Anderson v. State

Decision Date09 August 1983
Docket NumberNo. 1-982A269,1-982A269
PartiesCharles ANDERSON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Hansen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

Charles Anderson (Anderson) appeals the verdicts convicting him of the robbery and battery of Patrick J. Connelly (Connelly). Anderson raises five issues on appeal.

We affirm.

The facts most favorable to the State reveal that Connelly had been drinking earlier in the day when he met Anderson and James B. Ford (Ford) at the City Lights nightclub in Louisville at approximately 9:00 p.m. Connelly had never met Anderson or Ford but was seen buying them drinks. The three men were interested in partying and agreed to go north to Columbus to meet women that Anderson and Ford knew. They left the bar and drove around in Connelly's automobile. At one point in time, they stopped at a gasoline station in Louisville to refuel the vehicle. Connelly testified Anderson had taken his watch from him and Ford had stolen his money clip prior to stopping for gas. The three men then proceeded north to Columbus.

Connelly testified he sat in the front seat between Anderson and Ford, who was driving. Anderson showed Connelly a pocket knife which Anderson kept out for most of the trip in order to keep Connelly in the vehicle. Connelly also testified he had been stabbed fourteen times. Some of these wounds were inflicted during the trip.

Upon arriving in Columbus, the three men proceeded to the home of a friend of Ford. They then continued on to a liquor store. A witness testified that he saw two black men walking away quickly from the car at an intersection. The witness thought the white man, who was in the car with the other men, was hurt and got help. Ford and Anderson continued to the home of Janice Crippen, Ford's friend, where the men had stopped previously, who testified that Ford wore white pants with a blood stain, that Anderson had on blue jeans with dark stains on them, and that he had blood on his hands. Ford and Anderson left this residence and proceeded to the home of Ford's girlfriend. Ford and Anderson were arrested there in the morning. The officers found the blood stained clothing that Ford and Anderson had been wearing. Connelly's watch and money clip were found near where Anderson slept.

Connelly testified Anderson ordered him to remove his Masonic ring. Anderson tried to pull the ring off of the finger but could not remove it. Anderson then attempted to cut Connelly's finger off but could not because the knife was too dull. Connelly's finger was severely damaged as a result of Anderson's action. Connelly lost approximately nine pints of blood as a result of his wounds.

The first issue Anderson raises is whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to dismiss the robbery count involving the watch and money clip. Anderson argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider this crime because the watch and money clip were taken from Connelly while they were in Louisville. Anderson requests we take judicial notice that Louisville is not within Indiana and reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss.

This court has no difficulty in acknowledging that Louisville does not have the good fortune to be in Indiana. However, we do not believe the trial court erred by denying Anderson's motion to dismiss. Anderson's argument is premised upon the belief that the robbery of the watch and money clip were separate events from the occurrences in Indiana.

A review of the criminal venue statute, Ind.Code 35-1.1-2-1(e), 1 supports the trial court's ruling. I.C. 35-1.1-2-1(e) provides:

If the commission of an offense commenced outside Indiana is consummated within Indiana, the offender shall be tried in the county where the offense was consummated.

It is well established that venue and jurisdiction are not the same thing, but this statute indicates that the Bartholomew Circuit Court was the proper court to try Anderson. Moreover, the Indiana case law extends jurisdiction to crimes commenced in Indiana and completed out of state where it is shown that the out of state crime was integrally related to the crimes in Indiana. Conrad v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 446, 317 N.E.2d 789, Pollard v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 599, 388 N.E.2d 496.

The facts do not support Anderson's premise that the robbery of the watch and money clip were separate events from the occurrences in Indiana. Connelly, Anderson, and Ford left the nightclub with the intent of going to Columbus. While the evidence established the watch and money clip were removed from Connelly's possession when he was in Kentucky, the evidence also showed Anderson kept Connelly at knifepoint while Ford was driving in Indiana, Anderson stabbed Connelly in Indiana, and Connelly was left bleeding profusely in Indiana. Upon arrival in Columbus, the robbery continued as Anderson tried to remove Connelly's Masonic ring. Frustrated because he could not remove the ring, Anderson tried to cut off Connelly's finger. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Anderson or Ford ever abandoned their plans or that there was any type of digression from or cessation of the activities which began in Kentucky. We believe the evidence established a continuous transaction in which the events in Kentucky were integrally related to the occurrences in Indiana. Thus, jurisdiction was proper. See, Conrad v. State, supra. A person who commits a crime partly in one state and partly in another state may be tried in either state under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. Lane v. State, (1980) Fla., 388 So.2d 1022.

The second issue which Anderson raises is whether the trial court erred by refusing to give an instruction which Anderson tendered. The instruction would have instructed the jury that theft is a lesser included offense of robbery. The trial court submitted instructions regarding robbery as either a class A or class C felony and also gave an instruction on conversion. Anderson asserts theft is an inherently lesser included offense of robbery, Hitch v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 1, 284 N.E.2d 783, and argues the trial court erred.

Indiana employs a two step analysis regarding the use of instructions on lesser included offenses. The first step involves a determination of whether the lesser offense is included within the crime charged and secondly, whether there is evidence of probative value from which the jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense. Roddy v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 1098. The supreme court has recognized the existence of two types of lesser included offenses: those offenses which are necessarily included because it is impossible to commit the greater offense without committing the lesser offense and those lesser offenses which may have been committed by the manner in which the greater offense was actually committed. Jones v. State, (1982) Ind., 438 N.E.2d 972. The court further elaborated upon the second step by stating:

Of course, the fact that a lesser offense is "included" within the crime charged, as allegedly committed in the charging instrument, does not ipso facto entitle either the state or defendant to an instruction on the lesser and included offense. As per step two of the rationale and methodology outlined in Lawrence v. State, sup...

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  • Joy v. State
    • United States
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    ...Taylor v. State, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1087, 1091-92; Richardson v. State, (1981) Ind., 429 N.E.2d 229, 231-32; Anderson v. State, (1983) Ind.App., 452 N.E.2d 173, 178. Provided the trial court does not abuse its discretion, and articulates facts supporting its decision, Indiana Code sect......
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