Anderson v. Tadlock

• Decision Date: 08 June 1937
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 297
• Citation: 175 So. 412,27 Ala.App. 513
• Parties: ANDERSON v. TADLOCK.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

175 So. 412

27 Ala.App. 513

ANDERSON v. TADLOCK.

4 Div. 297

Court of Appeals of Alabama

June 8, 1937

Appeal from Circuit Court, Bullock County; J.S. Williams, Judge.

Action in trespass by Willene Tadlock against F.H. Anderson. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Cope & Cope, of Union Springs, for appellant.

T.S Frazer and Andrews & Andrews, all of Union Springs, for appellee.

SAMFORD Judge.

There were four counts in the complaint; two counts claiming damages for trespass to realty, and two counts claiming damages for trespass to personal property. And in each count there was a claim for punitive damages.

It is claimed in all four counts that the defendant, acting by and through his duly constituted agent, who at the time complained of was acting within the line and scope of his employment, committed the acts of trespass to the realty and to the personal property in the manner set out in the complaint.

The testimony for defendant is to the effect that at the time the contract was executed there was a balance due on same of $41.50, and that on the date the property was taken by defendant's agent there was still due the sum of $23.50 and that the payments were in default. On the contrary, there was evidence tending to prove that the entire amount had been paid.

The evidence further tended to prove that the plaintiff resided with her husband and minor children in a house located within the city limits of Union Springs, Ala., rented by her, and that the articles of personal property purchased from the defendant were stored in said dwelling house; that plaintiff, because of ill health, left her house some time during the third week of October, 1935, at which time her husband, under her direction, nailed up the door to the house and closed the windows.

There was evidence tending to prove that the defendant sent his agent with instructions to repossess the personal property and that the agent, in carrying out his instructions, took a hammer, broke open the door, loaded the furniture on a dray, and carted it away, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, and that plaintiff had never recovered the property from the defendant.

It is now a firmly established rule in this jurisdiction that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the master is liable in damages for the torts of the servant committed while acting within the line and scope of his employment. This rule was announced in Gilliam v. South & N.A.R.R. Co., 70 Ala. 268, and has been followed consistently by our Supreme Court, and this court, in suits where the wrongs complained of have been committed by an agent within the line and scope of his employment. Alabama Power Co. v. Bodine, 213 Ala. 627, 105 So. 869.

This rule also applies where the wrong complained of was intentionally, willfully, or maliciously done in such manner as to authorize a recovery for punitive damages. Bessemer Coal, Iron & Land Co. et al. v. Doak, 152 Ala. 166, 44 So. 627, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 389. While in the earlier decisions, both in England and in many of the United States, a different rule has obtained, now in almost all jurisdictions it is well settled that the master is liable for the willful or malicious acts of the servant done in the course of his employment and within its scope, although the acts were not expressly ratified by the master or authorized by him. Postal Telegraph Co. v. Brantley, 107 Ala. 683, 18 So. 321. Authorities collated 39 Corpus Juris, (1487) (7), notes 72 and 73.

The evidence being in conflict on the issues involved, the court properly refused to give at the request of the defendant charges instructing a verdict as to each of the counts separately.

In a suit in trespass for taking...