Anderson v. Northwestern Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 28 September 1951
• Docket Number: No. 240,240
• Citation: 64 S.E.2d 265,233 N.C. 372
• Parties: ANDERSON, v. NORTHWESTERN MOTOR CO. et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 265

64 S.E.2d 265

233 N.C. 372

ANDERSON, v.NORTHWESTERN MOTOR CO. et al.

No. 240

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 28, 1951

W. H. McElwee, Jr., North Wilkesboro, for plaintiff, appellant.

Trivette, Holshouser & Mitchell, North Wilkesboro, for defendants, appellees.

ERVIN, Justice.

To obtain an award of compensation for an injury under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, an employee must always show these three things: (1) That he suffered a personal injury by accident; (2) that his injury arose in the course of his employment; and (3) that his injury arose out of his employment.Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 53 S.E.2d 668.Furthermore, he must establish a fourth essential element, towit, that his injury caused him disability, unless it is included in the schedule of injuries made compensable by G.S. § 97-31 without regard to loss of wage-earning power.Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 25 S.E.2d 865.As used here, the term 'disability' signifies an impairment of wage-earning capacity rather than a physical impairment.This is necessarily so for the very simple reason that the Act expressly specifies that 'The term 'disability' means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.'G.S. § 97-2 (i).

The assignments of error permit the plaintiff to challenge the validity of the judgment of the Superior Court on alternative grounds.This he does.He insists primarily that the decision of the Full Commission is not sustained by its findings of fact, and he asserts secondarily that such findings of fact are not supported by the evidence before the Commission.Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760.

While there seems to be no case on the specific point in this State, courts in other jurisdictions hold with virtual uniformity that when an employee afflicted with a pre-existing disease or infirmity suffers a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and such injury materially accelerates or aggravates the pre-existing disease or infirmity and thus proximately contributes to the death or disability of the employee, the injury is compensable, even though it would not have caused death or disability to a normal person.Schneider's Workmen's Compensation (Perm.Ed.), Text Volume 6, section 1543 (i);58 Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, section 247;71 C.J., Workmen's Compensation Acts, section 358.

When this proceeding was heard before the Commission, the plaintiff invoked these outside authorities, and argued that he was entitled to an award of compensation under them because the evidence established these three propositions: (1) That he was afflicted with a pre-existing infirmity of the spine; (2) that on March 7, 1949, he suffered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and (3) that such personal injury accelerated or aggravated his pre-existing infirmity of the spine and in that way proximately contributed to a disability on his part.The defendant denied the validity of this argument.

The plaintiff's primary position on the appeal may be summarized as follows: The Commission rejected the outside legal authorities invoked by plaintiff as the basis for his claim, and for that reason did not find the facts in respect to the plaintiff's third proposition.As a consequence, the findings are silent on the main issue joined between the parties, fail to determine the controversy involved in the proceeding, and do not support the decision, denying compensation to the plaintiff.Hence, the Superior Court erred in refusing a request by plaintiff that the proceeding be remanded to the Commission with an instruction that the Commission find from the evidence whether the personal injury by accident suffered by plaintiff on March 7, 1949, proximately contributed to a disability on his part by accelerating or aggravating his pre-existing spinal infirmity.Evans v. Tabor City Lumber Co., 232 N.C. 111, 59 S.E.2d 612;Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 49 S.E.2d 797.

The plaintiff's primary position is untenable because his fundamental premise, i. e., that the Commission rejected the outside legal authorities invoked by him as the basis for his claim and by reason thereof did not find the facts in respect to his third proposition, lacks validity.

When the record is read aright, it reveals that the Full Commission...