Anderson v. School Bd. of Madison County

Citation517 F.3d 292
Decision Date11 February 2008
Docket NumberNo. 06-60902.,06-60902.
PartiesJoan ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF MADISON COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Suzanne Griggins Keys (argued), Byrd & Associates, Jackson, MS, for Anderson.

Holmes S. Adams (argued), John Simeon Hooks, Adams & Reese, Jackson, MS, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

Since 1969, the Madison County School District ("MCSD") in Mississippi has been under a federal court order to desegregate its schools. On June 18, 2004, the MCSD filed a motion for full unitary status, claiming it had complied with the district court's orders and had "to the extent practicable, eliminated the vestiges of racial discrimination resulting from the former racially dual system."1 The United States ("Government") and a group of private citizens ("Private Plaintiffs" or "Appellants") opposed the motion and argued that the MCSD was not entitled to full unitary status. After discovery and a hearing, the district court granted the MCSD's motion on April 7, 2006, ending more than three decades of federal court supervision over the school district. Only the Private Plaintiffs have appealed.

I.

The MCSD is one of many school districts in Mississippi that at one time practiced de jure raced-based segregation. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's directive in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 20, 90 S.Ct. 29, 24 L.Ed.2d 19 (1969), we mandated that those school districts could "`no longer operate a dual school system based on race or color' and [that] each district is to operate ... as a unitary school system within which no person is `effectively excluded from any school because of race or color.'" United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 423 F.2d 1264, 1267 (5th Cir.1969) (quoting Alexander, 396 U.S. at 20, 90 S.Ct. 29). The district court for the Southern District of Mississippi, finding that the MCSD operated a de jure segregated school system, issued its original desegregation order in 1969, requiring the MCSD to (1) divide the school district into three attendance zones, (2) implement a transportation scheme that is "non-segregated and non-discriminatory," and (3) select locations for school construction and school consolidation "in a manner which will prevent the recurrence of the dual school structure once this desegregation plan is implemented."

Since the issuance of the 1969 order, the district court has supervised the MCSD's desegregation, efforts and enforced' compliance through a series of consent orders. The most recent consent order, approved by the district court on April 24, 2000, addressed a number of issues including school construction, transportation, majority-to-minority transfers, staff recruitment, hiring, assignment and compensation, and the creation of a bi-racial advisory committee.

On June 18, 2004, the MCSD filed a motion for declaration of full unitary status. Following discovery, the Government and Private Plaintiffs stipulated in a pretrial order that they did not object to a finding of unitary status with regard to eleven operational areas: (1) student assignment, except as it related to the magnet program at Velma Jackson High School ("VJHS"), (2) enforcement of student attendance zones and student transfers, (3) transportation, (4) extracurricular activities, (5) majority-to-minority transfers, (6) special education programs, (7) gifted programs, (8) student discipline, (9) the bi-racial advisory committee, (10) a Title I initiative program, and (11) the MCSD's reporting obligations.

However, both the Government and Private Plaintiffs objected to a finding of unitary status with respect to the magnet program and facilities at VJHS, and facilities at other schools. The Private Plaintiffs further objected to a finding of unitary status regarding (1) faculty assignment, (2) employment procedures, (3) the use of sixteenth section funds2 and contributions from private groups, and (4) an alternative school. The Private Plaintiffs also argued that the motion should be denied because the MCSD did not act in good faith to comply with the court's orders to remedy problems in these areas.

In February 2006, the district court held a four-day public hearing on the MCSD's motion and both sides presented witness testimony. Members of the public were also invited to comment on the motion. On April 7, 2006, the district court issued a thorough and well-reasoned Memorandum Opinion and Order concluding that the MCSD was entitled to full unitary status. Based on that conclusion; the court granted the MCSD's motion and dissolved all existing desegregation and consent orders. The Private Plaintiffs timely appealed.

A basic description of the MCSD's geography is helpful in understanding the present dispute over whether the district court erred in finding that the MCSD is entitled to full unitary status. The MCSD serves all of Madison County, except for an area served by the Canton Public School District. In 1969 the MCSD served approximately 4,500 students, 75% of whom were African-American. By contrast, in the fall of 2005, the MCSD served almost 11,000 students, approximately 38% of whom were African-American and 58% were, white. Pursuant to the 1969 desegregation order, the MCSD is divided into three zones. Zone I, located in the northeast part of Madison County, covers a geographically large but rural and sparsely populated area. Student enrollment at Zone I schools is more than 96% African-American. Zone II accounts for 85% of the MCSD's total" enrollment, and encompasses the cities of Ridgeland and Madison in the southern part of Madison County. Zone III covers a rural area and only. serves about 5% of the MCSD's students.

II.
A. Standards of Review

The district court's finding that the MCSD is unitary is a factual finding that we review for clear error. See Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 157 (5th Cir.1990). "[Al finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, if the district court's factual findings are "plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, we must accept them, even though we might have weighed the evidence differently if we had been sitting as a trier of fact." Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1312 (5th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have also recognized that, given the unique factual circumstances present in school desegregation cases, the district court's factual findings are entitled to "great deference." Flax, 915 F.2d at 158. This is particularly true when, as here, the district judge has "supervised the case for many years." Id. We review de novo whether an issue is ripe for judicial review. See Groome Res., Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 198-99 (5th Cir.2000).

B. Ripeness

As an initial matter, Appellants argue that several issues decided by the district court were not ripe for review. In determining whether a matter is ripe for judicial review we consider "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United Tramp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir.2000) ("Ripeness separates those matters that are premature because the injury is speculative and may never occur from those that are appropriate for judicial review."). Generally, issues are not ripe if "further factual development is required." Wolfe, 212 F.3d at 895.

First, Appellants point out that in 2005 the parties agreed to a create a committee to evaluate and recommend changes to the magnet program at VJHS. It is undisputed that the committee had not completed its evaluation by the time the district court granted the MCSD's motion. Appellants argue that the district court should have postponed its ruling until the committee completed its evaluation. Second, Appellants contend that the district court did not wait long enough following renovations and repairs at VJHS in 2005 to be able to adequately judge whether the magnet program could attain its goal of attracting white students. Lastly, Appellants argue that because of the MCSD's poor track record in honoring construction commitments, the court erred by ruling on the MCSD's motion while construction projects remained pending throughout the district.

We find these arguments unavailing. The factual record in this case has been extensively developed over more than thirty years of district court supervision. Further, prior to ruling on the MCSD's motion, the court conducted a lengthy public hearing where both sides presented evidence. Appellants cite no authority, and we have found none, requiring district courts to consider motions for unitary status only upon the completion of all school district construction projects and committee evaluations. Given the unique nature of desegregation litigation, such a requirement would be impractical, and as the MCSD points out, would likely result in the MCSD remaining forever under federal court supervision. Also, the current magnet program at VJHS had been in full operation since the 2000-2001 school year, long enough to allow the district court to make informed findings concerning its effectiveness — notwithstanding Appellants' argument that the 2005 renovations could possibly have some future effect that was not observable to the court in 2006. Thus, we find that no further factual development was required, and the issues decided by ...

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