Anderson v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 92-5811
| Decision Date | 13 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-5811,92-5811 |
| Citation | 991 F.2d 794 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. James A. ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Marvin Runyon, John B. Waters, and William H. Kennoy, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before KEITH and SILER, Circuit Judges, and WOODS, District Judge. *
This is an employment discrimination and retaliation case. Plaintiff-appellant James A. Anderson filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga on May 6, 1991. Mr. Anderson is a black male afflicted with diabetes. He was 41 years old at the time the events underlying his claim occurred. Plaintiff-appellant alleges employment discrimination on the basis of race, age, sex and physical handicap by defendant-appellee Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the individual defendants-appellees, who were members of the Board of Directors of TVA during the relevant time period. 1 Mr. Anderson also alleges retaliation by TVA for certain protected activities in which he engaged. Mr. Anderson's claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, 29 U.S.C. § 633a and 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 and 794(a).
Defendants moved for dismissal and/or summary judgment, asserting a variety of grounds for relief. The motion was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On March 10, 1992, subsequent to full briefing and oral argument, the Magistrate Judge issued his Report and Recommendation, without specifically addressing the plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims. On April 20, 1992, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed the instant appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM.
The facts underlying plaintiff-appellant's complaint are substantially undisputed and are set forth at length in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, which is a part of the record in this case. For purposes of this Opinion, the following summary is sufficient.
Plaintiff's claims arise out of events that occurred in connection with a reduction in force (RIF) carried out by TVA in mid-1988. Mr. Anderson worked for defendant-appellee TVA in a managerial capacity from November 16, 1983 until September 2, 1988. At the time of his resignation, he was employed as an Equal Opportunity Analyst at an M-3 competitive level with a "permanent-nonveteran" classification.
After receiving notification that he would be displaced by the RIF, plaintiff-appellant secured employment as Director of Unemployment Insurance in Tennessee's Department of Employment Security in Nashville. He tendered his resignation to TVA, effective September 2, 1988. 2 One year later, plaintiff-appellant became Director of Special Projects under the Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Employment Security, in Nashville. In September of 1990, plaintiff-appellant returned to Chattanooga as a member of the Commissioner of Employment Security's personal staff.
During his sojourn in Nashville, plaintiff-appellant maintained his permanent residence and mailing address in Chattanooga, where his wife and daughter remained. Anderson lived in Nashville during the work week and commuted home to Chattanooga on the week-ends. In 1989, however, Anderson started law school in Nashville, and his week-end commute was less regular during that year.
Prior to his separation from TVA, Anderson instituted an administrative class complaint against the TVA, alleging disparate impact race discrimination against black managers as a class in TVA's evaluation system and by operation of TVA's policy of providing "credit for performance" during reductions in force, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He amended this complaint to add an individual claim of discrimination in March, 1989. The individual complaint was based on the TVA's reemployment of one Lynn Talley, who had been employed by TVA during Anderson's tenure as a "pre-permanent" equal opportunity analyst with a competitive level of M-2. Her position had been eliminated by TVA's 1988 reduction in force. Anderson also filed, on April 10, 1989, a formal complaint regarding Talley's reemployment with the Merit System Protection Board, contending that her reemployment ahead of him violated his reemployment rights, in light of his higher seniority.
On July 20, 1989, Anderson informed TVA that he also wanted his individual complaint amended to include an allegation of discrimination in his non-selection for the position filled by Glenda Funchess. 3 He also again indicated that he wanted to include his non-selection for the Analyst M-2 position held by Talley as a basis for his complaint.
Final Agency Decisions on each of Anderson's complaints were duly rendered. On May 30, 1989, TVA served a Notice of Final Interview, relating to the class complaint, on Anderson by certified mail, return receipt requested. Anderson never picked up this item of mail, and the notice was eventually returned to TVA by the Chattanooga post office.
Also on May 30, 1989, Anderson's appeal to the MSPB, initiated April 10, 1989, was dismissed by an Administrative Law Judge. The ALJ's decision included notification that it would become a final decision on July 4, 1989, unless Anderson further appealed to the MSPB before that date. The decision also contained notification that Anderson could appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit within 30 days of the date on which the decision became final, i.e., July 4, 1989. Anderson did not seek further review in either forum.
On July 17, 1989, TVA sent a second Notice of Final Interview with regard to Anderson's pending class complaint, via first class mail to his Chattanooga address. The Magistrate Judge deemed that notice to have been received by Anderson, on July 20, 1989.
On August 1, 1989, Anderson filed a formal class discrimination complaint with the TVA EO, which was transmitted to the EEOC District Office in Memphis, on August 9, 1989.
On August 4, 1989, Notice of Final Interview on plaintiff's individual complaint was issued. The letter also contained notification that a formal administrative complaint must be filed within fifteen days of receipt of the notice letter. On August 17, 1989, Anderson filed a formal individual discrimination complaint with the TVA EO. He alleged age, sex, race, reprisal and handicap discrimination in connection with the 1988 reduction in force, the TVA's failure to recall him during the notice period in 1988, and his non-selection for the EO Analyst M-2 and M-4 positions in November and August of 1988.
An EEOC Administrative Law Judge recommended dismissal of Anderson's class complaint on March 7, 1990. TVA issued a final agency decision (No. 1138-C) on April 18, 1990, adopting the ALJ's recommendation and rejecting Anderson's class complaint. The final agency decision was sent to Anderson's Chattanooga address non-restricted certified mail, return receipt requested. This letter was never collected by Anderson, or anyone acting for him, and was ultimately returned to the TVA.
A final agency decision on Anderson's individual discrimination complaint was entered by TVA on May 1, 1990. (No. 1136). That decision was also mailed non-restricted certified mail, return receipt requested to Anderson's home address in Chattanooga, and was never claimed, although two notices were left at Anderson's home, on May 7 and 17, 1990. This letter was eventually returned to TVA unclaimed.
The final agency decision in the class and individual complaints were mailed via first class mail to Anderson's home address on May 11 and May 23, 1990, respectively. The notice on the class complaint was apparently received, as Anderson appealed that decision on May 29, 1990. On May 29, 1990, Anderson also wrote a letter acknowledging receipt of TVA's final decision on Complaint No. 1136, the individual complaint, in which he notified TVA of his intent to appeal the decision. 4
Anderson's entire file was transmitted to the Director of Review and Appeals for the EEOC in Washington, D.C., on July 5, 1990. On August 29, 1990, the EEOC affirmed TVA's decision rejecting the class complaint. The EEOC decision incorporated a right to sue notice, informing Anderson of his right to file a civil action in federal court within thirty days of his receipt of the decision. Anderson did not file a civil suit based on the class complaint.
On October 11, 1990, TVA sent Anderson a letter bearing the following caption: "ATTEMPTED DELIVERY OF NOTICE OF PROPOSED DISPOSITION OF DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT--EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FILE REFERENCE NO. 1136, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION NO. 253-89-0820." The letter concerned a previously mailed certified letter, dated September 4, 1990, that was never claimed by Anderson.
Anderson filed this lawsuit on May 6, 1991, almost one year after the TVA rendered its decision on Anderson's individual claim, referenced as No. 1136. He insists that he was never notified that a final agency decision had been reached on his individual complaint.
Appellant has presented two issues to this Court: 1) whether the district court erred in granting TVA's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the doctrine of constructive notice is applicable and operates, in conjunction with the statute of limitations, to bar plaintiff's complaint; and, 2) whether filing a notice of intent to sue is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a civil action under the ADEA in district court. In addition, the appellee has raised the issue of whether plaintiff's instant appeal is barred by his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Uwakwe v. Pelham Acad.
...But Cook has subsequently been followed by the Sixth Circuit and district courts in that circuit. Anderson v. Tenn. Valley Auth. , 1993 WL 113730, at *4–5, 991 F.2d 794 (6th Cir. 1993) ("As in Cook , no genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment is raised by Anders......