Anderson v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND, United States District Judge
• Citation: Anderson v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 608 F.Supp.3d 214 (W.D. Pa. 2022)
• Decision Date: 22 June 2022
• Docket Number: 2:21-CV-00493-CCW
• Parties: Douglas J. ANDERSON, as Administrator of the Estate of Theresa R. Anderson, and Douglas J. Anderson, in his own right, Plaintiff, v. MOTORIST MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

608 F.Supp.3d 214

Douglas J. ANDERSON, as Administrator of the Estate of Theresa R. Anderson, and Douglas J. Anderson, in his own right, Plaintiff,

v.MOTORIST MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

2:21-CV-00493-CCW

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed June 22, 2022

Richard J. Joyce, Joyce & Bittner, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Joseph A. Hudock, Jr., Summers, McDonnell, Hudock, Guthrie & Skeel, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND, United States District Judge Before the Court is a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Douglas J. Anderson, as the administrator of the Estate of Theresa R. Anderson, and in his own right ("Mr. Anderson"), ECF No. 20, and a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Motorists¹ Mutual Insurance Company ("Motorists Mutual"), ECF No. 17.

Mr. Anderson settled with third party tortfeasors following a motor vehicle accident in which Theresa Anderson was killed. ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 1–12, 17–18. He then filed a claim for underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits with Motorists Mutual. ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 13–15, 18. The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment focus on the amount of credit to which Motorists Mutual is entitled on Mr. Anderson's UIM claim. Id. ¶ 19.

For the reasons that follow, Mr. Anderson's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED in part with respect to the fact that Motorists Mutual is not entitled to a $500,000 credit pursuant to the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, and DENIED in all other respects.

Further, Motorists Mutual's Motion will be GRANTED such that Court will enter a declaratory judgment that Motorists Mutual is entitled to a credit of $5,100,000 on Mr. Anderson's UIM claim.

I. Background

This case relates to an October 30, 2012 motor vehicle accident in which Theresa Anderson was killed. ECF No. 19 ¶ 1. After the accident, Mr. Anderson sued the third-party tortfeasors who were involved in the accident. After settling with the third parties, he filed a claim for underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits with Motorists Mutual. ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 2–18. Motorists Mutual reviewed Mr. Anderson's UIM claim and denied it on the basis that the value of the claim did not exceed the combined $5,100,000 liability limits of the third-party tortfeasors. Id. ¶ 19.

Mr. Anderson filed a Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County against Motorists Mutual seeking that the Court find that Mr. Anderson is legally entitled to recover the total amount of underinsured benefits available under the Motorist Mutual Policies. ECF No. 1-2 at 11.

Motorists Mutual, asserting diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, timely removed the action to this Court. Id. ¶¶ 20–21; see ECF No. 1. Motorists Mutual then filed its answer, defenses, and counterclaim. ECF No. 19 ¶ 22; see generally ECF No. 3. Motorists Mutual's counterclaim requests a declaratory judgment that it is entitled to a credit of $5,600,000² against any award in the UIM case. ECF No. 3 ¶ 38.

Although not discussed in the parties’ summary judgment briefing, this Court finds that the constitutional standing requirements of a "case" or "controversy" are met in this case such that the Court has the ability to issue declaratory judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) ("In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."); Ke v. DiPasquale , 828 F. App'x 98, 101 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass'n, Inc. v. Gov't of U.S. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2000) ) (noting that as a threshold matter, "[a] declaratory judgment or injunction can issue only when the constitutional standing requirements of a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ are met and ... [such standing] exists when there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." (internal quotations omitted)).

Following discovery, the parties filed their motions for summary judgment, which are now ripe for disposition.

II. Undisputed Material Facts

Motorists Mutual filed a concise statement of material facts in support of its Motion, ECF No. 19. Mr. Anderson did not oppose any of Motorists Mutual's facts, and, in his own concise statement of material facts, incorporated all of Motorists Mutual's material facts by reference. ECF No. 24 ¶ 2. The only addition to Mr. Anderson's concise statement of material fact was that he attached a "complete copy of the Declarations sheet and the Underinsured Motorist Coverage - Part C, PP 74 18, provisions of the Motorist[s] Mutual policy issued" in this case. ECF No. 24 ¶ 2. Thus, it appears to the Court that the parties agree on the undisputed material facts in this case recited below, as they pertain to the cross-motions presently before the Court.

A. The Accident

Theresa Anderson died in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on October 30, 2012 on Second Avenue in the City of Pittsburgh. ECF No. 19 ¶ 1. Wendy Meyers was operating the vehicle in which Theresa Anderson was a passenger at the time of the accident. Id. ¶ 2. The other vehicle involved in the accident was a truck driven by Austin Rummel and owned by M&C Trucking Company. Id. ¶ 3.

B. Applicable Insurance Policies at the Time of the Accident

Wendy Meyers was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on a policy of insurance providing $100,000 in liability coverage (the "State Farm Policy"). Id. ¶ 8.

Austin Rummel, M&C Trucking Company and John Muchesko had primary liability limits of $1,000,000 on a policy written by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual"). Id. ¶ 10. They were also insured under an umbrella policy written by Liberty Mutual with liability limits of $4,000,000 (together, with the primarily liability policy, the "Liberty Mutual Policies"). Id. ¶ 11.

Theresa Anderson was insured by Motorists Mutual on a policy providing $100,000 of underinsured motorist coverage ("UIM") per accident (the "Motorists Mutual Policy"). Id. ¶ 13. She elected stacking of UIM coverage for the two vehicles covered under the policy. Id. ¶ 14. As a result of her election of the stacking option, Ms. Anderson has $200,000 of UIM coverage available for the October 30, 2012 accident. Id. ¶ 15.

C. The Underlying Litigation and Related Settlement

Following the accident, Mr. Anderson filed three actions³ related to the accident, which were all consolidated at GD 14-015587 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 7.

With respect to Wendy Meyers, State Farm paid its policy limit of $100,000 in settlement of Mr. Anderson's claim. Id. ¶ 9. Mr. Anderson also settled his claim against Austin Rummel, M&C Trucking Company and John Muchesko (the "Rummel Tortfeasors") for $550,000. Id. ¶ 12. Upon being informed of the settlement with the defendants in the third-party action in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Motorists Mutual consented to the settlement in accordance with the terms of the Motorists Mutual Policy. Id. ¶ 16 (citing ECF No. 1-2, Mr. Anderson's complaint stating that "[p]rior to the claims against the third party insurers above, the Plaintiff requested and received from Motorist Mutual[ ] approvals necessary to meet the policy requirements to settle with the third party carriers and proceed with a UIM claim under the Motorist Mutual Policy"). On June 4, 2020, Mr. Anderson settled and discontinued the consolidated cases. Id. ¶ 17.

D. The Applicable Provision of the Motorists Mutual Policy

As relevant to this case, Motorists Mutual's UIM endorsement provides that it will pay UIM benefits if "[t]he limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements ..." (the "UIM Exhaustion Clause"). Id. ¶ 22; see also ECF No. 24-1 at 3.

III. Legal Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist. , 872 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "A factual dispute is ‘genuine’ if the ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, (1986) ). "A factual dispute is ‘material’ if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ " Id. (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

The burden to establish that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact "remains with ‘the moving party regardless of which party would have the burden of persuasion at trial.’ " Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp. , 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc. , 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d Cir. 1987) ). That said, "[i]f the non-moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, ‘the moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to carry that burden.’ " Kaucher v. County of Bucks , 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wetzel v. Tucker , 139 F.3d 380, 383 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998) ).

Once the moving party has...