Anderson v. Standard Register Co.

• Citation: 857 S.W.2d 555,128 Lab.Cas.P 57
• Parties: 128 Lab.Cas. P 57,695, 8 IER Cases 1106 Angela ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Decision Date: 28 June 1993
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

Page 555

857 S.W.2d 555

128 Lab.Cas. P 57,695, 8 IER Cases 1106

Angela ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Nashville.

June 28, 1993.

Royce Taylor, Murfreesboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

William Ozier, Nashville, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

REID, Chief Justice.

The issue presented for review in this retaliatory discharge case is whether an employer may discharge an employee pursuant to a facially neutral absence control policy for absence caused by a work-related injury. The judgment of the trial court and Court of Appeals granting summary judgment for the employer is affirmed.

Prior to the date on which plaintiff sustained a work related injury, the defendant established and followed consistently a policy whereby it terminated the employment of any employee who was absent from work for more than 26 weeks without regard for the cause of the absence.

Ms. Anderson had been employed by the defendant for approximately 10 years when she sustained a work-related injury to her right shoulder on March 26, 1988. Because of lifting restrictions imposed by her physician, she was not able to perform her job or any other work available at defendant's plant. On April 24, 1989, approximately 13 months after the date of her injury, Ms. Anderson was discharged because she was "medically unable to perform her job duties." At that time, her physician had not released her to work without lifting restrictions. The plaintiff testified that in her opinion her employment was terminated because "I'd been out so long and there's other people that have to take my place. You have to be trained on these jobs. And I just felt like that they didn't have the time to wait."

On June 27, 1989, approximately two months after her employment had been terminated, Ms. Anderson was released to work without lifting restrictions, but with a 13 percent anatomical impairment to the right upper extremity. She received temporary total disability benefits until July 10, 1989. Subsequently, she filed a suit for permanent partial disability benefits under the workers' compensation law.

This present suit, alleging that she was discharged because she asserted a workers' compensation claim, was filed on March 6, 1990. The court granted the employer a summary judgment, finding there was "no direct evidence that the Plaintiff was terminated because of the fact that she had made a claim for workers' compensation" and further finding that "the Plaintiff was terminated pursuant to a neutral policy of the Defendant to terminate employees who have been absent for an extended period of time, regardless of the reason."

The Court of Appeals found the employer was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, for two reasons:

First, at-will employees discharged pursuant to a reasonable, facially neutral absence control policy have no retaliatory discharge claim against their employer. Second, even if they did, Standard has produced evidence, uncontradicted by Ms. Anderson, demonstrating that Ms. Anderson would be unable to establish a causal connection between her workers' compensation claim and her discharge if this case were to go to trial.

The cause of action for retaliatory discharge defines the balance point between the employment-at-will doctrine and rights granted employees under well-defined public policy. By statute, an employer cannot discharge employees because of their race, religion, sex, age, physical condition or mental condition (T.C.A. §§ 4-21-401(a)(1) (1991), 8-50-103(a) (Supp.1992)), because they report work place safety violations (T.C.A. § 50-3-106(7) (1991)), because they miss work to perform jury duty (T.C.A. § 22-4-108(f) (Supp.1992)), or because they refuse to participate in or be silent about illegal activity at the work place (T.C.A. § 50-1-304 (1991)). In addition to the protection afforded by statutes, the Court in Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., Inc., 762 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tenn.1988), suggested several examples of clearly defined public policies which could warrant the protection provided by an action for retaliatory discharge.

This Court, in Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.1984), found the right to assert a claim for workers' compensation benefits was protected. In that case the Court stated:

In our opinion, a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, although not explicitly created by the statute, is necessary to enforce the duty of the employer, to secure the rights of the employee and to carry out the intention of the legislature. A statute need not expressly state what is necessarily implied in order to render it effectual.

Id. at 445 (citations omitted). The Court found that T.C.A. § 50-6-114 evidences a clear public policy that employees should be protected from having their employment terminated for asserting a workers' compensation claim. In Clanton, the plaintiff, who had received a full settlement for injuries sustained in the course and scope of her employment, was discharged the day after the settlement was approved, in retaliation for asserting a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The court relied on the history and purpose of the workers' compensation laws to conclude that retaliatory "discharges will have the effect of relieving the employer of its duty to compensate and the employee of his or her right to compensation." Id. at 444-45. The court found that "retaliatory discharge constitutes a device under § 50-6-144." Id. at 445. T.C.A. § 50-6-114 provides:

No contract or agreement, written or implied, or rule, regulation, or other device, shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this chapter except as herein provided.

The issue before this court is whether the absence control policy implemented by the employer constitutes a "rule, regulation or other device" that operates to relieve the employer of its obligations under the workers' compensation law, and, thereby, allows a cause of action to the plaintiff and others discharged pursuant to that policy.

The plaintiff's position is that:

To allow an employer to maintain a policy of firing employees, when they are absent as a result of work-related injuries and are not allowed to return to work until released by the doctor, sends a strong signal to employees not to seek medical attention even when there is [a] serious medical problem.

She insists that any plan or policy whereby an employer may discharge an employee who has sustained a work-related injury prior to the time the employee reaches maximum recovery will have a "chilling" effect on the assertion of workers' compensation benefits and should be found to violate T.C.A. § 50-6-114. She relies upon Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 752 P.2d 645, 652 (1988), wherein the Kansas court stated:

In this case, it was undisputed that Safeway could have terminated Coleman's employment under the applicable attendance policy if she had accrued six infractions. The district court correctly decided that any absences caused by her work-related injury should not be counted against Coleman. Allowing an employer to discharge an employee for being absent or failing to call in an anticipated absence as the result of a work-related injury would allow an employer to indirectly fire an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim, a practice contrary to the public policy of this state ... Other jurisdictions have also recognized that it is a violation of public policy and workers' compensation law to discharge any employee for absences due to work-related injuries. See e.g., Lo Dolce v. Regional Transit Service, Inc., 77 App.Div.2d 697, 429 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1980).

The case relied on in Coleman, Lo Dolce v. Regional Transit Service, Inc., however, was overruled by Duncan v. New York State Develop. Center, 63 N.Y.2d 128, 481 N.Y.S.2d 22, 470 N.E.2d 820 (1984). In overruling the reasoning of Lo Dolce, the New York Court of Appeals stated in Duncan,

Clearly, there must be a causal nexus between the employee's activities in obtaining compensation and the employer's conduct against the employee. Moreover, the very meaning of 'discrimination' requires that there be a distinction among groups. Thus, an employment practice that is applied evenhandedly to all employees represents a neutral policy that does not constitute discrimination, particularly...