Anderson v. The State
Decision Date | 31 December 1885 |
Docket Number | 12,216 |
Citation | 4 N.E. 63,104 Ind. 467 |
Parties | Anderson v. The State |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Reported at: 104 Ind. 467 at 476.
From the Noble Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
H. G Zimmerman, F. Prickett, L. H. Wrigley and S. M. Hench, for appellant.
F. T Hord, Attorney General, H. C. Peterson and R. P. Barr, for the State.
OPINION
This was a criminal prosecution based upon the following indictment:
Anderson, the defendant below and the appellant here, moved to quash the indictment, upon the ground that it was not charged with sufficient certainty that the crime was committed in Noble county, in this State. The circuit court nevertheless overruled the motion to quash the indictment, and a trial, which ensued, resulted in the jury finding the appellant guilty as charged, and in a judgment that he be imprisoned in the State's prison for the term of five years. Numerous questions were reserved upon the proceedings below.
While the indictment was not as full, formal and explicit as the old forms required, and as it might easily have been made, it was, notwithstanding, a substantially good indictment under our present criminal code, which, for many purposes at least, makes the caption and upper marginal title a preliminary part of an indictment. R. S. 1881, sections 1732, 1733; Moore Crim. Law, sections 165, 166; 1 Bishop Crim. Proc., section 377. See, also, section 1756, R. S. 1881.
The plain, and indeed only fair inference from the indictment, considered with reference to all its parts, was that the county of Noble, in which the offence was charged to have been committed, was the county of that name situate within and constituting a part of this State.
The prosecuting witness testified that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her twice while she was alone with him in the woods near Rome City, on the day named in the indictment, and that on both occasions the intercourse was forcible and against her will. The appellant, who became a witness in his own behalf, admitted the acts of sexual intercourse testified to by the prosecuting witness, at the times and places indicated by her, but, in extenuation, claimed, and very positively asserted, that both acts of intercourse were with her full and free consent.
As applicable to the issue thus made by the evidence, the court instructed the jury as follows:
The appellant assails this instruction for the alleged reason that it injuriously restricted him to a single theory in his defence, since he had the right, up to the last moment, to elect upon what ground he would base his defence. When the trial began the appellant had an election as to the ground upon which he would rest his defence. Having, however, elected to take the stand as a witness and to admit all the material matters charged against him, except the alleged forcible and felonious character of the sexual intercourse, he thereby committed himself to a single theory in his defence, for the obvious reason that by his admissions, he had rendered any and every other line of defence unavailable. The instruction in question was not, therefore, open to the objection urged against it. The court also instructed the jury as follows:
There was evidence to which this instruction was applicable, and, in the connection in which it was given, it stated the law aptly and appropriately.
The court further instructed the jury in these words:
There was evidence tending to prove that within a short time after the 18th day of June, 1884, the appellant was committed to the common jail of Noble county upon the charge contained in the indictment in this case, and that, not long after he was so committed, he made a vigorous and nearly successful effort to escape from that jail. That effort to escape constituted a circumstance which the jury were authorized to consider in connection with the other evidence in the cause, and, in that view, we see no error in the instruction given in relation to it as above. Whart. Crim. Ev., section 750.
The court still further instructed the jury that, ...
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Haverstick v. State
...5, Burns' 1914; section 1, c. 96, Acts 1909, pp. 257, 258; Bridgewater v. State, 153 Ind. 560, 566, 55 N. E. 737;Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 477, 478, 4 N. E. 63, 5 N. E. 711. And it is no part of his duty to disparage the law as so declared. Bridgewater v. State, 153 Ind. 560, 566, 55......
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Tully v. State
... ... confuse, mislead or prejudice the jury.' ... See ... Davis v. State, 54 Fla. 34, 44 So. 757, and ... Lewis v. State, 55 Fla. 54, 45 So. 998. We are of ... the opinion that this assignment has not been sustained. We ... have examined Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 4 ... N.E. 63, 5 N.E. 711, and State v. Duffey, 128 Mo ... 549, 31 S.W. 98, cited to us by the defendant, but see no ... occasion for commenting thereon. We would again refer to ... Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 17 So. 286, 48 Am. St ... Rep. 245, and our comments ... ...
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Walden v. State
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Haverstick v. State
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