Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 04 October 1977 |
| Docket Number | 4 Div. 545 |
| Parties | Ronald Ray ANDERSON v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Guy F. Gunter, III, Opelika, for appellant.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Milton T. Belcher, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Second degree murder; sentence: one hundred twenty-five years and one day imprisonment.
The body of Mrs. Rudene Edwards was found in her Phenix City home on October 20, 1976, at approximately 7:00 A.M. The cause of death was determined to be from multiple blows to the head with a blunt instrument. The bloody stock of a .22 caliber rifle was found at the scene. The home had been ransacked.
Robbery was the crime originally contemplated by the intruders. Sixty-six thousand four hundred fifty dollars ($66,450.00) had been seized by the FBI from the Edwards' safe-deposit box in the course of a gambling investigation. Mrs. Edwards had recently recovered the money through a much-publicized civil action in federal court. Apparently ignorant of the fact that most people use banks, the robbers assumed that Mrs. Edwards would have the money in her home. Their assumption was incorrect.
No physical evidence was uncovered which would connect the appellant with the crime. There was no eyewitness testimony, and the testimony of the majority of the State's witnesses failed to connect the appellant with the murder in any way. We will summarize the testimony of only those witnesses which tend to implicate the appellant in the crime.
Lamar Jackson testified that he was at the home of Sarah "Cricket" Rezk in Columbus, Georgia, on October 3, 1976. While there, he overheard a conversation between Linn Conley, Bobby Joe Lee and the appellant. Conley stated that he knew of a $50,000 "score" in Phenix City. The "score" (target of the robbery) was identified as the mother of Bobby Smith, who was Mrs. Edwards. The appellant stated that he would have to check with Andy Austin and would get back with Linn Conley later. Jackson heard essentially the same conversation take place again at the Rezk house on October 17, two days before the murder.
Jackson stated that around 1:30 P.M. on October 19, the appellant borrowed the automobile and .38 caliber pistol of Sarah Rezk and departed with Andy Austin. Around 8:30 P.M. Jackson drove Deborah Vella to the "Southeastern," a billiard parlor for the purpose of retrieving Cricket Rezk's pistol. Appellant would not give the pistol to Deborah Vella at that time. The next day, the appellant returned the automobile and the pistol. The pistol was covered with an unidentified substance which appeared similar to jelly. Jackson cleaned the pistol for Cricket.
About three or four days after the murder, Jackson was at the Rezk residence again in the presence of Cricket, Deborah Vella, Andy Austin and the appellant. He overheard a conversation wherein the appellant stated to Austin:
". . . 'You didn't have to do it you didn't have to do it the way you did.' "
Austin replied:
". . . 'If the money would have been there like we was told we things wouldn't have happened the way they did.' "
Appellant said:
". . . 'You didn't have to hit her as many times as you did.' "
Austin replied:
". . . "
Appellant again stated:
". . . 'Well, you didn't have to you didn't have to kill the woman.' "
Austin responded:
". . . . . ."
Jackson admitted having previously been convicted of two felonies of "receiving stolen goods" and "auto theft." At the time of his testimony, he was unemployed. The prior year he worked as a part-time bartender. He was on occasion an informer for the Columbus Police Department, and he expected to get a substantial reward which had been posted in the instant case. He admitted to having used narcotics and marijuana.
Deborah Vella testified that the appellant borrowed Sarah Rezk's pistol and car on October 19 and left with Andy Austin. She made three or four trips to the Southeastern for Mrs. Rezk asking that the appellant return the gun. Appellant refused stating that "he was going to probably have to use it later on, he had something another going down." He returned the gun and the car to Mrs. Rezk the next day.
Deborah Vella was present at the Rezk residence on October 17 and overheard the conversation concerning the $50,000 "score over there at Bobby Smith's mama's house." She heard the appellant say that he would not go unless Andy Austin wanted to go.
The witness testified that during either the first or second week in November following the murder, she, the appellant and Andy Austin were riding in Cricket Rezk's automobile and "went to K-Mart to take back some stuff." In route there, the appellant told her that in reference to the crime,
On cross-examination, the witness admitted to engaging in "a little bit" of prostitution and that she made her living by "boosting" and "kickbacking" which from the record appears to be the act of shoplifting merchandise and later returning it to the store for a refund as though it had been purchased.
Sarah "Cricket" Rezk, an admitted prostitute, testified to substantially the same facts as Lamar Jackson and Deborah Vella had concerning the appellant borrowing the gun and car and refusing to return the gun until the next day after the crime. She testified that four days after the murder, she overheard Austin tell Jackson and the appellant that he (Austin) "didn't leave no man, woman, or child behind him as a witness." Appellant told Austin that the "last score" should not have happened the way it did, that it was not worth what they came out with.
Thus, the only circumstantial evidence connecting the appellant with the crime comes from a group of thieves, shoplifters and prostitutes. This point is stressed by counsel for appellant. However, evidence of criminal conspiracies hardly ever comes from ministers and civic leaders. The appellant can hardly complain of the unsavory character of the witnesses against him as they were all his chosen companions. The weight and credibility of the testimony was for the jury to determine.
A conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence solely so long as that evidence is so strong and cogent as to show the defendant's guilt to a moral certainty. Tanner v. State, 291 Ala. 70, 277 So.2d 885 (1973). Circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence, provided it points to the guilt of the accused. Locke v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 338 So.2d 488 (1976). We are convinced that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficiently strong and cogent as to show the defendant's guilt to a moral certainty. The testimony of Lamar Jackson, Sarah Rezk and Deborah Vella, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to support the verdict.
Throughout the trial, evidence in one form or another was put before the jury showing the bad character of the appellant and his commission of other crimes not charged in the indictment. In most instances, the trial judge either sustained the appellant's objection; the objection came after the answer was given and no motion to exclude the answer was made; or the objection was not specific. However, one instance does stand out and warrants review.
Deborah Vella testified that during either the first or second week of November following the murder, she and the appellant and Andy Austin were riding in an automobile headed toward K-Mart. When K-Mart was mentioned, the defense attorney objected to any further testimony, and the trial court sustained the objection. In answer to further questions, the witness stated that while they were riding on Forest Road and on Macon Road, the appellant told her that he was unable to find the $50,000 (apparently at the Edwards' home).
On direct examination of the appellant, his attorney asked him about the alleged conversation in the automobile in November. The appellant admitted going to K-Mart, but denied having the conversation in route with Deborah Vella concerning the $50,000. He contended that the trip to K-Mart was actually a week before the date of the murder and that he did not recall any other conversations with her in an automobile in route to K-Mart.
During cross-examination of the appellant by the district attorney, the following occurred:
The district attorney recalled Deborah Vella to the witness stand and called her attention to her prior testimony concerning the trip to K-Mart (on November 8). The following occurred:
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