Anderson v. Pension and Retirement Bd. of City of Milford

• Decision Date: 03 December 1974
• Citation: Anderson v. Pension and Retirement Bd. of City of Milford, 355 A.2d 283, 167 Conn. 352 (Conn. 1974)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2711 J. Allen ANDERSON et al. v. The PENSION AND RETIREMENT BOARD OF the CITY OF MILFORD et al.

Page 283

355 A.2d 283

167 Conn. 352, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2711

J. Allen ANDERSON et al. v. The PENSION AND RETIREMENT BOARD OF the CITY OF MILFORD et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Dec. 3, 1974.

Gerald F. Stevens, Milford, for appellants (named plaintiff et al.).

Stephen E. Ronai, Milford, for appellees (defendants).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

The plaintiffs, retired members of the Milford police department, brought this action for damages claiming that the defendant Pension and Retirement Board had improperly computed their pension benefits. After a hearing, the Court of Common Pleas rendered judgment for the defendants. From that judgment the plaintiffs have appealed to this court assigning error in the court's conclusions, in the overruling of the plaintiffs' claims of law, and in its rulings on evidence.

The facts ¹ can be summarized as follows: In managing the pension and retirement system for the Milford police department, the defendant board is governed by certain provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between the city of Milford and Local 899, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. That agreement provides that each employee of the Milford police department fifty years of age or over, who has served for at least twenty-five years, shall upon written request, be retired by the board on an annual pension equal to two percent of his 'average annual pay' for each year of service. 'Average annual pay' is then defined as 'the average of all compensation including but not limited to . . . base salary, holiday pay, longevity pay, overtime pay, etc., which the employee receives during his or her three (3) highest paid fiscal years.'

Another agreement between the city and the Milford Police Union Local 899 provides, in part, that '(e)ach member of the Department upon retirement . . . shall be financially compensated, i.e., paid in cash for seventy-five (75%) percent of all unused sick days credited to the member's sick leave account at the time of his retirement.' Pursuant to that agreement, each of the plaintiffs received a lump sum payment for his unused sick days immediately prior to retirement. These lump sum payments were received along with each of the plaintiffs' regular wages and were labeled 'adjusted pay.' Although the city deducted pension contributions and withholding taxes from each of the lump sum payments, the board refused to consider those unused sick day payments in computing the plaintiffs' pension benefits.

It is the plaintiffs' contention that the language of the collective bargaining agreement expressed a clear intention to include all forms of compensation in the definition of 'average annual pay' and that payments for accumulated sick days are 'compensation' within the contract definition of 'average annual pay.' The trial court concluded, however, that the plaintiffs had 'failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that the parties intended to include 'sick pay' in determining the retirement benefit under the definition of 'average annual pay," and that the use of the word 'etc.' was so ambiguous that parol and documentary evidence was admissible as an aid to the court in the interpretation of the contract.

' The intention of the parties to a contract is to be determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circimstances connected with the transaction. The question is not what intention existed in the minds of the parties, but what intention is expressed in the language used.' Ives v. Willimantic, 121 Conn. 408, 411, 185 A. 427, 428; Schubert v. Ivey, 158 Conn. 583, 589, 264 A.2d 562; Sturtevant v. Sturtevant, 146 Conn. 644, 647, 153 A.2d 828; Buckley v. Buckley, 144 Conn. 403 409, 133 A.2d 604. The words used by the parties 'must be accorded their common meaning and usage where they can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.' Beach v. Beach, 141 Conn. 583, 589, 107 A.2d 629, 632; Sturtevant v. Sturtevant, supra, 146 Conn. 647-648, 153 A.2d 828.

It was unnecessary for the trial court to go beyond the language used by the parties in the collective bargaining agreement. In that agreement 'average annual pay' is defined by the words 'all compensation' followed by the phrase 'including but not limited to base salary, holiday pay, longevity pay, overtime pay, etc.' That phrase contains words of illustration, not limitation. Thus the use of abbreviation 'etc.' does not inject any ambiguity into the meaning of 'all compensation.' It merely indicates that the list of examples preceding it are not exhaustive. See 1 Am.Jur.2d, Abbreviations, § 8; Black's Law Dictionary 652 (4th Ed.).

'Compensation' is a generic term when used with reference to services and has been defined as 'salary,...