Anderson v. Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist.

Decision Date16 March 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 1:19-CV-42 (LAG)
Citation449 F.Supp.3d 1329
Parties Lezley B. ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. SUMTER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

Kenneth E. Barton, III, Cooper, Barton & Cooper, LLP, Bruce D. Dubberly, IV, Mason Gaines Bryan, Michael Devlin Cooper, Macon, GA, for Plaintiff.

Brian C. Smith, Phillip L. Hartley, Gainesville, GA, Kenneth P. Robin, Cumming, GA, Megan Nicole Martin, Michael James Walker, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

LESLIE A. GARDNER, JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 16 ). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part . Plaintiff's False Claims Act (FCA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Defendant Sumter County School District (SCSD) are DISMISSED with prejudice . Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendant Torrance Choates and Georgia Whistleblower Act (GWA) claim against SCSD remain.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lezley B. Anderson, Ed. D., brought this action against Defendants SCSD and Superintendent Torrance Choates, in his individual capacity, on March 8, 2019. (Doc. 1.) In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that SCSD—her former employer—retaliated against her in violation of the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (Count I) and the GWA, O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4 ( Count II). (Id. ¶¶ 80–107.) Plaintiff further alleges that both Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III). (Id. ¶¶ 108–115.)

Defendants answered on May 7, 2019. (Doc. 10.) On August 8, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), seeking dismissal of all claims. (Doc. 16.) Following Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 27 ) and Defendants' Reply (Doc. 28 ), the Motion is now ripe for the Court's review. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.3.1(A).

LEGAL STANDARD

"[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings ... is subject to the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Payne v. Doco Credit Union , 734 F. App'x 623, 627 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain specific factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is plausible on its face if the complaint alleges enough facts to "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A complaint must plead "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of the defendant's liability. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Court must "take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs," but the same liberal reading does not apply to legal conclusions. Edwards v. Prime, Inc. , 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). "[A] plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions" cannot "unlock the doors of discovery." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Additionally, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff was employed by SCSD as the principal of the Sumter County Primary School (SCPS) from 2016 to 2018.1 (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9–10.) Prior to that, Plaintiff was a principal at other SCSD schools from 2013 to 2016, and worked as an assistant principal and teacher with SCSD. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) On numerous occasions, SCSD recognized Plaintiff for her performance, which was always exemplary. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 17.) The schools where Plaintiff served as principal saw performance improvements and received recognitions and designations. (Id. ¶¶ 14–16.)

Choates was appointed SCSD superintendent in October 2016. (Id. ¶ 18.) As superintendent, Choates has day-to-day decision-making authority over SCSD management, including spending and employment matters. (Id. )

I. Racial Comments and Hiring Directive

Plaintiff does not set forth facts regarding her racial background in the Complaint, but she does raise allegations related to race. Plaintiff alleges that Choates made several comments to Plaintiff concerning race while she was SCPS principal. (Id. ¶¶ 19–25.) In February 2017, Choates told Plaintiff that she was spoiled and that she did not know what it is like to struggle because she is not black. (Id. ¶ 19.) Subsequently, Choates told Plaintiff that her school was "too white" and acknowledged that he was not permitted to direct Plaintiff to hire only black teachers, but instructed her to keep these factors in mind. (Id. ¶ 20.) When an assistant principal position opened up, Choates told Plaintiff that she must hire a black man for the vacancy. (Id. ¶ 21.) When Plaintiff responded that she would not know an applicant's race from their application, Choates told her she should learn applicants' races by interviewing them. (Id. ) SCSD's director of human resources later echoed that directive. (Id. ) Plaintiff told at least two Sumter County Board of Education members about Choates' directive. (Id. ¶ 22.)

Plaintiff and her hiring committee ultimately recommended a candidate of Indian national origin who was already an SCSD employee. (Id. ¶ 23.) Choates responded to the recommendation by discouraging Plaintiff from hiring the candidate, asking if she could "even understand what they say?" (Id. ) Plaintiff ultimately hired the candidate. (Id. ) In a May 31, 2018 meeting, Choates discussed how "internationals" were unable to handle discipline because of language barriers, and how students could not understand their accents. (Id. ¶ 25.)

II. Attendance Directives

The funding SCSD receives from the state and federal governments is based, in part, on enrollment and attendance data. (Id. ¶¶ 27–29, 41.) Georgia law requires school systems to report their initial full-time equivalent (FTE) enrollment count between October 1 and November 17 each year. (Id. ¶ 46.) That count is used to determine state and federal funding for educational programs for the following fiscal year. (Id. ) On September 26, 2017, Choates directed all SCSD principals to have parents with children who had absences of at least two consecutive days to retroactively withdraw and then re-enroll their children. (Id. ¶ 30.) This change would have resulted in a lower number of student absences and would have, correspondingly, avoided a reduction in state and federal funding. (Id. ¶ 31.) The proposed change also would have affected the school's Climate Star Rating pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 20-14-33. (Id. ) Plaintiff informed SCPS staff that the school would not comply with the directive because it was illegal. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff also told a Board of Education member about the directive on October 5, 2017. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff does not indicate whether the directive was put into effect or if any other SCSD schools complied. (See generally Doc. 1.)

On October 11, 2017, Choates directed his subordinates to change the attendance records of students with at least two consecutive absences to an "OTH" exemption code. (Id. ¶ 34.) An email to school administrators on October 12 also described this directive. (Id. ) This new directive would also have avoided a reduction in funding due to the students' absences by causing those students to appear as present on state records. (Id. ¶ 35.) In November 2017, Plaintiff learned that Choates, through a designee, had instructed each SCSD school's data clerks to change attendance records to "OTH" in accordance with the directive. (Id. ¶ 36.) Around the same time, the SCPS counselor ran an attendance report that showed students who had fewer absences than when truancy paperwork had been filed. (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff checked one of the affected students' records and found that eight of the student's absences were not counted due to the "OTH" code, resulting in the record reflecting fourteen rather than twenty-two absences. (Id. ¶ 38.) With respect to this student, use of the "OTH" code resulted in state reports inaccurately reflecting that the student received special education services on the eight days the "OTH" code was used. (Id. ¶ 40.) A student having a certain number of absences may trigger a federal requirement that the school provide additional special education services. (Id. ) There is no assertion that this particular student, or any other, met that threshold or that the additional services would result in an allocation of federal funds. (See generally Doc. 1.)

Plaintiff called SCSD's student information specialist and explained that it was improper and illegal to use the "OTH" code as Choates had directed. (Id. ¶ 39.) The student information specialist told Plaintiff that Choates directed his subordinates to use the code to improve SCSD's attendance numbers on the reports it submits to the state and federal governments. (Id. ) That same day, Georgia Department of Education (DOE) Deputy Superintendent Stephanie Jordan visited SCSD. (Id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff expressed to Jordan her concerns about Choates' attendance directives, as well as his use of Title I funds (described below). (Id. ¶ 42.)

Around November 17, 2017, Plaintiff's husband, Wiley Anderson (Mr. Anderson), contacted the DOE at Plaintiff's direction to file a complaint about Choates' attendance directives. (Id. ¶ 43.) Mr. Anderson eventually communicated with the program manager of academic auditing in the Governor's Office of Student Achievement, who provided Mr. Anderson with a complaint form. (Id. ) On November 27, SCSD's student information specialist emailed all principals, informing them that the district could no longer use the "OTH...

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