Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 03 August 1926 |
| Citation | 110 So. 250,92 Fla. 477 |
| Parties | ANDERSON v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Marion County; L. L. Parks, Judge.
Elmer R. Anderson was convicted of first degree murder, and he brings error.
Reversed and a new trial granted.
Syllabus by the Court
Defendant particularly when charged with capital offense, is entitled to reasonable time to prepare defense; where defendant was indicted for murder May 11th and put on trial May 19th following, motion for continuance should have been granted. A person charged with crime, and particularly a capital offense, is entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for his defense, and under the facts in this case the time allowed by the circuit court was unreasonably short, and the defendant's motion for a continuance should have been granted.
Identification of defendant should be reasonably clear and unequivocal testimony that prisoner looked like person seen at scene of murder, coupled with statement that he looked a little taller than man seen by witness who had no previous personal knowledge or acquaintance of or acquaintance with prisoner was not sufficient to go to jury. The identification of a person charged with crime should be reasonably clear and unequivocal. Testimony to the effect that the prisoner 'looks like' a person seen at the scene of the murder, coupled with the statement that the prisoner 'looked to be a little taller than the man I saw,' and the witness not having had any previous personal knowledge of or acquaintance with the prisoner, was not sufficient identification to have been allowed to go to the jury, and its effect may have been harmful.
R. B. Bullock and C. E. Armstrong, both of Ocala, and Zack H. Douglas, of Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.
J. B. Johnson, Atty. Gen., and H. E. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Elmer R. Anderson, the plaintiff in error, was convicted of murder in the first degree for the killing of Edward J. Schrubb and sentenced to death.
The state's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. According to the testimony introduced by the state, Anderson left the Windsor Hotel at Jacksonville, Fla., about 1:30 p. m. on Tuesday, April 28th, in an automobile driven by Schrubb, bound for Lake City. Schrubb was seen driving the car while passing through Gainesville with only one person in the car with him. He and Anderson were seen in Ocala, Fla., about 7:30 p. m. the same day.
The dead body of Schrubb was found in the woods about 75 feet from the main road, 13 1/2 miles south of Ocala on the night of Wednesday, April 29th, or early in the morning of the 30th.
On May 2d, Anderson was arrested in Nashville, Tenn. He was in possession of Schrubb's automobile. He gave his name as 'White.'
There was other incriminating evidence which it is not necessary to review, as it does not affect our decision on the errors requiring reversal.
Anderson, his wife, and brother-in-law testified that Anderson left Nelbourne on the night of April 27th to go to Chicago in response to a telegram advising him of his mother's illness in Milwaukee, and that he had about $75 with him at the time; that he also had about $500 to his credit in a bank.
Anderson testified that he arrived in Jacksonville too late to catch the morning train for Chicago, and that the next one would not leave until 8:35 that night. He walked about the streets of Jacksonville with nothing to do, and met some one whom he knew by the name of Schmidt, who in the course of conversation told him he was going to drive to Lake City, and invited him to go with him. He said Schmidt left him for a short time, and came back in a car driven by Schrubb, and he, Schmidt, and Schrubb left the Seminole Hotel destined for Lake City, expecting to be back in time to catch, the train for Chicago. When they arrived in Lake City, Schmidt interviewed a party, and then informed Anderson that he had to go to Ocala, but told him that if he could not get back to Jacksonville from Ocala in time to catch the train, he could go on to Orlando, where he could get a train that would get him in Jacksonville in time to take his train to Chicago. After having supper in Ocala, Schmidt told him he wanted to call on a friend, and asked him if he minded waiting for him. He told him no, and Schmidt and Schrubb drove off in the car. Anderson waited until about 10 o'clock, when Schmidt returned in the car alone. He seemed excited and told Anderson that 'I' or 'we' have broken into a place, and offered him $50 to drive the car back to Jacksonville and leave it in front of the Seminole Hotel. Anderson declined the $50, but said he would take the car.
The first assignment of error relates to the denial of the defendant's motion for a short continuance.
The homicide occurred on the night of the 28th of April, the indictment was found on the 11th of Any, the prisoner was arraigned on the 12th of Any, and the case set for trial on the 19th of Any, giving the defendant but six clear working days after the finding of the indictment in which to prepare for trial in a case involving his life, and which resulted in his being sentenced to death.
In a case where the state relies solely on circumstantial evidence, it is more difficult for the defendant to prepare for trial than where the evidence is direct.
The defendant testified that there was a third party in the car with him and Schmidt. To establish this would have required investigations in Jacksonville, Lake City, Gainesville, and many of the other towns through which they passed to see if he could find any persons who saw them. A limit of six days made such an investigation practically impossible, and the defendant thereby was deprived of the opportunity to prepare for his defense.
The court erred in denying the motion for a continuance.
We think the assignment of error relating...
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