I must be stupid to not know what is going on. ...
Everyone was yelling and giving [their] opinions, and every time I would give mine everyone would scream again. I was nervous and stressed out with everybody yelling so I just went along with everybody. But then I felt guilty for doing what I did because that was on my conscience. They pressured me to change my vote because we [were] not going anywhere. I change[d] my vote because I was afraid and pressured. I'm only 20 years old and I've never been on a jury and they were hollering and calling me names. I couldn't take the pressure. I just wanted to get away.
It was too much loud arguing[,] I couldn't think straight anymore.
The trial court denied Anderson's motion, without a hearing, stating that "[it] is well settled that a jury verdict may not be impeached by a juror's post-verdict affidavit or testimony absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances," and that "a verdict may not be impeached by proof of the tenor of [jury] deliberations." Resp't's Ex. D. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court dismissed the seventh-degree possession count as a lesser-included count, and sentenced Anderson to identical consecutive prison terms of four and one-half years to nine years for the third-degree sale and third-degree possession counts.
Anderson appealed to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department. He argued, inter alia, that he was denied a fair trial in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because Jurors 11 and 2 had been coerced by other jurors to convict him. On April 13, 1998, the Second Department, over a dissent by Justice Ritter, affirmed. See People v. Anderson, 249 A.D.2d 405, 671 N.Y.S.2d 149 (2d Dep't 1998). The court acknowledged that "a verdict may be impeached upon a showing of improper influence;" however, it concluded that Anderson "does not raise an issue of improper influence, but rather seeks to impeach the verdict by delving into the tenor of the jury's deliberative process." Id. at 150. The court noted that "the alleged behavior of the other jurors was not brought to the court's...
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Anderson v. Miller
...the jury room so that the Court may ascertain whether the petitioner's constitutional rights have been violated." Anderson v. Miller, 206 F.Supp.2d 352, 357 (E.D.N.Y.2002). Judge Block held the evidentiary hearing on December 3, 2001, which was continued on January 28 and February 15, 2002.......