Anderson v. Shalala, 94-2896
| Decision Date | 06 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-2896,94-2896 |
| Citation | 51 F.3d 777 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 14545B Clara B. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Robert W. Pratt, Des Moines, IA, for appellant.
Gary L. Hayward, Des Moines, IA, for appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, LAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Clara B. Anderson appeals from the district court's 1 order affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny Anderson supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. We affirm.
Anderson filed her applications for benefits on April 25, 1991, alleging that she became disabled on July 24, 1988, as a result of back and hip problems. The Social Security Administration denied Anderson's applications initially and on reconsideration, whereupon she sought a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ").
Anderson last worked as a dispatcher for a trucking company. She has other relevant work experience as a transportation manager and office manager. Anderson was 42 years old at the time of her August 4, 1992, hearing. In a lengthy, comprehensive opinion, the ALJ determined that although Anderson had demonstrated her inability to return to her past relevant work, the Secretary had met her burden of establishing the existence of other work that Anderson could perform. Accordingly, the ALJ ruled that Anderson was not entitled to benefits. The Appeals Council subsequently denied review, and Anderson filed the instant complaint seeking judicial review.
Anderson has a lengthy history of medical treatment, but the afflictions relevant to this appeal began with an automobile accident in 1985 in which Anderson injured her back and neck. Anderson underwent neck surgery in March 1986 and returned to work. She reinjured herself at work, however, and has not worked since her alleged onset date. After a number of rehabilitative setbacks, Anderson was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease and underwent back surgery in 1989. She subsequently underwent cervical fusion procedures in September 1990 and January 1991.
Throughout 1990 and 1991, Anderson made a substantial number of trips to the hospital complaining about pervasive headaches, hip pain, numbness in her arms, depression, and other ailments. She received substantial numbers of injections of steroids and pain killers; so much so that her physicians noted that she displayed drug-seeking behavior and had a possible substance abuse problem.
In July 1991, a consultative psychiatric evaluation showed that Anderson suffers from a histrionic personality disorder but that this posed only a slight impairment on her lifestyle and ability to function. In December 1991, Anderson was diagnosed as having a depressive or somatoform disorder. She was treated on a monthly basis from February through June 1992, when she reported being much happier. The medical evidence indicates that Anderson's depression was well controlled with appropriate medication.
Anderson contends that the Secretary's denial of benefits is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Anderson also argues that the ALJ failed to properly shift the burden of proof to the Secretary to show that Anderson retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform any work. Essentially, Anderson claims that because the Secretary failed to produce additional medical evidence of Anderson's RFC, the Secretary failed to meet her burden.
The Secretary counters that Anderson's RFC was established at the same time as the determination of her inability to perform her past relevant work. Therefore, the Secretary claims that no additional evidence must be adduced supporting Anderson's RFC apart from that already in the record. It was the ALJ's responsibility to determine Anderson's RFC based on all the relevant evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and Anderson's own description of her limitations. 20 C.F.R. Secs. 404.1545-46, 416.945-46. We must determine whether the record presents medical evidence of Anderson's RFC at the time of the hearing. Frankl v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 935, 937-38 (8th Cir.1995). If there is no such evidence, the ALJ's decision "cannot be said to be supported by substantial evidence." Id.
The need for medical evidence, however, does not require the Secretary to produce additional evidence not already within the record. "[A]n ALJ is permitted to issue a decision without obtaining additional medical evidence so long as other evidence in the record provides a sufficient basis for the ALJ's decision." Naber...
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