Anderson v. Triad Int'l Maint. Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 June 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:11-cv-3-J-32TEM
• Parties: TED B. ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. TRIAD INTERNATIONAL MAINTENANCE CORPORATION Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

TED B. ANDERSON, Plaintiff,

v.TRIAD INTERNATIONAL MAINTENANCE CORPORATIONDefendant.

Case No. 3:11-cv-3-J-32TEM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

Date: June 6, 2012

ORDER

Plaintiff, Ted B. Anderson, filed this action against Defendant, Triad International Maintenance Corporation("TIMCO"), claiming race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981andTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.The case is before the Court on TIMCO's motion for summary judgment.(Doc. 30.)The Court held oral argument on May 23, 2012(Doc. 49) and has considered TIMCO's motion and exhibits (Docs. 30, 31), Anderson's response and exhibits (Docs. 37, 38), the argument of counsel, case law, and all relevant facts and circumstances.

I.Background

TIMCO is a corporation in the business of providing aircraft maintenance, repair, and overhaul services.(Doc. 6 at ¶ 8.)Anderson is a black man who was employed at TIMCO's Lake City, Florida facility as a tool clerk from June 21, 2004 until December 6, 2007.(Id.at ¶¶ 4, 7;Doc. 37at 5.)Anderson's duties consisted of distributing the necessary tools toworkers, checking the tools back in, and ensuring proper inventory of the tools.(Doc. 6 at ¶ 9.)Anderson was the only black tool clerk.(Id.at ¶ 11.)

Near the end of 2007, TIMCO decided to lay off some of its workforce at the Lake City facility due to a slowdown in business and the loss of a major customer.(Id.)The reduction in force ("RIF") included the elimination of one tool clerk position.(Id.)To facilitate the RIF, TIMCO utilized evaluations which were completed for each employee.(Doc. 37at 1.)The RIF evaluations for the tool clerks included three categories applicable to all employees (quality, work attitude, and teamwork) and nine tool clerk-specific categories related to safety and technical ability.(Docs. 31-3 at 11;30 at 4.)These categories were scored on a four-point scale, with "1" being the best score and "4" being the worst.(Docs. 37 at 2; 31-3 at 11.)The evaluation also contained a space for a narrative description of the employee's overall performance, although this narrative was not calculated into the RIF score.(Docs. 31-3 at 10;30 at 4.)

Theresa Wingerd, the lead tool clerk, initially scored the tool clerk evaluations and gave Anderson better scores than two of the white tool clerks, William Whitfield, Jr. and James Wilhite.(Doc. 37at 1.)Subsequently, Brian Booher, the Stores Manager, reviewed the evaluations with Wingerd.(Id.)After Booher provided his input, Wingerd changed Anderson, Whitfield, and Wilhite's scores, and Anderson ultimately received the lowest score of all of the tool clerks.(Id. at 1-2.)On November 27, 2007, TIMCO informed Anderson that he was selected for layoff effective December 28, 2007; however, Anderson terminated his employment with TIMCO on December 6, 2007.(Id. at 4-5.)

On March 31, 2009, the Florida Commission on Human Relations issued a cause determination, based upon its investigator's finding that "there [wa]s reasonable cause to believe that [TIMCO] unlawfully discriminated against [Anderson] based on [his] race."(Doc 6at 10, 16.)Thereafter, on August 24, 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a Letter of Determination, finding "reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ha[d] occurred."(Id. at 8.)¹When conciliation efforts failed, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on October 5, 2010.(Id. at 6.)Anderson filed his complaint in this Court on January 27, 2011.(Id.)

II.Standard

Summary judgment is proper "when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1314(11th Cir.2011);Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c).The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52(1986).Although all facts and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 594(11th Cir.2011), "the nonmoving party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact throughspeculation, conjecture, or evidence that is 'merely colorable' or 'not significantly probative.'"Vega v. Invsco Grp., Ltd., 432 F. App'x 867, 869-70(11th Cir.2011)(quotingAnderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50).

In an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff must produce evidence that is sufficient to support an inference that the employer based the employment decision at issue on an illegal criterion.Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1207(11th Cir.1997)."At the summary judgment stage, our inquiry is whether an ordinary person could reasonably infer discrimination if the facts presented remain unrebutted."Id.Thus, a plaintiff survives summary judgment "'if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer's proffered reasons for its challenged action.'"Id.(quotingCombs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1529(11th Cir.1997)).

III.Discussion²

A plaintiff may prove discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence.Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358(11th Cir.1999)."Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence, that, 'if believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption.'"Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266(11thCir. 1999)(quotingBurrell v. Bd. of Trs of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393(11th Cir.1997)).It "is composed of 'only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate' on the basis of some impermissible factor."Id.(quotingCarter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582(11th Cir.1989)).Anderson has not offered direct evidence of discrimination.

When the plaintiff attempts to prove intentional discrimination using circumstantial evidence, the Court must apply the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792(1973)andTexas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248(1981).Vega, 432 F. App'x at 870;Childress v. Caterpillar Logistics Servs., Inc., 369 F. App'x 95, 96 n.3(11th Cir.2010);Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d at 1267.

Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.If he meets that burden, then an inference arises that the challenged action was motivated by a discriminatory intent.The burden then shifts to the employer to "articulate" a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.If the employer successfully articulates such a reason, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is really pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d at 1267(internal citations omitted).

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a RIF case, a plaintiff must: (1) show that he was in a protected class and was adversely affected by an employment decision; (2) prove that he was qualified for his position or to assume another position at thetime of the discharge; and (3) produce sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that his employer intended to discriminate in reaching the discharge decision.³Lawver v. Hillcrest Hospice, Inc., 300 F. App'x 768, 773(11th Cir.2008);Rowell, 433 F.3d at 798;Benson, 113 F.3d at 1208.TIMCO does not contest that Anderson satisfies the first two elements (Doc. 30at 16); thus, "[a]t issue is whether [Anderson] can point to sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find discriminatory intent."Standard, 161 F.3d at 1329.To establish intent, Anderson must proffer evidence that could lead a factfinder to conclude that: (1) TIMCO consciously refused to consider retaining him because of his race; or (2) TIMCO regarded race as a negative factor in such consideration.Padilla v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 270 F. App'x 966, 971(11th Cir.2008);Rowell, 433 F.3d at 798.As evidence of discriminatory intent, Anderson offers the following:

• Anderson's superiors, both white, changed his, Whitfield, and Wilhite's RIF evaluation scores such that instead of the two white tool clerks receiving worse scores than Anderson, Anderson received the worst score.(Doc. 37at 1.)After the revisions, Whitfield and Wilhite earned identical scores of 2.58, while Anderson received a score of 2.66.(Id. at 2.)

• TIMCO did not change the RIF evaluation scores of the other non-black tool clerk, Robert Hudson, who initially received a better overall score than Anderson.(Id. at 3.)

• TIMCO changed Anderson's RIF scores in the categories of: "Issues tools and tooling to authorized personnel and ensures proper transactions and paperwork are accomplished to maintain accurate records[;]" and "Ensures tools and tooling are stored in their proper location, secure and in an orderly manner" from "2" - meaning "Above Average" - to "3" - meaning "Below Average."(Docs. 37 at 2, 9;30 at 4 n.3;6 at 14.)However, Anderson avers that he"scored well on the correlating categories in his past performance evaluations[;]" specifically, for "Quality of Work" in his evaluation that was conducted the same year as the RIF, Anderson earned a score of "2" for "work exceeds quality requirements for accuracy and neatness[,]" and in another performance evaluation, Anderson "exceeded" the required quality of work.(Doc. 37at 2-3.)

• Anderson's RIF evaluation scores were worse than his past performance evaluation scores, which

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