Anderson v. Taft

• Decision Date: 13 January 1898
• Citation: 20 R.I. 362,39 A. 191
• Parties: ANDERSON v. TAFT, Town Treasurer.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

39 A. 191

20 R.I. 362

ANDERSON

v. TAFT, Town Treasurer.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 13, 1898.

Action by Seymour Anderson against Cyrus Taft, town treasurer. To the action of the court in refusing to admit certain evidence defendant excepted, and urges the exception as a ground for a new trial. New trial denied.

S. S. Lapham and F. P. Owen, for plaintiff.

Charles E Gorman, for defendant.

MATTESON, C. J. This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence of the town of Cumberland in failing to keep one of its highways safe for travelers. At the trial in the common pleas division the defendant offered testimony that the highway had been used in the same condition it was in on the night of the accident for upwards of 20 years, without accident. The court refused the offer, and thereupon the defendant excepted, and now urges the refusal as a ground of his petition for a new trial.

There are cases which, expressly or impliedly, sanction the defendant's contention that the testimony is competent evidence on the question of negligence. Quinlan v. City of Utica, 11 Hun, 217, 74 N. Y. 003; Hubbell v. City of Yonkers, 104 N. Y. 434, 10 N. E. 858. But the weight of authority, and, as it seems to us, the better reasons, support the opposite view. Collins v. Inhabitants of Dorchester, C Cush. 396; Aldrich v. Inhabitants of Pelham, 1 Gray, 510; Kidder v. Inhabitants of Dunstable, 11 Gray, 342; Blair v. Inhabitants of Pelham, 118 Mass. 420; Bailey v. Town of Trumbull, 31 Conn. 582; Bassett v. Shares, 63 Conn. 39, 27 Atl. 421; Association v. Giles, 33 N. J. Law, 260; Elliott, Roads & S. 646. If the defendant had been permitted to put in the testimony, the plaintiff would have been entitled to rebut it by testimony that accidents had happened within the 20 years. The defendant might then have shown that the accidents were caused, not by the defective condition of the highway, but because of the want of due care on the part of the traveler. Apart from the consideration that other accidents would be res inter alios acta as to the plaintiff, it is apparent that such testimony, could the parties be prepared to meet it, might introduce into the case numerous collateral issues bearing only remotely on the main issue, which would tend to greatly protract the trial, distract the attention of the jury from the issues involved in the suit, and impose great and unnecessary expense on the parties. The opinion in Association v. Giles, 33 N. J. Law, 264, states...