Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 30 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. A91A1822,A91A1822 |
| Citation | 203 Ga.App. 118,416 S.E.2d 309 |
| Parties | ANDERSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
James A. Chamberlin, Jr., Brunswick, for appellant.
Richard H. Taylor, Sol., for appellee.
A jury found Anderson guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive, OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1); driving with an alcohol concentration of .12 grams or more at any time within three hours after such driving or being in actual physical control from alcohol consumed before such driving or being in actual physical control ended, former OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(4) 1; carrying a concealed weapon, OCGA § 16-11-126(a); and speeding, OCGA § 40-6-180. He was sentenced on the D.U.I. to the extent that he was a less safe driver and on the weapon and speeding charges. He challenges the evidence, the court's charge, and juror and court personnel conduct.
1. In enumerations of error one through four, Anderson claims that the verdicts on D.U.I. and carrying a concealed weapon were contrary to the weight of the evidence and that the court erred in denying his motions for directed verdicts of acquittal on these three charges. The inquiry is the sufficiency of the evidence. See Lewis v. State, 186 Ga.App. 92 (1), 366 S.E.2d 305 (1988); Stinson v. State, 185 Ga.App. 543, 364 S.E.2d 910 (1988); and Towns v. State, 185 Ga.App. 545, 365 S.E.2d 137 (1988), for a discussion of the general grounds.
At approximately 6:30 p.m. a Glynn County police officer was heading southbound on U.S. Highway 341 when he noticed a vehicle heading northbound and appearing to exceed the posted 55 miles per hour speed limit. Radar clocked the speed at 81 miles per hour. The officer turned around, followed the car and pulled it over.
As Anderson exited, the officer asked for his driver's license and told him why he had been stopped. Anderson commented that he had not realized he was going that fast. As he reached with his left hand toward his left hip area, ostensibly to retrieve his wallet, his waist length jacket "bloused open a little bit" and the officer spotted a .380 caliber automatic handgun. Anderson himself believed that when he stood normally, the end of the pistol was visible only about an inch beneath his jacket. He had a Florida concealed weapon or firearm license but none from Georgia.
The officer told Anderson to place his hands on the hood of the patrol car, which he did. He kept trying to turn toward the officer and the officer told him more forcefully to keep his hands on the car hood.
The officer removed the weapon and handcuffed Anderson. As they spoke, the officer detected the odor of alcohol on Anderson's breath. His speech was "a little slurred" and at one point he indicated confusion about whether he was in Georgia or Florida. By his own admission, Anderson had consumed two vodka drinks and one beer. He failed to pass the field sobriety breath test and was arrested on all charges. An Intoximeter 3000 test administered at the station at 7:36 p.m. showed a blood alcohol level of .12 percent.
As to a conviction under OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1), it was not necessary that the State prove that Anderson was drunk when driving but rather that, beyond a reasonable doubt, he was under the influence of alcohol so as to make it less safe for him to operate a motor vehicle. See Harper v. State, 91 Ga.App. 456, 458(2), 86 S.E.2d 7 (1955). Nor must the State have shown that Anderson committed an unsafe act, State v. Smith, 196 Ga.App. 876, 877, 397 S.E.2d 304 (1990); Moss v. State, 194 Ga.App. 181, 182, 390 S.E.2d 268 (1990), although he was committing the unsafe act of speeding at the time he was initially spotted by the officer.
The Intoximeter 3000 "Taguchi cell" argument in regard to both D.U.I. verdicts is without merit. Lattarulo v. State, 261 Ga. 124, 127(4), 401 S.E.2d 516 (1991). See also Hudson v. State, 197 Ga.App. 428, 429(1), 398 S.E.2d 779 (1990), concerning a claim of effect of extraneous factors on the test results.
As to the concealed weapon conviction, the evidence belies the assertion that initially the gun was clearly visible to the officer.
The evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving under the influence of alcohol in both manners charged and of carrying a concealed weapon. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Directed verdicts of acquittal were not required on these charges. See OCGA § 17-9-1(a).
2. The fifth enumeration of error challenges the court's charge on testimony from expert witnesses, urging that it gave undue weight to the testimony of the State's witness and minimized the testimony of defendant's expert witness. No supporting authority is cited.
The charge was as follows:
First, the charge immediately followed the court's clear instruction that the opinion of an expert witness was to be given just such weight and credibility as the jury saw fit.
Second, the instruction was not limited to the State's witness but was neutral in its specific mention of both alleged experts. Moreover, the substance of the lengthy testimony of defendant's expert could not have been readily synopsized for inclusion in the jury instruction, nor was the trial court, by its own statements, able to expand on the expert's area of expertise because of confusion in this regard.
The instruction considered in the context of the whole charge, see Howell v. State, 157 Ga.App. 451, 457(6)-458, 278 S.E.2d 43 (1981), did not prejudice defendant in the manner claimed.
3. The sixth enumeration of error contends that the court's charge on former OCGA § 40-6-392(b)(3) was impermissibly burden shifting.
The court charged: "If you should find that a chemical analysis test was run of the defendant's breath, blood, urine or other bodily substances, and that the alcohol contained .10 grams percent or more alcohol in the blood stream, a legal presumption would be established that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating beverages to the extent that he was a less safe driver than he otherwise would have been were he not so affected.
"However, that is a rebuttable presumption and the burden is on the State to prove that he was under the influence of intoxicating beverages to the extent that he was a less safe driver than he otherwise would have been were he not so affected and/or that his blood stream contained .12 grams percent alcohol or more at the time of his arrest...."
Even though worded in terms of a presumption, former OCGA § 40-6-392(b)(3) has been held not to create a burden-shifting presumption of guilt but rather to have the "effect of defining the level of blood-alcohol that is sufficient to permit an inference that the driver is 'under the influence' " when read in conjunction with OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1)-(3). Lattarulo v. State, supra, 261 Ga. at 125(1), 401 S.E.2d 516. However, "the statute may not be charged to the jury using the word 'presumption.' " Lattarulo, adopting this portion of Simon v. State, 182 Ga.App. 210, 355 S.E.2d 120 (1987) [], and Peters v. State, 175 Ga.App. 463, 333 S.E.2d 436 (1985) [physical precedent]. That is true "even where the jury is instructed that the presumption contained therein is rebuttable." Peters at 468(2), 333 S.E.2d 436.
The erroneous charge requires that the conviction for violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1) be reversed.
4. Enumeration of error seven claims that the court committed reversible error in failing to charge OCGA § 40-6-392(b)(1) and (2), it having charged on the presumption arising from OCGA § 40-6-392(b)(3). The question is moot because we have already ruled that the charge was fatally flawed. See Division 3, supra.
5. In enumeration of error eight, Anderson contends that it was error to fail to charge the elements of OCGA § 16-11-126. The harm claimed is that there was evidence which would have authorized the jury to find that the firearm was carried openly and fully exposed to view and the instruction should have advised the jury that if the weapon-carrying was in an open manner and fully exposed to view, there was no violation.
The court charged: "[I]t is unlawful...
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