Anderson v. Whipple

Citation71 Idaho 112,227 P.2d 351
Decision Date30 January 1951
Docket NumberNo. 7555,7555
PartiesANDERSON v. WHIPPLE et ux.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Dean Kloepfer, Burley, Lawrence H. Duffin, Rupert, for appellant.

S. T. Lowe, Burley, for respondents.

TAYLOR, Justice.

The plaintiff (appellant), a widow 81 years of age and mother of the defendant R. H. Whipple, commenced this action on the 26th day of February, 1948. In her complaint she alleges that she is and for a long time has been the owner of the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section Thirty-six, Township Ten South, Range Twenty-four East of the Boise Meridian, in Cassia County, Idaho; that the defendants are in possession of said premises and have been unlawfully withholding the possession from the plaintiff since the 1st day of January, 1946; that the value of the rents and profits of the land is $800.00 per year; that she has been deprived of the rents and profits and further damaged by the withholding of possession in the sum of $500.00; that defendants claim an interest in the property adverse to the plaintiff, which is without right; and that the defendants have not any estate, right, title or interest whatever in said lands. Plaintiff prays that defendants be required to set forth the nature of their claim; that all adverse claims be determined; that it be adjudged that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the possession of the premises; that the defendants have no estate nor interest therein; that they be barred from asserting any claim; for restitution of the premises; for the reasonable rental value from January 1, 1946; for $500.00 damages; 'and for such other and further relief as to equity shall seem meet and proper.'

The defendants (respondents) are husband and wife. In their answer they admit they hold possession and, as an affirmative defense, allege: That in March, 1934, in order to induce defendants to move upon the land involved and to farm it as her tenants, the plaintiff agreed with them 'that she would rent the said premises to the defendants at the customary crop rental, and thereafter she agreed with these defendants that if they would occupy the said premises, farm the same, and pay her a reasonable rental therefor, each year during her natural life, they could occupy the same during her natural life and, upon her death, the real estate would be their real estate.'; that pursuant to the agreement they moved upon the premises March 18, 1934, and that they have ever since and now are occupying the premises under and by virtue of that agreement, and have fully complied with the terms and conditions of the contract; that they paid plaintiff a crop rental for the years 1934, 1935 and 1936; that in the year 1937 the plaintiff demanded a cash rental of $400.00; that the defendants acceded to such demand and paid a cash rental of $400.00; for each of the years 1937 to and including the year 1942; that in the year 1943 the plaintiff increased the rent to $500.00 per year and that they paid plaintiff $500.00 for each of the years 1943, 1944 and 1945; that in the year 1946 the plaintiff demanded a cash rental of $700.00, and, although that sum was unreasonable, the defendants paid $700.00 rental for the year 1946; that for the year 1947 the defendants offered plaintiff $700.00 rental, which she refused to accept; that, wholly relying upon the agreement 'entered into in the year 1934, as aforesaid,' they leveled a portion of the land, thereby increasing the irrigable acreage thereof approximately two acres; that they built a brooder house thereon at a cost of approximately $300.00; constructed a 60 foot straw shed at a cost of approximately $100.00; purchased gas and used the gas on the premises in treating and destroying noxious weeds; constructed an irrigation ditch at an approximate cost of $25.00; removed approximately 20 tree stumps; reset a light pole; painted the kitchen; prepared to plaster and plastered the dwelling house and paid the cost thereof except the compensation of the plasterers; that all of said improvements were made in reliance upon the promise and agreement of plaintiff that they could use and occupy the premises during her lifetime and upon her death the land would become the land of defendants.

It is to be noted that the agreement, alleged to have been entered into in March, 1934, was to rent the premises for a customary crop rental and 'thereafter she agreed' to the life tenancy and the fee after her death. Further that the allegation as to improvements is that they were made in reliance upon the agreement 'entered into in the year 1934, as aforesaid.'

In their cross-complaint the defendants allege that in 1946, 1947 and 1948, they received seven certain checks from the Amalgamated Sugar Company for beets grown on the land, which were made payable to R. H. Whipple and the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff wrongfully, unlawfully, wilfully and maliciously refused to endorse the checks, thus depriving them of the use of the proceeds from the date of issuance to the 6th day of April, 1948, to their damage in the sum of $62.94. They pray judgment for such damage and for $1000.00 punitive damages.

In answer to the cross-complaint the plaintiff alleges that the lease agreed to in 1934 was a lease for 'one crop year.', and that each year since 1934 up to and including 1945, the parties negotiated a new lease; that they were unable to agree on the terms of the lease for the year 1946, and that plaintiff has not accepted rental from the defendants since the 1st of January, 1946.

The defendants filed a written motion for an order directing that the cause be tried to a jury, on the ground that the pleadings show upon their face that it is an action at law and not a suit in equity. After argument, this motion was granted by the court. The cause was thereafter tried and submitted to a jury, for a general verdict as to who is entitled to possession; and three special verdicts, the first of which asked the jury to fix the reasonable rental value, the second as to whether or not the defendants were damaged by plaintiff's refusal to endorse the beet checks and, if so, the amount, and the third as to whether or not the defendants are entitled to punitive damages and, if so, the amount. In thus submitting the cause the court observed that it regarded the special verdicts as 'binding on the court, and not merely interrogatories to be accepted which are only advisory to the court in an equity case, the court having already decided that the defendants are entitled to a jury trial with a resulting verdict binding upon the court.'

By the so-called general verdict the jury found that the defendants are entitled to possession. By the special verdicts the rental value for each of the years 1946, 1947 and 1948, was fixed at $700.00; the damage for refusal to endorse checks, $62.94; and punitive damages were awarded in the sum of $533.33. Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. In the judgment which followed, the general and special verdicts were incorporated, but no other findings were made by the court. It was adjudged that the defendants were entitled to the possession of the land during the natural life of the plaintiff upon payment to her 'of a reasonable cash rent for the use and occupation of said premises during each year of the natural life of the said plaintiff and cross-defendant; that if the defendants and cross-complainants shall well and truly, each year, pay to the plaintiff and cross-defendant, Melissa Anderson, during her natural life, a reasonable cash rent, then at the death of said Melissa Anderson the above described real estate shall be and become the property of the defendants and cross-complainants, R. H. Whipple and Effie Whipple, his wife.' The reasonable rental value for the years 1946, 1947 and 1948, was fixed at $700.00 per year and judgment was entered for the defendants for $62.94 actual damages and $533.33 punitive damages and costs, to be offset against the rentals due to the plaintiff. $2,100.00 having been tendered and paid to the clerk by the defendants to cover the rental for the three years, the judgment directed the clerk to deduct defendants' damages and costs from this amount and pay the balance to the plaintiff.

The first question presented is the right to trial by jury.

'The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; * * *.' Const. Art. 1, sec. 7.

'The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, are hereby prohibited; and there shall be in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action; * * *.' Const. Art. 5, sec. 1.

'* * * the fact at issue shall be tried by order of court before a jury.' Const. Art 5, sec. 1.

These provisions were not intended to and do not extend the right of trial by jury to suits in equity. Their function is to preserve the right as it existed at the date of the adoption of the constitution. Christensen v. Hollingsworth, 6 Idaho 87, 53 P. 211, 96 Am.St.Rep. 256; Shields v. Johnson, 10 Idaho 476, 79 P. 391, 3 Ann.Cas. 245; Morton v. Morton Realty Co., 41 Idaho 729, 241 P. 1014; Johnson v. Niichels, 48 Idaho 654, 284 P. 840; Fogelstrom v. Murphy, 70 Idaho ----, 222 P.2d 1080.

The district court has 'original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, * * *'. Const. Art. 5, sec. 20.

'There is in this state but one form of civil actions for the enforcement or protection of private rights and redress or prevention of private wrongs: provided, that in all matters not regulated by this code, in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity jurisprudence and the rules of the common law, with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail.' Sec. 5-101, I.C.

These and other code provisions were intended to simplify pleading...

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79 cases
  • Wilson v. Bogert
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    ...item, referred to in the complaint as a 'reasonable settlement', to be paid plaintiff by defendants for her injuries. Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 227 P.2d 351. The agreement with respect to the other items, such as the expense of television, telephone, hospital, medical and nursing c......
  • State v. Creech
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