Anderson v. Nat'l Grid, PLC

• Decision Date: 25 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12–CV–4422 JFBARL.,12–CV–4422 JFBARL.
• Citation: 93 F.Supp.3d 120
• Parties: Michael ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL GRID, PLC, and Robert DeMarinis, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

93 F.Supp.3d 120

Michael ANDERSON, Plaintiff

v.NATIONAL GRID, PLC, and Robert DeMarinis, Defendants.

No. 12–CV–4422 JFBARL.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed March 25, 2015.

Kathleen Ann Tirelli, Scott Michael Mishkin, P.C., Islandia, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jessica C. Moller, Bond, Schoeneck & King PLLC, Garden City, NY, Robert Arthur LaBerge, Bond, Schoeneck & King PLLC, Syracuse, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff Michael Anderson (“Anderson” or “plaintiff”) commenced this action against National Grid, PLC (“National Grid”) and Robert DeMarinis (collectively, “defendants”) on September 5, 2012. He alleges disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”). In particular, plaintiff claims that National Grid, his former employer, and DeMarinis, a Vice President of National Grid, (1) failed to accommodate plaintiff's spondylolisthesis

, a condition that caused back pain; (2) terminated his employment with National Grid because he suffered from spondylolisthesis ; and (3) terminated him because he requested a reasonable accommodation for his spondylolisthesis.

Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants summary judgment for defendants as to the ADA claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL claims.

First, the Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to accommodate and discriminatory discharge claims fail as a matter of law because no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Under the ADA, a disability is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and in the instant case, there is no evidence that plaintiff's spondylolisthesis

substantially limited his ability to perform the major life activities of sitting or working.

Second, even if plaintiff could be found to be “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA, his reasonable accommodation claim still cannot survive summary judgment because he acknowledged under oath that he was performing all the essential functions of the job at the Patchogue Yard without any accommodation.

Third, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff was disabled, the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact concerning defendants' motivation for terminating his employment. Defendants have proffered evidence that they terminated plaintiff's employment because plaintiff had been spending time at home during his workday several times per week, and because plaintiff failed to cooperate in good faith with their investigation into his conduct. In fact, it is uncontroverted that: (1) plaintiff went home during the workday several times per week; and (2) when asked about his hours, plaintiff lied and stated that he only went home during the workday two or three days per month. Plaintiff explained that he was going home during the work day to rest his back, which was aggravated by extended driving and sitting while working—that is, in the middle of the day, he drove about forty-five minutes from work in Patchogue to his home in Southampton to rest his back, before driving back to work later in the day. Thus, plaintiff drove approximately an additional hour and a half for the purported reason of resting his back from the driving activity at work. Plaintiff also explains that he gave false information in the investigation because he was nervous and frightened. Regardless of what plaintiff's explanation is for his conduct and false statements in the investigation, plaintiff has provided no evidence that this legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination was pretext for discrimination. In particular, the Court rejects plaintiff's argument that discrimination must have motivated defendants' decision to terminate him because other, non-disabled employees of National Grid had engaged in similar conduct without being investigated or terminated. Critically, there is no evidence that defendants knew about the alleged malfeasance by these employees, and the one other employee whom defendants investigated had not engaged in the same type of conduct that plaintiff was believed to have committed. In short, the uncontroverted facts establish that National Grid had good reason to believe plaintiff had violated company policy, and there is simply no reason for a rational jury to find that the decision to terminate plaintiff (even if they disagreed with it) was motivated by disability discrimination.

Fourth, the Court concludes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim for many of the reasons just stated. In addition, there is uncontroverted evidence in the record that an anonymous complaint in March 2011 asserting that plaintiff was receiving overtime pay for time he was spending at home triggered the investigation of plaintiff's conduct by National Grid's Ethics and Compliance Office. In sum, plaintiff has produced no evidence showing that defendants' proffered reason for terminating his employment—violations of company policy—were pretext for either discrimination or retaliation.

Finally, because the Court grants summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law discrimination claims.

I. Background

A. Facts

The following facts are taken from the parties' depositions, declarations, exhibits, and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005). Unless otherwise noted, where a party's Rule 56.1 statement is cited, that fact is undisputed, or the opposing party has not pointed to any evidence in the record to contradict it.¹ The Court reserves recitation of certain facts for its analysis of the specific issues raised by the present motion.

1. Plaintiff's Employment at National Grid

National Grid is a public utility that provides natural gas service to customers on Long Island and elsewhere in New York. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 1.) The company has several facilities on Long Island, each of which serves a defined region. (Id. ¶ 2.) Relevant for purposes of the instant case are the facility in Riverhead (the “Riverhead yard”), which serves the region of Long Island east of the William Floyd Parkway, and the facility in Patchogue (the “Patchogue yard”), which serves a portion of Long Island west of the William Floyd Parkway. (See id. ¶¶ 3–4.)

Plaintiff began working for the Long Island Lighting Company (“LILCO”), National Grid's predecessor, in 1978.² (Aff. of Jessica C. Moller (“Moller Aff.”) Ex. D; Dep. of Michael James Anderson (“Anderson Dep.”) at 10.) From approximately 2000 until his termination in 2011, plaintiff was a senior field supervisor—a management level position responsible for the supervision of laborers, utility mechanics, and foremen—in gas field operations.

(Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 9; Anderson Dep. at 34.) As discussed infra, he worked in the Riverhead yard from 2000 through June 2010, when he was transferred to the Patchogue yard.

The instant case revolves around plaintiff's dissatisfaction with his transfer to the Patchogue yard due to a back condition called spondylolisthesis

that made it difficult for him to drive long distances. Plaintiff was first diagnosed with spondylolisthesis in 1999, and he avers that the condition causes him “excruciating back pain” that is “aggravated by long periods of sitting and/or driving.” (Aff. of Kathleen A. Tirelli (“Tirelli Aff.”) Ex. CC; Aff. of Michael Anderson (“Anderson Aff.”) ¶¶ 9–10.) To alleviate the pain, plaintiff had metal rods and screws inserted in his back sometime in 2000. (Id. ¶ 11.) After surgery, plaintiff was restricted from driving for more than thirty minutes at a time for four to six weeks. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 15; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 15; Anderson Dep. at 99–100 & Ex. 4.) When he returned to work, plaintiff was assigned a desk job as a resource planner in the Riverhead yard because driving for more than thirty minutes at a time aggravated his back. (Anderson Aff. ¶ 12; Anderson Dep. at 15.) Then plaintiff's manager asked him if he would assume the job of field supervisor, and plaintiff accepted even though was concerned about the amount of driving he would have to do. (Anderson Aff. ¶¶ 15, 18.) Plaintiff claims that he was assigned to the Riverhead yard for the next ten years because it was close to his home in Southampton, thus minimizing his commute time. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 18; see also Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 8.)

Over the ensuing years, plaintiff's back condition became known to others in the company. One of plaintiff's co-workers, Michael Stano, testified that plaintiff's back pain was “common knowledge” because everyone could see that he had trouble sitting down. (Moller Aff. Ex. F & Tirelli Aff. Ex. T, Dep. of Michael Stano (“Stano Dep.”) at 19–20.) Stano further stated that he thought everyone, at least the supervisors in Suffolk County, knew about plaintiff's bad back. (Id. at 19.) In addition, in 2002, plaintiff's doctor advised plaintiff to restrict his driving on a permanent basis. (Tirelli Aff. Ex. DD, Aff. of Dr. John J. Brennan (“Brennan Aff.”) ¶ 6.) The doctor also claims to have advised National Grid that plaintiff's driving should be limited because of his bad back.³ (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) In 2006, when Michael Howley (“Howley”) became plaintiff's manager, plaintiff also informed Howley of his back condition. (Anderson Aff. ¶ 21.) However, even though plaintiff claims he had been assigned to the Riverhead yard to accommodate his bad back, Howley testified that he did not know why plaintiff was stationed in the Riverhead yard for as long as he wa...