Anderson v. United States

• Decision Date: 12 January 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 1:20-CV-00157-GNS-HBB
• Parties: JONATHAN ANDERSON PLAINTIFF v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEFENDANT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

JONATHAN ANDERSON PLAINTIFF v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEFENDANT

Civil Action No. 1:20-CV-00157-GNS-HBB

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division

January 12, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Greg N. Stivers, Chief Judge United States District Court.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions in Limine (DN 57, 58, 59) and Defendant's Motion for Leave to File a Reply (DN 72). The motions are ripe for adjudication.

I. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff Jonathan Anderson (“Anderson”) was involved in a motor vehicle accident in May 2018 after colliding with a United States Postal Service vehicle.^[1] (Compl. ¶¶ 7-9, DN 1). This action was initiated against Defendant United States of America (“United States”) under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) and is set for a bench trial on January 18, 2023. (Compl. ¶ 1; Order 1, DN 52). The parties have filed motions in limine regarding potential testimony at trial.

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346(b).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motions in limine are like “any motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered . . . [and are] designed to narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Louzon v. Ford Motor Co., 718 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990)). While not explicitly authorized by the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts use their “inherent authority to manage the course of trials” to decide these motions. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 n.4; see Deere & Co. v. FIMCO Inc., 260 F.Supp.3d 830, 834 (W.D. Ky. 2017). Rulings amount to “no more than a preliminary, or advisory, opinion” and should only “eliminate evidence that has no legitimate use at trial for any purpose.” United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); Mahaney ex rel. Est. of Kyle v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 835 F.Supp.2d 299, 303 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (citations omitted). Absent “evidence [that] is patently ‘inadmissible for any purpose,'” courts may defer issues until trial “so that ‘questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.'” United States v. Stone, 543 F.Supp.3d 535, 539 (W.D. Ky. 2021) (quoting Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Fam. Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997); Gresh v. Waste Servs. of Am., Inc., 738 F.Supp.2d 702, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2010)); see Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975) (“Orders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be employed. A better practice is to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as they arise.”). Thus, decisions may be revisited “at any time and ‘for whatever reason [the Court] deems appropriate.'” Stone, 543 F.Supp.3d at 539 (quoting Yannott, 42 F.3d at 1007); see Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42.

IV. DISCUSSION

Anderson moves to exclude testimony at trial and objects to two witnesses and five exhibits for the United States. (Pl.'s Mot. Lim., DN 57). Two requests are unopposed, so they are granted.

(Def.'s Resp. Pl.'s Mot. Lim., DN 68 [hereinafter Def.'s Resp.] (maintaining no objections to requests 1-effect of verdict on the United States-and 3-attorney-client communications)).

The United States filed two motions: one to limit the testimony of Dr. John Gormley (“Dr. Gormley”) and one to exclude Dr. Sushma Chandan (“Dr. Chandan”) from testifying. (Def.'s Mot. Lim., DN 58; Def.'s Mot. Lim., DN 59). Anderson contests the limiting of Dr. Gormley's testimony but notes that Dr. Chandan will not be called as a witness. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Lim., DN 62 [hereinafter Pl.'s Resp.]; Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s Mot. Lim., DN 70). Thus, the United States' motion to exclude Dr. Chandan (DN 59) is denied as moot.

A. Anderson's Motion in Limine

1. Medicaid Payments & Collateral Sources of Income

Anderson moves to exclude evidence of payments by Medicare or Medicaid covering his medical expenses, alleging them to be collateral sources of income and that Kentucky law prevents the admission of such evidence. (Pl.'s Mot. Lim. 2-3). Anderson maintains that the United States, if found liable, should not receive a reduction of damages for these payments. (Pl.'s Mot. Lim. 3). The United States clarifies that the relevant payments were made by Medicaid and cites various federal district court rulings for the proposition that Medicaid is not a collateral source, so it “should receive an offset for any medical bill that is paid by Medicaid and the Medicaid payment should be viewed as a reasonable payment for medical services rendered.” (Def.'s Resp. 2-3 (citations omitted)). Even then, the United States alleges no prejudice would occur, as this is a bench trial and the charges do not typically reflect what was actually paid. (Def.'s Resp. 1).

This action was filed pursuant to the FTCA, under which Congress provided for the United States' liability to align with “circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” (Compl. ¶ 1); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, “substantive state law governs the merits of a FTCA claim,” so state collateral source rules apply. Gallivan v. United States, 943 F.3d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445, 449 n.5 (6th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). The collateral source rule precludes the reduction of a plaintiff's damages by amounts received from sources other than the tortfeasor. Hamlin v. Charter Twp. of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Jackson v. City of Cookeville, 31 F.3d 1354, 1359 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Kentucky rule provides this safeguard when the “benefits received by an injured party for his injuries from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor ....” Schwartz v. Hasty, 175 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Ky. App. 2005); see Burke Enters., Inc. v. Mitchell, 700 S.W.2d 789, 796 (Ky. 1985) (noting that a tortfeasor cannot receive any credit for medical expense payments “paid by a collateral source to the tort victim pursuant to a contractual obligation owed to the victim from the collateral source ....” (emphasis omitted)).

As noted above, the United States indicates that the relevant payments were made by Medicaid. (Def.'s Resp. 2). “Medicaid is a ‘cooperative federal-state public assistance program that makes federal funds available to states electing to furnish medical services to certain impoverished individuals.'” Tennessee ex rel. Tenn. Gen. Assembly v. U.S. Dep't of State, 931 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). After the Department of Health and Human Services approves a state's Medicaid plan, “the state receives reimbursement from the federal government for a percentage of the costs of providing care to eligible individuals ....” Id. (citing West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 2002); 42 C.F.R. § 430.12). The federal reimbursement compensates Kentucky for 72.17% of its service-related costs. Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures, 86 Fed.Reg. 67,479 (Nov. 26, 2021) (noting the percentages for Fiscal Year 2023).^[2]

Given the federal government reimbursement, the Medicaid payments do not, at this time, appear to be “wholly independent” from the United States. See Schwartz, 175 S.W.3d at 626; Mitchell, 700 S.W.2d at 796-97. It is unclear whether the Medicaid payments at issue were “pursuant to a contractual obligation” owed to Anderson. See Burke Enters., Inc., 700 S.W.2d at 796. Therefore, this issue is best suited for deferral until trial. See Sperberg, 519 F.2d at 712. To that end, Anderson's request is denied.

2. Conduct by Non-Parties

Anderson argues that no evidence should be presented which implicates a non-party to this action as being responsible for or contributing to his injuries. (Pl.'s Mot. Lim. 4). The United States concedes that non-parties cannot be allocated fault under Kentucky law but maintains that evidence of a non-party's conduct is relevant to Anderson's burden of proof. (Def.'s Resp. 3).

Kentucky's allocation of fault statute, KRS 411.182, applies to all tort actions involving fault by more than one party and requires the factfinder to determine the total damages recoverable by the claimant and the percentage of total fault apportioned among all parties, including each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and persons released by agreement. KRS 411.182(1). In making this determination, the factfinder “must consider both the character of the parties' conduct and causation in allocating fault.” Louisville SW Hotel, LLC v. Lindsey, 636 S.W.3d 508, 521 (Ky. 2021) (citing KRS 411.182(1)). This allocation, however, does not extend to non-parties. Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 824 (6th Cir. 2000).

The parties' contentions to this end do not reference any specific anticipated testimony or argument. Without more, it is unclear what particular evidence is sought to be excluded. The Court will be better situated to rule upon any objections in the proper context at trial. See Stone, 543 F.Supp.3d at 539; Sperberg, 519 F.2d at 712. Therefore, at this time, Anderson's request is denied.

3. Settlement Discussions

Anderson's fifth request maintains that settlement discussions or agreements should be excluded. (Pl.'s Mot. Lim. 4). The United States simply replies that “Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of...