Anderson v. University of Wisconsin

Decision Date11 August 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-C-635-S.,86-C-635-S.
Citation665 F. Supp. 1372
PartiesFradus Lee ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, University of Wisconsin Law School, Gerald J. Thain, John A. Kidwell, June Weisberger, Stuart Erlanger, Stephen J. Herzberg, Charles Irish, W. Lawrence Church and Bernard C. Cohen, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Steven J. Schaefer, of Fox, Fox, Schaefer & Gingras, Madison, Wis., for plaintiff.

Robert D. Repasky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHABAZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff Fradus Lee Anderson has brought handicap and race discrimination claims against the defendants. Plaintiff contends that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of handicap and race when they denied his request to be readmitted to the University of Wisconsin Law School. Defendants moved for summary judgment. On July 2, 1987, the Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. At that time, the Court ordered the Clerk to withhold entry of judgment until the Court issued an extensive memorandum setting forth the Court's reasons for granting defendants' motion. This memorandum sets forth those reasons for granting defendants' summary judgment motion.

The Supreme Court established the standard for granting a summary judgment motion in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court stated

Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
FACTS

Plaintiff Fradus Lee Anderson is an adult black male. On or about June 7, 1979, the Admissions Committee of the University of Wisconsin Law School voted to accept Anderson as a law student for the class of August 1979. Anderson was accepted as an LEO student. The LEO student program is a special program for minority students which provides financial and other assistance for minority students. There is a limited enrollment in the LEO program.

Anderson began law school the first semester of the 1979-80 school year. Anderson attained a 75 average for that semester. Anderson began the second semester of 1979-80, but was declared ineligible when the law school determined that it had not received the necessary certification of Anderson's undergraduate degree. Anderson subsequently provided the necessary certification, but did not resume the second semester of the 1979-80 law school year.

On October 10, 1980, Anderson wrote to Dean Helstad about reentering law school for the second semester of the 1980-81 year. In the letter to Helstad, Anderson asserted that he had a problem with alcohol and that he was initiating a program of treatment, including the taking of the drug Antabuse for alcoholism control. Dean Helstad was of the view that Anderson had a right to enter the second semester and complete a full year of law school.

Anderson enrolled in the second semester of the 1980-81 law school year. During this semester Anderson made telephone calls to E.L., his female legal writing partner. Anderson telephoned E.L. on Tuesday, March 17, 1981, at approximately 1:15 A.M. and was apparently drunk at the time. Anderson began the conversation talking about the "C" grade that he received on one legal writing task, and stated "I don't care if I got a C, because I got you." E.L. stated that Anderson's conversation was rambling, and that at one point he said, "I've got the money from the guy so that we can go to Jamaica." According to E.L., Anderson further stated that he thought she was "sexy" and that he was "in love with her." Anderson telephoned E.L. two days later on March 18, 1981 and apologized for this behavior. On April 12, 1981, Anderson called E.L. and said, "You did this, you caused this you damn bitch." E.L. perceived the calls to be threatening and she complained to the Law School about Anderson.

In May 1981, Anderson asked permission to drop two of the second semester courses that he was taking. The Law School did not permit the selective dropping of first year classes, and Anderson's request was denied. He was advised that it would be permissible for him to drop the full semester. Anderson asked to withdraw from all of the second semester courses by a letter dated May 5, 1981. His request was granted, but it was not possible to drop the Legal Writing course, and a grade of D was recorded.

On January 4, 1982, Anderson requested permission to enter the second semester of the 1981-82 school year. In a letter to Dean Helstad, Anderson asserted that he planned to attend classes regularly and do well as it was "important" that he be a lawyer, and important that he "not betray the faith and trust of those who have given" him a "chance." Anderson enrolled in and completed the second semester of Law School in 1981-82.

Anderson completed his first year of Law School with a 76.92 average. On or about August 24, 1982 Anderson was informed by Joan Rundle, Assistant Dean of the Law School, that his cumulative grade point average for his first year in Law School was 76.92, and below the 77.00 average that is necessary for retention in law school. Rundle further informed Anderson at that time that he could not continue in law school unless he received permission to do so from the Retentions Committee. Rundle also informed Anderson that if he wished to petition the Retentions Committee he should submit his request to the Committee immediately, and that it should be submitted to Professor Gerald Thain, Chair of the Committee.

In late August or early September of 1982, Anderson submitted a petition for permission to continue as a law student to the Retentions Committee. In his petition Anderson argued that he should be permitted to continue for the following reasons:

1. That if his summer session work was included, his weighted average would rise above the required 77.00 level;
2. That there was an improvement in his second semester grades as compared to his first semester grades; and
3. That he had been plagued by a very severe personal problem for the past half-decade plus, and that he had embarked upon a program that had not only helped him resolve the aforementioned personal problem, but would prove beneficial in many other areas of his life. (Details upon request).

On or about September 1, 1982, the members of the Retentions Committee were informed that Anderson had received an unrecorded grade of 80 in his Constitutional Law I Course during the summer session of 1982. This grade would have raised Anderson's cumulative average of 76.92 above the required level of 77.

On or about September 3, 1982, Thain requested Anderson to supply the Committee with further information regarding his petition. In writing, Anderson provided the Retentions Committee with the following information:

To explicate the nature of my personal problem: I am an alcoholic. I was reluctant to be more specific in the petition because I do not feel that I can adequately convey my feelings.
I was an active alcoholic when I entered Law School in 1979. I have been battling the disease since that time. I have tried various programs and none has been particularly helpful: One program felt that I have not suffered sufficiently to be properly motivated to recover; one program attempted to exercise the cause of my drinking through psycho-drama and other techniques and failed; and yet another where I was the only participant with a drinking problem applied transactional analysis in a group of individuals with severe emotional problems. However, each step brought me closer to grips with my problem, made me more aware of my predicament.
The first and most difficult problem for any alcoholic is denial: Invariably, a drinking alcoholic will deny—at least, inwardly—that he has a problem. I have overcome this hurdle, and I believe, at last, am on my way to recovery. As of now, I am a member of Alcoholics Anonymous, and consider myself a recovering alcoholic.
In my petition, I stated that my "personal problem" had stood in the way of my successfully completing Law School, and that I feel this obstacle has been removed. I do claim to have stopped drinking forever, but, taking one step at a time, I have stopped. Today, I have a sponsor, someone to guide me to sobriety and sanity, I attend meetings daily, I am surrounded by people who understand and give me support.
If you allow me to continue, I believe that I will be an excellent student.

On or about September 14, 1982, the Retentions Committee informed Anderson that the Committee had rejected his petition to continue in Law School by a vote of 5 to 0. The Committee voted to deny Anderson's petition for the following reasons:

You have stated both in writing and at the Committee's meeting with you on September 9, 1982, that alcoholism is the basic cause of your inability to perform at a satisfactory academic level as well as the underlying cause for your inability at times to take examinations when scheduled, the cause of your inability to carry to successful completion a full academic load for a normal semester since you first enrolled in Law School three years ago, the cause for frequent absence from classes, and the cause for your
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