Anderson v. State
Decision Date | 30 October 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 983S328,983S328 |
Citation | 469 N.E.2d 1166 |
Parties | Stephen ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Nora E. Herndon, Merrillville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Lisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from a conviction of robbery, a class A felony, Ind. Code Sec. 35-42-5-1, and from a habitual offender determination. The case was tried before a jury. Appellant was sentenced to a prison term of sixty years.
Appellant raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to robbery; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit instructions to the jury on the lesser included offenses of robbery; (3) whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's case; (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to prove appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
These are the facts that tend to support the determination of guilt. On April 20, 1982, David Mazan, accompanied by the appellant Steve Anderson, and Robert Hubbard, drove in Mazan's vehicle to various taverns in the area of Hammond, Indiana. While in Mazan's vehicle, Anderson and Hubbard severely beat Mazan and pushed him into the backseat. Anderson started to drive the vehicle toward Whiting, Indiana. Hubbard sat in the passenger seat and sharpened a butter knife on the pavement while the vehicle was traveling down the road. When they arrived at Whiting, Anderson and Hubbard removed Mazan from the vehicle and took him behind a building. Then, while Hubbard brandished the knife, Anderson demanded that Mazan give his money to him, and Mazan complied. Subsequently, they put Mazan back in the vehicle, and Anderson drove to a liquor store. After Anderson parked the vehicle, Mazan leaped out of the rear window of the vehicle and ran into the liquor store.
Michael Garrey, a security officer at the liquor store, observed Mazan enter the store. Mazan told Garrey of the robbery, and Garrey observed Anderson standing near the vehicle. Then, Anderson and Hubbard fled the area in Mazan's vehicle in the direction of Chicago, Illinois. Garrey recorded the license number of Mazan's vehicle and called the police.
Officers Joseph Bastie and Patrick Gleason of the Chicago Police Department heard on the radio information concerning the robbery and an advisement to watch for Mazan's 1970 brown Buick. While on patrol, they observed a vehicle which appeared similar to the description of Mazan's vehicle. The officers stopped the vehicle and arrested Anderson and Hubbard. Mazan's testimony indicated that Anderson had twelve to fifteen beers over a nine hour period.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in tendering an instruction which concluded that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to robbery. The challenged instruction is as follows:
"The defense of intoxication is defined as follows: It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct did so while he was intoxicated, if the intoxication resulted from the introduction of a substance into his body, without his consent or when he did not know that the substance might cause intoxication.
Voluntary intoxication is a defense only to the extent that it negates an element of the offense referred to by the phrase 'with an intent to' or 'with an intention to.'
Therefore, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to Robbery, Class C, or Robbery Class A."
This instruction parallels Ind. Code Sec. 35-41-3-5(b); however, this Court in Terry v. State, (1984) Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085, (DeBruler, J., concurring in result with opinion), declared that section of the statute void and without effect. A defendant in Indiana can offer a defense of voluntary intoxication to any crime. However, the potential of this defense should not be confused with the reality of the situation, Terry, supra. The standard of whether or not the evidence warrants an instruction on the defense of voluntary intoxication was set forth in Williams v. State, (1980) 273 Ind. 105, 402 N.E.2d 954:
Appellant's evidence in support of his degree of intoxication does not provide an adequate evidentiary basis for an instruction on voluntary intoxication as a possible defense for class A robbery. Appellant offers only evidence that he had been drinking; however, there is little objective evidence of impairment. Appellant and Hubbard beat the victim and threw him into the back seat. Appellant drove the victim's vehicle to Whiting. Appellant and Hubbard removed the victim from the vehicle and took him behind a building. Then, while Hubbard brandished a knife, appellant demanded that the victim give his money to him, and the victim complied. Appellant and Hubbard then placed the victim back in the vehicle and drove to a liquor store in order to buy more...
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