Anderson v. Rives, 6658.

Citation85 F.2d 673,66 App. DC 174
Decision Date24 August 1936
Docket NumberNo. 6658.,6658.
PartiesANDERSON v. RIVES.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

James J. Laughlin, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Leslie C. Garnett, U. S. Atty., and John J. Wilson and Allen J. Krouse, Asst. U. S. Attys., for appellee.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and VAN ORSDEL, GRONER, and STEPHENS, Associate Justices.

STEPHENS, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia discharging a writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the petition upon which the writ had been issued. The sole question in the case is whether a judgment of the same court sentencing the appellant to imprisonment was valid.

The facts are as follows: On May 16, 1934, an indictment had been returned charging that on April 24, 1934, the appellant had committed the crime of murder in the first degree. On June 26, 1934, the appellant entered a plea of guilty of murder in the second degree. On August 30, 1934, a judgment sentencing her to a term of twenty years in the penitentiary was entered. The importance of the dates mentioned is that all of them are subsequent to July 15, 1932, the effective date of the "Act to establish a Board of Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for the District of Columbia and to determine its functions, and for other purposes." Sections 1-9, 47 Stat. 696, D.C.Code, Supp. I, 1933, Title 6, §§ 137, 451-458, and section 10, added by the Act of June 5, 1934, 48 Stat. 880, D.C. Code, Supp. II, 1936, Title 6, § 459. The Indeterminate Sentence Act provides in Sections 3, 7 and 9, as follows:

"Sec. 3. That hereafter, in imposing sentence on a person convicted in the District of Columbia of a felony, the justice or judge of the court imposing such sentence shall sentence the person for a maximum period, not exceeding the maximum fixed by law, and for a minimum period not exceeding one-fifth of the maximum period fixed by law, and any person so convicted and sentenced may be released on parole as herein provided at any time after having served the minimum sentence: Provided, however, That this Act shall not abrogate the power of the justice or judge to sentence a convicted prisoner to the death penalty as now or hereafter may be provided by law: Provided further, That where a justice or a judge of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has imposed a life sentence on the prisoner convicted in the District of Columbia, said prisoner serving such sentence shall be eligible to parole as herein provided at any time after having served fifteen years of his life's sentence.

"Sec. 7. That all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with the provisions of the Act are hereby repealed: Provided, however, That for any felony committed before this Act takes effect, the penalty, sentence, or forfeiture provided by law for such felony at the time such felony was committed shall remain in full force and effect and shall be imposed, notwithstanding this Act.

"Sec. 9. Upon the appointment of the members of said board, the powers of the existing parole board over prisoners confined in the penal institutions of the District of Columbia shall cease and determine and all the powers of said existing parole board under the authority of the Act of Congress approved June 25, 1910, entitled `An Act to parole United States prisoners, and for other purposes,' as amended, over said prisoners confined in the penal institutions of the District of Columbia shall be transferred to and vested in said Board of Indeterminate Sentence and Parole: Provided, however, That in the case of a prisoner convicted of felony committed prior to the effective date of this Act, and in the case of any prisoner convicted of misdemeanor when the aggregate sentence imposed is in excess of one year, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence and Parole may parole said prisoner, under the provisions of this Act, after said prisoner has served one-fifth of the sentence imposed." 47 Stat. 697, 698, 699 (D.C.Code Supp. I, 1933, Title 6, §§ 453, 457, 458).

The statute stipulating the penalty for murder in the second degree provides:

"* * * The punishment of murder in the second degree shall be imprisonment for life, or for not less than twenty years." 31 Stat. 1321, § 801.

This statute has been made a part of the District of Columbia Code. D.C.Code 1929, Title 6, § 24. The term of court at which the sentence of twenty years was imposed upon the appellant has expired.

The contention of the appellant is that since the act for which she was indicted and her conviction were both subsequent to the date upon which the Indeterminate Sentence Act became effective, it was the duty of the trial court to sentence her under that Act, and that thereunder the court should have imposed not a definite sentence of twenty years as it did, but a sentence stipulating a maximum and a minimum period. Therefore, the appellant asserts, the sentence actually imposed, not being in strict conformity with the Indeterminate Sentence Act, is void, and, the term having expired, she is entitled to discharge — this upon the theory that the trial court has lost jurisdiction to impose a new and correct sentence.

It is true that if a criminal judgment is not in strict accord with the statute applicable to the crime involved, it is void. We so held in De Benque v. United States, 66 App.D.C. 36, 85 F.(2d) 202, decided May 11, 1936. But it is not true that where a court has imposed a void sentence, it lacks power, because of expiration of the term, to impose a new and valid one. This also we held in De Benque v. United States. Therefore, if we were to conclude that the sentence imposed in the instant case were void, we would be obliged to remand the case with directions to resentence the appellant.

But we think that the sentence imposed was valid: The problem in the case arises in the application of Section 3 of the Indeterminate Sentence Act to the penalty "fixed by law" for second degree murder. In the ordinary case the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Act is not difficult. For example, the penalty for housebreaking is fixed by law at imprisonment for not more than fifteen years. 31 Stat. 1323, 1324, § 823, D.C.Code 1929, Title 6, § 55. Therefore, under the Indeterminate Sentence Act the trial court could impose a term of imprisonment of fifteen years, or less, as a maximum, and of not more than three years as a minimum, i. e., not more than one-fifth of the fifteen years. But in the instant case the maximum term of imprisonment for second degree murder is life, and it is not possible to take one-fifth of life because life itself is indeterminate.

The statute must be given a sensible construction as to its applicability. United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall.(74 U.S.) 482, 19 L.Ed. 278.1 That case, of course, had to do with the applicability of a statute to facts obviously not intended to be covered by the statute, but the principle of the case is valid in respect of the applicability of a statute to another statute. We think that by no sensible construction of the Indeterminate Sentence Act can it be said to have been intended to apply where it is mathematically impossible to apply it.

It is objected that the second proviso of Section 3 of the Indeterminate Sentence Act"where a justice or a judge of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has imposed a life sentence on the prisoner convicted in the District of Columbia, said prisoner serving such sentence shall be eligible to parole as herein provided at any time after having served fifteen years of his life's sentence." — indicates that Congress did intend the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Act to offenses involving life imprisonment as a penalty. But this is not a necessary conclusion. Section 9 of the Indeterminate Sentence Act provides for the transfer of the powers of the parole board existing under the authority of the Act of Congress approved June 25, 1910, entitled "An Act to parole United States prisoners, and for other purposes," 36 Stat. 819, as amended by the Act of January 23, 1913, 37 Stat. 650, 18 U. S.C.A. §§ 714-723 over prisoners confined in the penal institutions of the District of Columbia, to the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and Parole created by the Indeterminate Sentence Act. It is conceivable that the second proviso of Section 3 was intended to guide the new parole board so far as concerned release on parole of prisoners already serving a life sentence. But we do not assume in the instant case to pass upon the effect of those provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Act relating to the parole of prisoners, because no question of right to parole is herein presented. And even if the second proviso of Section 3 must be said to indicate that Congress did intend the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Act to offenses involving life imprisonment as a penalty, still we cannot give effect to such expression of intention when the particular provision, to which the proviso in question is attached, stipulating precisely the method of application of the Act, is mathematically inapplicable to the offense and penalty involved.

It is also objected that to hold the Indeterminate Sentence Act inapplicable to second degree murder and the penalty therefor is to...

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    ...3d cir., 155 F.2d 592, affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 330 U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818; Anderson v. Rives, 66 App.D.C. 174, 85 F.2d 673; Egan v. United States, 52 App.D.C. 384, 287 F. 958; Harman v. United States, 8 cir., 50 F. 921; Howard v. State, 28 Ariz.......
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