Anderson v. State

• Citation: 220 So.3d 1133
• Decision Date: 09 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. SC14–881,No. SC12–1252,SC12–1252,SC14–881
• Parties: Charles L. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Charles L. Anderson, Petitioner, v. Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

220 So.3d 1133

Charles L. ANDERSON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Charles L. Anderson, Petitioner,

v.Julie L. Jones, etc., Respondent.

No. SC12–1252

No. SC14–881

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 9, 2017

Martin J. McClain, Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Scott Gavin, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant/Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee/Respondent

PER CURIAM.

Charles Anderson appeals an order denying his motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Anderson also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the postconviction court's order as to Anderson's conviction and deny Anderson's habeas petition but vacate the death sentence and remand for a new penalty phase.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1999, Anderson was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of his stepdaughter, Keinya Smith. The facts of the murder were set forth in this Court's opinion on direct appeal as follows:

In 1980, Charles Anderson married Edwina. At the time of the marriage, Edwina had a five-year-old daughter (Keinya) from a previous relationship. In 1992, the Miami police became aware that Anderson was sexually abusing Keinya. He subsequently pled to eleven counts of attempted capital sexual battery and was sentenced to probation. One of the conditions of the probation was that he have no contact with Keinya. If Anderson violated probation, he faced the possibility of life in prison.

Despite the conditions of his probation, witnesses testified that Anderson continued to have contact with Edwina and Keinya. Apparently he spent several nights a week at Edwina's house. On Wednesday, January 12, 1994, Keinya was supposed to leave her job at Publix at 6 p.m., yet she did not return home until much later. A Publix employee by the name of Patrick Allen drove Keinya home. After dropping Keinya off, Allen realized that he was being followed by an individual in another car. Allen ultimately eluded the individual. When Allen was later shown photographs of Anderson's car, he was able to verify that the car that chased him belonged to Anderson.

Two nights later, on Friday, January 14, Allen brought Keinya home again. Anderson was sitting in his car waiting for Keinya to return, and as soon as Keinya got out of Allen's car, Anderson's car darted toward Allen. Another chase ensued, and this time Allen fired several gunshots at Anderson during the chase. When Anderson returned home, he and Keinya got into a heated argument. A neighbor testified that she overheard Anderson say to Keinya, "You told him. Why was he shooting at me?" and that Keinya responded, "I didn't tell him nothing." A cousin who was present during the argument testified that Anderson hit Keinya. Keinya then grabbed a knife and said, "Let me call the police." She proceeded to dial 911, but when the operator picked up, Keinya hung up the phone. The 911 operator called back, but was unable to get an answer and therefore a police car was sent to the house. When the police arrived, both Anderson and Edwina went outside and talked to the police. Keinya locked herself in her room. Anderson and Edwina convinced the police that everything was okay and the police left. Keinya's cousin testified that after the police left, Anderson walked to the room where Keinya was hiding and said that he was going to wait in Publix for twenty-four hours—that if he could not get Patrick, then he would come after her. Although Keinya was supposed to work on Saturday, she did not go to work because she was scared.

Keinya did go to work on Sunday, January 16, 1994. Her time card revealed that she left work at 6:01 p.m. Allen testified that he saw Anderson's car waiting outside Publix.

On that same day, John Gowdy and Amelia Stringer were driving north on U.S. 27. Gowdy testified that he saw someone on the side of the road at approximately 7 p.m. Although it was dark at the time, Gowdy was able to see the person in the grass median between the northbound and southbound lanes. Gowdy observed the car in front of him make a U-turn and he did the same thing. Gowdy then witnessed the car in front of him swerve into the median and then back into the lane, apparently running over the person. Gowdy immediately reported the incident to the police. Gowdy described the suspect's car as a blue/gray four-door. Anderson's car is dark blue with a gray top and has two doors. Stringer, who was in the car with Gowdy, saw the person in the median lie down in the grass and then sit up. She also witnessed the car in front of them run over the person in the median.

When the police arrived at the scene, they discovered blood on the pavement, some clothing items, and a name tag which read "Keinya." Items were found in the northbound lane and in the median near the southbound lane. Four tire impressions were taken from the scene. Keinya's dead body was found on Monday, January 17, by a fishing camp in the Everglades.

About a week after the murder, Anderson voluntarily agreed to be interviewed by the police. At one point during the interview, Anderson responded that he did pick up Keinya from work on Sunday night, but that he did not kill her. Within seconds of making this statement, Anderson recanted, claiming that he was being facetious. Anderson consented to a search of his car, although the police already had a warrant. The police took impressions of the car's tires. An expert testified that of the four impressions taken from the scene, one could not have been made by Anderson's tires, one was consistent with Anderson's tires, and the other two impressions were of no value. There was damage to Anderson's radiator, the splash guard was cracked, and an area under the car appeared to have been wiped. Another expert testified that grease marks found on Keinya's jacket could have been made by two coils from underneath Anderson's car. That expert also stated that two other coils from Anderson's car could not have made the grease marks. Several spots in and under Anderson's car were suspected to have blood. There was a positive presumptive result from the car's splash pan, but the police could not get any DNA results from this spot, meaning that it could have been human blood or animal blood. However, a spot of blood on Anderson's car seat matched Keinya's DNA. Finally, a number of fibers were found under Anderson's car. An expert testified that one of the fibers was consistent with fibers from Keinya's pants. Twelve other fibers taken from the car did not match Keinya's clothing.

During the trial, the parties agreed to the following stipulation, which was read to the jury:

It has been stipulated between parties that Keinya Smith is dead. That she died on January 16, 1994. And that she died as a result of blunt force trauma inflicted by a motor vehicle. It is further stipulated between parties that the items of evidence found on U.S. 27 by Lieutenant Vaughn and Detective Foley, including jewelry, blood stains, name tags and hair and scalp, originated from Keinya Smith.

The State also presented the testimony of Anderson's probation officer, Lisa White, who stated that Anderson was on probation for eleven counts of attempted capital sexual battery on Keinya. White further stated that shortly after Keinya's body was found, Anderson contacted her and asked whether he could have his family back now that Keinya was dead.

Anderson did not put on any evidence during the guilt phase. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury convicted Anderson of first-degree murder.

During the penalty phase, the State presented the testimony of the medical examiner, who testified that in addition to various other injuries, Keinya's neck was fractured when she was run over by the car, and the fractured neck led to rapid unconsciousness and death. The medical examiner stated that survival following the incident was seconds to minutes at the most. State witness Mitzy Clark testified that on the night of the murder, she was driving on U.S. 27 when she saw a person lunge at her car, trying to get Clark to stop. Clark stated that she did not stop because she was scared. The State also presented the testimony of Edwina, who described the circumstances of Keinya's sexual abuse. Edwina made it clear that Anderson not only attempted, but actually completed the crime of sexual battery:

Q: Did [Keinya] tell you that [Anderson] inserted his penis inside her vagina on several occasions?

A: Yes.

Edwina also testified that on the Friday before the murder, Anderson said, "I'm going to prison, but somebody is going to be dead, I bet you that." Finally, Edwina stated that Anderson called her on the day of the murder, asked if Keinya was working that day, and asked what time Keinya got off work. Officer Estopinan, the officer who investigated the previous sexual batteries, also testified about the circumstances of Keinya's sexual abuse.

The defense called a number of penalty-phase witnesses who described Anderson's childhood and subsequent addiction to drugs. Anderson also testified on his own behalf. During the course of his testimony, Anderson admitted that he sexually abused Keinya.

The jury ultimately recommended death by an eight-four vote. The trial court found the following five aggravators: (1) Anderson had a previous conviction of a violent felony (the attempted sexual batteries), (2) the murder was committed while engaged in the commission of a felony (kidnapping), (3) the murder was committed to avoid arrest, (4) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and (5) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of legal

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