Anderson v. Trident Eng'g & Inspection Corp.

Decision Date17 June 2021
Docket NumberNo. 2:21-cv-00149-LEW,2:21-cv-00149-LEW
PartiesMARTIN ANDERSON, Plaintiff v. TRIDENT ENGINEERING AND INSPECTION CORP., et al., Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine
ORDER ON EX PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

On this day, Plaintiff Martin Anderson filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1) and a Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 7). Preliminary injunctive relief is never awarded as of right and is extraordinary in nature, particularly when it is granted without giving the opposing party an opportunity to be heard. Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011); Baber v. Dunlap, 349 F. Supp. 3d 68, 74 (D. Me. 2018). Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends he is likely to succeed on the merits of a claim arising under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") and will suffer irreparable injury unless injunctive relief is provided posthaste.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Martin Anderson was or is the principal executive officer of an entity named Alaska Technical Training, Inc. ("ATTI"), which entity may or may not be a going concern at this time. On March 13, 2019, Plaintiff sold ATTI's assets (but not its stock) to Southern Services, Inc. ("SSI"). In addition to the right to receive periodic monetary payments from SSI (paid to ATTI), Plaintiff secured an employment contract with SSI.

In or about March of 2021, Defendant Trident Engineering and Inspection Corporation purchased "SSI's Alaska Office." Compl. ¶ 20. Prior to closing the sale, during a visit to the Alaska office in January of 2021, Trident personnel represented to Plaintiff that Trident would assume the purchase-payment and employment obligations SSI owed to Plaintiff (though Plaintiff states that his contract with SSI was not assignable). During that visit, Plaintiff provided Trident personnel access to his computer (evidently an SSI asset) so that Trident could install software that would enable Plaintiff to perform work for Trident. On March 23, 2021, Trident notified Plaintiff that he was terminated. A few days later, Plaintiff appeared at the Alaska office to turn over the laptop he used while employed by SSI. The cause for the termination is not apparent from the TRO record, but one plausible inference is that it may relate to Plaintiff's observation that his noncompete agreement with SSI would terminate upon Trident's purchase of SSI's Alaska office.

This litigation arises out of subsequent activities related to certain online accounts evidently established by Plaintiff before SSI purchased the assets of ATTI. In particular, Plaintiff established an account with Brinkster, a cloud-based hosting service, which account Plaintiff used to host both business files and personal files (inclusive of personal email accounts). According to Plaintiff, after terminating his employment Trident personnel accessed his "personal" Brinkster account and made changes that prevent him from accessing the account and prevent him, his wife, and his child from accessing personal email accounts and other private data. Although it is not clear from Plaintiff's papers, it appears that the Brinkster account was registered to martya@usalaska.biz, an email address Plaintiff used for business purposes. By commandeering the Brinkster account, Defendants can access all of the personal data that Plaintiff and his family have stored on Brinkster, including highly personal marital communications and attorney-client communications.

Plaintiff also alleges that he received notification that someone accessed his personal Google account on April 9, 2021, using a HP Laptop 14. Evidently, this was a computer owned by SSI and purchased by Trident because Plaintiff attributes the access to Defendants. Plaintiff also alleges that someone within Trident accessed his personal computer on April 10, 2021. What the someone may have done to either the Google account or the personal computer is not apparent from the pleadings. Finally, during the week of April 12, 2021, Defendants or their agents accessed a LinkedIn account established by Plaintiff and made unspecified changes to the account.

Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to damages and injunctive and equitable relief under the CFAA, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g), based on Defendants' knowing and intentional intrusion into his computer accounts and data, whether to obtain information from the same or recklessly or intentionally to cause harm. Compl. Count I.

DISCUSSION

The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is "the same as for a preliminary injunction." Bourgoin v. Sebelius, 928 F. Supp. 2d 258, 267 (D. Me. 2013). (citations and quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the record before the Court must demonstrate (A) that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of a claim for which injunctive relief is available; (B) that plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent interim relief; (C) that the balance of equities between or among the parties tips in the plaintiff's favor; and (D) that providing the requested relief will not harm the public interest. Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci. Advancements, Inc., 794 F.3d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 2015). As the party seeking injunctive relief - and as the only party before the Court - the plaintiff necessarily bears the burden of establishing that the factors favor the award of a temporary restraining order. Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115, 117, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2011).

A. Likelihood of Success

Failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success of the merits is ordinarily dispositive. New Comm. Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). On the other hand, "[a]s a matter of equitable discretion, a preliminary injunction does not follow as a matter of course from a plaintiff's showing of a likelihood of success on the merits." Benisek v. Lamone, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943-44 (2018) (per curiam). In the final analysis, "trial courts have wide discretion in making judgments regarding the appropriateness of such relief." Francisco Sánchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 572 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2009)).

The First Circuit has provided a succinct description of the CFAA:

Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 to address the problems of computer crime and hacking. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190; see also WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 2012). Originally a criminal statute, in 1986 the Act was expanded to include a civil action component as well. Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030); Miller, 687 F.3d at 201. Under the civil action provision, "[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1030] may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). The term "damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information" and the term "loss" is defined as "any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8), (11).

Turner v. Hubbard Sys., Inc., 855 F.3d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff contends he is likely to prove Defendant...

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