Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co.

Decision Date07 January 1919
Citation169 Wis. 106,170 N.W. 275
PartiesANDERSON v. MILLER SCRAP IRON CO. ET AL.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Municipal Court of Brown County; N. J. Monahan, Judge.

Action by Katherine Anderson, as administratrix of the estate of Joseph Boncher, deceased, against the Miller Scrap Iron Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

Personal injury. The defendant company is a Wisconsin corporation, having its principal place of business at Green Bay. Joseph Boncher was a resident of Wisconsin, an employé of the defendant company. The business of the company, a dealer in scrap iron and steel, was carried on almost entirely within the state of Wisconsin. Nearly all of Boncher's services had been rendered within the state. Prior to the time of the accident, which occurred on June 30, 1917, the company had purchased the scrap on a small piece of narrow gauge railroad near Gibbs' farm, a place about 10 miles from Iron River, Mich. The work of gathering this scrap was under the personal direction of the defendant Herman Miller. The employés of the company boarded at Iron River, and went to and from their work in an automobile. On the second day, as they were going to work, the automobile, which was being driven by Herman Miller, was overturned, and Boncher suffered injuries from which he afterwards died. This action is brought by the administratrix of his estate to recover damages for the injuries sustained by Boncher and for his death. The liability of the defendants is predicated upon the survival statute of the state of Michigan. There was a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding the defendants guilty of negligence, and judgment was entered thereon for $4,116.59 damages and costs, from which judgment the defendants appeal. Other material facts will be stated in the opinion.Richmond, Jackman, Wilkie & Toebaas, of Madison, for appellant Miller Scrap Iron Co.

Kittell, Jaseph & Redfield, of Green Bay, for appellant Miller.

Kaftan & Reynolds, of Green Bay, for respondent.

Peter Fisher, of Kenosha, and Worth E. Caylor, of Chicago, Ill., amici curiæ.

ROSENBERRY, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The plaintiff claims the right to recover damages under the laws of the state of Michigan for the injury and death of Boncher, on the ground that the defendant company and its agent, Herman Miller, were negligent. The defendants claim that the liability of the defendant company is that prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act of Wisconsin (St. 1917, §§ 2394--1 to 2394--95), and inasmuch as the plaintiff has requested that, in the event it is held that the Workmen's Compensation Act applies to the company, the judgment shall be reversed as to both defendants, we will first consider that question.

The plaintiff's contention is that the injuries to the deceased, Boncher, having occurred within the state of Michigan, the rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties must be determined in accordance with the law of the state of Michigan; that the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Wisconsin cannot affect the rights, duties, and liabilities of the defendant company, because such act can have no extraterritorial effect. On behalf of the defendant company it is claimed that, this being an action in a Wisconsin court, both parties to which reside within the state of Wisconsin, and the contract of employment having been made within this state, at least in the courts of this state, the rights, duties, and liabilities of the defendant company are those prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Prior to the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act the liability of the employer was that prescribed by the common law, as modified by statute. The liability was held not to be one ex contractu, but one ex delicto, and the liability was held to result from the wrong which followed from the failure of the employer to discharge the duty which he owed to his employé to observe that degree of care which the law required of him. An action to enforce a claim against the employer for violation of his duty was therefore an action ex delicto, and the principles governing tort actions were applied. An action for personal injuries, being in its nature transitory, might be brought in any court having jurisdiction of the parties; but, wherever brought, the rights and liabilities of the parties were determined by the law of the place where the injury occurred. Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664, 34 L. R. A. 503, 59 Am. St. Rep. 859. The injuries sustained by the deceased, Boncher, having resulted from an accident which happened in Michigan, the plaintiff claims the benefit of this established principle of law, and seeks to enforce the liability of the defendants therefor in accordance with the laws of the state of Michigan, and such would be the plaintiff's undoubted right, but for the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act.

[1] It is claimed that the scheme of compensation provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act is a substitute for the common-law liability of the employer, and that it should therefore be administered in accordance with the principles applicable to the law of torts. In Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 365, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489, language was used arguendo which, taken apart from its context, may lend colorable support to this theory; but, when the whole opinion is considered, it cannot be fairly said that it does so. The matter there under consideration was whether or not the Legislature could change a remedy for a tort, and it was held that it might do so. That is not equivalent to holding that the liability imposed by the act is tortious in its nature.

It is true that the liability of the employer at common law was that of a wrongdoer, and therefore tortious in its nature. It is also true that for that liability the Workmen's Compensation Act has substituted another liability. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the principles applicable to torts should be applied to the liabilities of the employer under the act. The liability of the employer under the act is not based upon any wrongful conduct or negligent act of the employer. However blameless the employer may be, he is nevertheless liable if the employé be injured and he bring himself within the terms of the act.

The liability of the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act is not only one of an entirely different nature, but it is based upon a wholly different economic theory. The clear intent and purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to burden a particular industry in which the injury to an employé occurs with the damages resulting from such injury and to secure to the injured employé as large a part of the financial burden imposed by the act upon the industry as is possible. The law is therefore administered by state agencies for the benefit of the injured employé. He has the benefit of legal advice, often without expense, and where expense is incurred it is limited by the terms of the law.

Naturally such a radical change in our laws was necessarily followed by a period of adjustment. It ought to be clear to every one at this time, however, and particularly to the legal profession, that along with the practical abolition of the tortious liability of the employer there went an abolition of the refinements and technicalities which grew up in the administration of the law relating to personal injuries. It was the duty of the Legislature to determine what economic polioy was in the interest of the general welfare. The Legislature having made that determination, it is the duty of the courts so to administer the law within constitutional limitations as to give full effect to the legislative purpose. Many cases have been brought here because counsel have failed fully to grasp the meaning of this fundamental change in an important field of the law.

[2] To what injuries did the Legislature intend that the Workmen's Compensation Act should apply? It is claimed that by the language of section 2394--1, Stats., which provides that “in any action to recover damages for a personal injury sustained within this state it shall not be a defense that the employé assumed the risk, that the injury was caused by want of ordinary care on the part of a fellow servant, or that the employé was guilty of contributory negligence, the act is expressly limited to injuries occurring within the state.

Manifestly the state of Wisconsin cannot prescribe the liability of employers for purely tortious injuries to employés occurring without the state of Wisconsin, because, as we have seen, the liability in such a case is that prescribed by the law of the place where the injury occurs. The effect of that part of the act, therefore, abolishing the common-law defenses against claims for personal injuries based upon negligence, is necessarily limited in its application to the state of Wisconsin, and the section would have meant the same thing that it now means, had the words “in this state” been omitted.

Section 2394--3, Stats. which provides that “liability for the compensation hereinafter provided for, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, shall exist against an employer for any personal injury accidentally sustained by his employé, and for his death,” where the prescribed conditions of compensation concur, and that the right to recover the compensation provided in the act “shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer for such injury or death,” and that in all other cases the liability of the employer shall be that at common law, except that he may not avail himself of the common-law defenses of assumption of hazard, negligence of a fellow servant, or contributory negligence, contains no language from which it may be inferred that its application was intended to be limited to injuries which occur within the state.

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