Anderson v. Standard Register Co.

• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee
• Writing for the Court: REID
• Citation: 857 S.W.2d 555,128 Lab.Cas.P 57
• Decision Date: 28 June 1993
• Parties: 128 Lab.Cas. P 57,695, 8 IER Cases 1106 Angela ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Page 555

857 S.W.2d 555 128 Lab.Cas. P 57,695, 8 IER Cases 1106 Angela ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee,
at Nashville. June 28, 1993.

Royce Taylor, Murfreesboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

William Ozier, Nashville, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

REID, Chief Justice.

The issue presented for review in this retaliatory discharge case is whether an employer may discharge an employee pursuant to a facially neutral absence control policy for absence caused by a work-related injury. The judgment of the trial court and Court of Appeals granting summary judgment for the employer is affirmed.

Prior to the date on which plaintiff sustained a work related injury, the defendant

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established and followed consistently a policy whereby it terminated the employment of any employee who was absent from work for more than 26 weeks without regard for the cause of the absence.

Ms. Anderson had been employed by the defendant for approximately 10 years when she sustained a work-related injury to her right shoulder on March 26, 1988. Because of lifting restrictions imposed by her physician, she was not able to perform her job or any other work available at defendant's plant. On April 24, 1989, approximately 13 months after the date of her injury, Ms. Anderson was discharged because she was "medically unable to perform her job duties." At that time, her physician had not released her to work without lifting restrictions. The plaintiff testified that in her opinion her employment was terminated because "I'd been out so long and there's other people that have to take my place. You have to be trained on these jobs. And I just felt like that they didn't have the time to wait."

On June 27, 1989, approximately two months after her employment had been terminated, Ms. Anderson was released to work without lifting restrictions, but with a 13 percent anatomical impairment to the right upper extremity. She received temporary total disability benefits until July 10, 1989. Subsequently, she filed a suit for permanent partial disability benefits under the workers' compensation law.

This present suit, alleging that she was discharged because she asserted a workers' compensation claim, was filed on March 6, 1990. The court granted the employer a summary judgment, finding there was "no direct evidence that the Plaintiff was terminated because of the fact that she had made a claim for workers' compensation" and further finding that "the Plaintiff was terminated pursuant to a neutral policy of the Defendant to terminate employees who have been absent for an extended period of time, regardless of the reason."

The Court of Appeals found the employer was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, for two reasons:

First, at-will employees discharged pursuant to a reasonable, facially neutral absence control policy have no retaliatory discharge claim against their employer. Second, even if they did, Standard has produced evidence, uncontradicted by Ms. Anderson, demonstrating that Ms. Anderson would be unable to establish a causal connection between her workers' compensation claim and her discharge if this case were to go to trial.

The cause of action for retaliatory discharge defines the balance point between the employment-at-will doctrine and rights granted employees under well-defined public policy. By statute, an employer cannot discharge employees because of their race, religion, sex, age, physical condition or mental condition (T.C.A. §§ 4-21-401(a)(1) (1991), 8-50-103(a) (Supp.1992)), because they report work place safety violations (T.C.A. § 50-3-106(7) (1991)), because they miss work to perform jury duty (T.C.A. § 22-4-108(f) (Supp.1992)), or because they refuse to participate in or be silent about illegal activity at the work place (T.C.A. § 50-1-304 (1991)). In addition to the protection afforded by statutes, the Court in Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., Inc., 762 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tenn.1988), suggested several examples of clearly defined public policies which could warrant the protection provided by an action for retaliatory discharge.

This Court, in Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.1984), found the right to assert a claim for workers' compensation benefits was protected. In that case the Court stated:

In our opinion, a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, although not explicitly created by the statute, is necessary to enforce the duty of the employer, to secure the rights of the employee and to carry out the intention of the legislature. A statute need not expressly state what is necessarily implied in order to render it effectual.

Id. at 445 (citations omitted). The Court found that T.C.A. § 50-6-114 evidences a clear public policy that employees should be protected from having their employment

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terminated for asserting a workers' compensation claim. In Clanton, the plaintiff, who had received a full settlement for injuries sustained in the course and scope of her employment, was discharged the day after the settlement was approved, in retaliation for asserting a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The court relied on the history and purpose of the workers' compensation laws to conclude that retaliatory "discharges will have the effect of relieving the employer of its duty to compensate and the employee of his or her right to compensation." Id. at 444-45. The court found that "retaliatory discharge constitutes a device under § 50-6-144." Id. at 445. T.C.A. § 50-6-114 provides:

No contract or agreement, written or implied, or rule, regulation, or other...