Anderson v. State

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Thompson
• Citation: Anderson v. State, 678 S.E.2d 84, 285 Ga. 496 (Ga. 2009)
• Decision Date: 08 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. S09A0166.,No. S09A0112.,S09A0112.,S09A0166.
• Parties: ANDERSON v. The STATE. Wallace v. The State.

678 S.E.2d 84

285 Ga. 496

ANDERSON v. The STATE.

Wallace v. The State.

No. S09A0112.

No. S09A0166.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 8, 2009.

Jabrian Anderson, pro se (case no. A09A0112).

Wystan B. Getz, Decatur, for appellant (case no. S09A0166).

Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, Dist. Atty., Daniel J. Quinn, Barbara B. Conroy, Asst. Dist. Attys., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Reggie A. Lampkin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Defendants Jabrian Anderson and Edward Wallace were convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in connection with the shooting death of Tamauris Smith.¹ They appeal, asserting, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was authorized to find the following: Jabrian Anderson, Prince Price, and the victim were riding in a burgundy Grand Am. Price was driving. He followed Kentavious Peavy, who was driving a white Chevy Malibu. Edward Wallace and Stantavis King were Peavy's passengers. When the Grand Am pulled over, Wallace told Peavy to stop the Malibu. Anderson and the victim got out of the Grand Am and Anderson held the victim at gunpoint with an AK-47. Wallace jumped out of the Malibu and approached the Grand Am with a .45 caliber handgun. The victim started running; Wallace and Anderson fired their weapons and the victim fell to the ground. Anderson stood over the victim with the rifle and fired several more times. The victim was mortally wounded; he suffered five back-to-front bullet wounds. Shell casings from a .45 caliber handgun as well as an AK-47 were found at the scene.

The evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they were convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Defendants assert the trial court erred in curtailing cross-examination of the victim's girlfriend, Charity Willoughby. On direct examination, Willoughby testified that she last saw the victim at a Citgo gas station, and that police often frequent that gas station. In addition, Willoughby testified that the victim called her later and told her he was with Anderson and Price; that several hours later, Anderson used the victim's cellphone to call her; and that Anderson asked her about the victim's whereabouts, adding that the victim borrowed his "chopper" to perpetrate a robbery at the Citgo gas station. Testifying further, Willoughby averred that she was skeptical about Anderson's story because she did not believe the victim would do anything at the gas station when the police were there so frequently. On cross-examination by Wallace, Willoughby was asked to clarify her response and she replied: "I wouldn't believe that he would get out of a car [with an AK-47] at a place where police were." She added: "Or that he would do something he would get locked up for." In an attempt to "impeach" the witness, Wallace then asked if the victim ever implied that he killed someone. The State interposed an objection and, in the ensuing colloquy, Anderson argued that

the reason I'm trying to offer it is we believe the evidence is going to show that [the victim] was going to use the [AK-47] to go to try to rob Mr. Wallace. And we are trying to buttress his violent propensity by showing that he has made these admissions to Ms. Willoughby in the past about other violent acts.

The trial court sustained the State's objection.

Even if it can be said that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting this line of questioning, but see Roseberry v. State, 274 Ga. 301, 303(2), 553 S.E.2d 589 (2001) (murder victim's character is generally irrelevant), we find no harmful error because the jury heard other testimony demonstrating that the victim may have previously committed violent, criminal acts, including a murder. See Cane v. State, 285 Ga. 19(2), 673 S.E.2d 218 (2009). Moreover, the evidence of defendants' guilt, which included the testimony of several eyewitnesses, was overwhelming. See generally Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 60-61, 230 S.E.2d 869 (1976).

3. Anderson argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in several respects. "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686(II), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This inquiry consists of two parts:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Id. at 687(III), 104 S.Ct. 2052.

With regard to the first part of the inquiry, there is a strong presumption that the performance of counsel was within the wide range of reasonable professional lawyering, and we cannot reach a contrary conclusion unless defendant successfully rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Flanigan v. State, 269 Ga. 160(2), 496 S.E.2d 255 (1998). "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Strickland, supra at 689(III)(A), 104 S.Ct. 2052. The test "has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted." Jefferson v. Zant, 263 Ga. 316, 318(3)(a), 431 S.E.2d 110 (1993).

(a) Anderson posits that trial counsel was ineffective because he objected on "relevancy" grounds when Willoughby testified that she did not believe Anderson gave the victim his "chopper" to commit a robbery. In this regard, Anderson argues that trial counsel should have objected on the grounds of speculation, opinion, and credibility, inasmuch as credibility determinations...