Anderson v. Ætna Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 December 1909
• Citation: 74 A. 1051,75 N.H. 375
• Parties: ANDERSON v. ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

74 A. 1051

75 N.H. 375

ANDERSON

v. ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Merrimack.

Dec. 7, 1909.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Merrimack County; Stone, Judge.

Action by Ola Anderson against the FEtna Life Insurance Company. Verdicts for plaintiff, and case transferred from Superior Court on defendant's exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

The provisions of the policy relative to the amounts payable for various bodily injuries and as weekly indemnities for disability are stated in the opinion. The policy further stipulated that: "No legal proceeding shall be brought * * * unless commenced within one year from the date of the alleged accident, as to death, loss of limb, or surgical operation, or within six months from the riling of claim with the company, as to total or partial disability." The plaintiff was injured on August 31, 1906. January 15, 1907, he tiled with the company notice of his injury, claim of weekly indemnity for permanent total disability, and certificate of his medical attendant as to the extent of his injuries, which contained a reference to "reamputation of crushed limbs." Payment was refused on the ground that the plaintiff was only entitled to one-fifth the principal sum, for loss of his left hand. The writ in this action was made and dated July 8, 1907, but was not delivered to the sheriff until on or about September 9, 1907, which was the day of its service upon the defendants. The plaintiff was engaged in the granite business, and he had a quarry and stoneyard in Concord. On the day of the accident, while he was checking off stone on a platform car, a locomotive ran from the main line of the railroad upon the sidetrack leading to the yard, and collided with the car upon which he stood. The injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision included loss of the left arm at the middle third by amputation, loss of the thumb and two fingers of the right hand, fractures of the nose and two ribs, severe injuries to the head, and scalding of the back, and the undersides of both arms. The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the injuries to his head resulted in serious impairment of memory and inability to figure contracts, which continued at the date of the writ, that his disability was total within the terms of the policy during the time covered by the specification, and that the following surgical operations were performed: (1) Amputation of left hand at forearm; (2) reduction of fracture of nose; (3) reduction of fractures of ribs; and (4) amputation of fingers of right hand. The defendants excepted to the denial of their motion for a nousuit and to the refusal of the court to make the following rulings: (1) That the plaintiff cannot recover for weekly indemnity under the policy; (2) that he cannot recover for surgical operations under the policy; (3) that if he can recover for any surgical operation under the policy, he can only recover the sum of $25 for amputation of his hand. It was agreed by the defendants that if the plaintiff was entitled to weekly indemnity for total disability, he could recover for 20 weeks in this action. Two verdicts were found for the plaintiff: (1) verdict for $500—the weekly Indemnity due under the policy for total disability for 20 weeks—with interest thereon from January 15, 1907; (2) a verdict of $70 for surgical operations, made up in accordance with a schedule annexed to the policy, which provided that "the amounts stated shall be payable in addition to other benefits," as follows: Amputation of hand, $25; reduction of fracture of nose, $25; reduction of fractures of ribs, $10; amputation of fingers, $10.

Martin & Howe, for plaintiff. Streeter & Hollis (Edward K. Woodworth, orally), for defendant.

PARSONS, C. J. The policy upon its face insures against loss of life, limbs, sight, or time, and states that the principal sum insured is $5,000, and that the weekly indemnity for total disability is $25. The plaintiff was injured during the life and within the terms of the policy, and offered evidence from which the court has drawn the inference that he was totally disabled within the meaning of the policy because of the results of the injuries proved. There is no contention that the evidence was not legally sufficient to authorize the finding of total disability. Why, then, should not the defendants pay the plaintiff the indemnity for total disability promised by the face of the policy? If the plaintiff's total disability is permanent, as it appears to be conceded it will be, he would, if he has any right to such indemnity, be entitled to the weekly indemnity for 200 weeks, thus exhausting the full principal sum. But the engagements upon the face of the policy are made "subject to the conditions and benefits printed on the following pages."

The defendants, for the purpose of escaping their apparent liability for the principal sum insured, contend that one of the "benefits" to which the plaintiff is entitled is the payment to him of one-fifth the principal sum, or $1,000, for the loss of his left hand, which was one of the Injuries he received, and that a correct construction of the conditions of the contract releases them, upon payment of the fixed sum for the disability produced by this injury, from their engagement to indemnify the plaintiff for the total disability actually resulting from the injuries he received. The main controversy, therefore, is whether the plaintiff can recover the weekly indemnity of $25 stipulated in the policy, for the total disability resulting from an accident occurring during the life of the policy, or whether his recovery must be limited to the fixed sum which the policy provided should be paid for the removal of the left hand at or above the wrist. The plaintiff standing on his policy, in this suit is neres sarily bound by its provisions, and the da fendants are liable only in accordance with the terms of the contract. Johnson v. Casualty Co., 73 N. H. 259-261, 60 Atl. 1009, 111 Am. St Rep. 609, and cases cited. This does not mean that an insured who has been fraudulently induced to enter into an unconscionable contract, or deceitfully persuaded to accept as evidence of the contract a policy which misrepresents it, has no remedy, but merely that in a suit on the policy he must accept the contract proved by the evidence which he offers. The only question therefore is: What was the contract?

"'In construing Insurance policies courts are governed by the same general rules which are applicable to other written contracts. That is to say, it is the duty of the court to adopt that construction of the policy which, in its judgment, shall best correspond with the intention of the parties.' Stone v. Insurance Co., 69 N. H. 438, 45 Atl. 235. The intention of the parties so found from competent evidence is the contract the court in each case is called upon to enforce." Johnson v. Casualty Co., 73 N. H. 259, 262, 60 Atl. 1009, 111 Am. St. Rep. 609. The evidence from which such intention is to be found is the language of the written instrument, read in the light of the situation and general purpose of the parties. As men in general do not enter into contracts that are absurd or frivolous, or understandingly include in a written contract stipulations tending to defeat its main purpose, the inconvenience, hardship or absurdity of one construction or its contradiction of the general purpose of the contract, is weighty evidence that such meaning was not intended, when the language is open to a construction which is neither absurd nor frivolous, and is in agreement with the general purpose of the parties. Sanders v. Insurance Co., 72 N. H. 485, 57 Atl. 655, 101 Am. St. Rep. 688; Kendall v. Green, 67 N. H. 557, 562, 563, 42 Atl. 178.

"Insurance, then, is a contract of indemnity," under which "satisfaction is to be made to the person insured for loss he may have sustained." Cummings v. Insurance Co., 55 N. H. 457-459. The general purpose of the contract under consideration was therefore to indemnify the insured for loss resulting from accidental personal injury. With such end in view it would be natural to expect that the greater the loss, the larger would be the sum payable as indemnity. Such are the main provisions of the contract. For injuries producing a partial disability, disabling the insured from the performance of one or more of the duties of his occupation, payment at the rate of $10 per week for 26 weeks is stipulated. For a total disability $25 per week is agreed to be paid during the continuance of such disability, for a time sufficient to exhaust the policy. The limit, therefore, of indemnity provided for partial disability is $200. while for permanent total disability the full face of the policy, or $5,000, is payable. The policy also prescribes the sums payable for certain specified results following an injury. For loss of life, death resulting within 90 days of...