Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 05 May 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 289,289 |
| Citation | 253 A.2d 387,6 Md.App. 688 |
| Parties | Fred ANDERSON v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Sidney S. Campen, Jr., Easton, for appellant.
Henry J. Frankel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, John C. North, III, State's Atty. for Talbot County, Easton, on the brief, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.
Appellant was found guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court for Talbot County of manslaughter and was thereafter sentenced by the court to a term of ten years under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction. He contends on this appeal that the lower court erred in overruling his pretrial motion to suppress his confession and in thereafter permitting the confession to be received in evidence at the trial. More specifically, he urges that his written statement was inadmissible in evidence because the State failed to prove that he had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his constitutional right to remain silent and to have counsel to represent him.
There was evidence adduced at the trial from which the trier of fact could find that T. J. Cooper, a migrant farm worker, was stabbed while in the living quarters provided him by the Adams Cannery, and that shortly thereafter he died of his wounds; that State Trooper Charles M. Griffith arrived at the cannery at approximately 4:00 a. m., where he found appellant in a nearby shanty 'very drunk' and arrested him; that he searched appellant, removed a knife from his pocket and transported him to the State Police Barracks where he was placed in a cell; and that there was no conversation with him until the early afternoon when he awoke, ate a meal, and made a written statement to Sergeant Emil C. Myers that he had stabbed Cooper because Cooper had been 'picking on me.'
At the hearing on appellant's pretrial motion to suppress his confession, appellant testified that he was 62 years old, had not advanced beyond the fourth grade in formal education, and at the time of the crime had been employed by the Adadms Cannery as a migrant farm worker. He admitted drinking two pints of wine on the night Cooper was killed and that he had not been questioned until after he awoke later that day in a cell. He stated that when Sergeant Myers took him from his cell and began questioning him, he was 'feeling pretty nervous at the time,' and that the conversation began with Sergeant Myers' informing him that Cooper had died and that he should 'tell him what happened.' His attorney then asked him:
'Q. Did he say anything to you before he asked you to tell him what happened?
A. No sir.
Q. Are you sure he didn't say anything to you?
A. No sir.
Q. Fred, did he mention something about a lawyer?
A. Well, he mentioned that after he-shortly after he asked me about the-to tell him what happened.
Q. Fred, are you sure he asked you before or afterwards? Didn't he mention something to you about a lawyer, and what not?
A. He did mention something about a lawyer * * *
Q. And asked you some questions?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Do you remember anything else that he asked you Fred?
A. (No answer)
Q. Fred, if the officer told you something about a lawyer, that you had a right to a lawyer why didn't you ask him for a lawyer?
A. Well, I thought anytime would do, I didn't know.
Q. I didn't hear your answer. What's that?
A. I thought it would be anytime-anytime I could see a lawyer, I thought it would be all right. I didn't know.
Q. Did he tell you at that time that he had a right to an attorney, or a lawyer, and that you had a right not to answer anything before you had a lawyer?
A. Well, yes sir.
Q. Did you understand that?
A. No sir, I didn't understand it.
Q. Did the officer tell you that you had a right not to say anything at that time?
A. That I had a right not to say anything? I don't remember.'
Then, on cross-examination, appellant was further questioned:
'Q. And after he told you that then he told you you had a right to ad lawyer, isn't that right?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And did you ask him for a lawyer?
A. No sir.
Q. He told you, did he not, that if you wanted a lawyer but couldn't afford one that the State would furnish one at no cost to you?
A. Yes sir.
Q. But you still didn't ask for one? At that time?
A. No sir.
Q. Now he also told you you had a right to remain silent and not answer any questions, didn't he?
A. He might have.
Q. He might have but you don't remember that * * *
A. No sir.
Q. * * * too clearly. Now, he also told you that anything that you said would be used against you, or could be used against you in a trial later on, didn't he?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And he also said that if after you started answering questions you wanted a lawyer that you could have one at any time, didn't he?
A. I don't know sir, he might have, but I don't remember it.
Q. You don't deny that he said that? You just don't remember is that correct?
A. No sir, I don't remember.
Q. Do you recall Sgt. Myers asking you whether you understood the rights that he'd explained to you?
A. No sir.
Q. You don't remember that?
A. No sir.
Q. Do you deny that he asked you that?
A. I wouldn't say that he didn't ask me that, I don't remember.
Q. But he told you you had a right to remain silent and that anything you said could be used against you. Didn't he tell you that?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Well, didn't you understand that to mean that you had a right to remain silent, not to answer anything just as he had told you?
A. No sir, I didn't know what that mean.
Q. I see. Now he also told you that you had a right to a lawyer. Did you know what that meant?
A. A right to a lawyer?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes sir.
Q. And you understood, did you not, that a lawyer would be furnished you at no expense if you wanted one?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And you also understood, did you not, that you had the right to stop answering questions at any time that the Sergeant was asking questions of you?
A. No sir, I didn't know that.
Q. You didn't know that. Did you at any time ask for a lawyer?
A. No sir.
Q. Did you object to signing the statement?
A. Well, I had to do-I thought I had to do what he asked me to do. He told me to sign it.
Q. Do you remember the Sergeant reading the statement back to you before you signed it?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Was what he read back to you correct and accurate?
A. I guess so.
Q. If the statement as read back to you by Sergeant Myers was not correct in some part of it, if he put down something that you didn't say would you have spoken up and called that to his attention?
A. If I could've remembered it.
Q. * * * The question was asked you, 'Do you understand', and you answered 'Yes sir, I do', and now you say that you didn't understand. Now my question is why would you first say at that time that you did understand, if in fact you didn't?
A. Well, I don't know what silent means.
Q. You don't know what silent means?
A. No sir.
Q. Well, did you ask Sgt. Myers what silent means?
A. No sir.
Q. When he asked you if you understood you said 'Yes', didn't you?
A. Yes sir.'
At the conclusion of appellant's testimony, the defense produced as a witness Dr. William Bosma, a psychiatrist at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital, who, on three occasions immediately prior to trial, had examined appellant. He testified that appellant's intelligence was in the 'dull, average' strata, and that while his vocabulary was 'very poor' in connection with anything but his work, he was 'extremely good with numbers'; that he categorized appellant as a 'passive character,' one who would not oppose the expressed intentions of other persons, and that this personality trait was such that appellant would answer questions asked of him in the affirmative regardless of whether he truly agreed with the responses; that appellant 'would say no if the statement was untrue but I think if certain pressure were applied, which I understand had not been, he would say yes'; and that when he (Dr. Bosma) read the four-fold constitutional warnings printed at the beginning of the statement form to the appellant, the appellant did not understand the words 'absolute,' 'silent,' 'statement' and 'to be questioned.' It was Dr. Bosma's opinion that the appellant did not comprehend the meaning of his constitutional warnings.
The State then called Sergeant Myers as a witness, who stated that prior to questioning appellant concerning the crime, he informed him of the rights required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, and was convinced that he understood them and desired that they be waived. The following colloquy occurred:
'A. I was doing it off the cuff but at the same time referring to the form because many times it would say 'we', and of course I was alone, I would have to say 'I', and for that reason I was more or less talking to him, but at the same time referring to these notes to make certain that I got each of them in.
Q. All right sir. Go on.
A. I told him that if he did want to make a statement and did answer our questions, anything he did say would be used against him in a court of law. He also had a right to be alone with a lawyer and to talk to him and be advised by him before being questioned. After he talked to a lawyer he could also have him present during any time during the taking of the statement, or any time that we talked with him. He was told if he was unable to afford a lawyer but he did want one before talking to us that a lawyer would be appointed to represent him at public expense, without cost to him. If he did decide to talk to me without a lawyer present, but during the questioning he wanted to stop and have a lawyer he had a right to do so and to say nothing more. He was told that he was not being promised anything to make a statement or to answer questions, and that no threats are or would be made against him to have him tell u...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nash v. State
...asked what he was afraid of he answered 'I was afraid if I didn't tell the truth, something might happen to me.'2 See Anderson v. State, 6 Md.App. 688, 253 A.2d 387 (1969).3 Appellant recognizes that Miranda permits waiver of counsel and right to silence by an accused after he has been prop......
-
State v. Smith
...and the surrounding facts and circumstances.'" Lloyd v. State, 45 Ala.App. 178, 227 So.2d 809, 814 (1969) (quoting Anderson v. State, 6 Md.App. 688, 253 A.2d 387 (1969)). In United States v. Filiberto, 712 F.Supp. 482 (E.D.Pa.1989), the court explained that "failure to sign a form of waiver......
-
State v. McGee
...waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. Cf. State v. Auger, Mo.Sup., 434 S.W.2d 1; Anderson v. State, 6 Md.App. 688, 253 A.2d 387 (and cases cited); People v. Johnson, 75 Cal.Rptr. 401, 450 P.2d 865 (and cases cited); State v. Kremens, 52 N.J. 303, 245 A.2d ......
-
Fowler v. State
...without prior consultation with counsel is not necessarily an essential link in the chain of proof of waiver. See Anderson v. State, Md.App., 253 A.2d 387 (1969). ...