Anderson v. Wood

Decision Date14 May 1941
Docket NumberNo. 7805.,7805.
Citation152 S.W.2d 1084
PartiesANDERSON, County Judge, et al. v. WOOD, Sheriff.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

John R. Shook, Crim. Dist. Atty., and Pat Camp, Benton Davies, and T. H. Ridgeway, Asst. Dist. Attys., all of San Antonio, for plaintiffs in error.

John H. Wood, Jr., Weber & Wolfe, and John K. Weber, all of San Antonio, for defendant in error.

ALEXANDER, Chief Justice.

The Sheriff of Bexar County brought this suit against the Commissioners' Court of said county and others, to restrain the defendants from interfering with the alleged right of the sheriff to employ and discharge the court house engineer, janitors and elevator operators, jail guards and jail matrons, and county traffic officers. Upon a hearing on the application for a temporary injunction, the trial court held that the right to employ and discharge the above-mentioned court house employees rested exclusively in the Commissioners' Court; that the right to employ and discharge the jail employees above mentioned rested exclusively in the sheriff; and that the sheriff had the right to direct the traffic officers above referred to in the performance of their duties, but that the Commissioners' Court had the right to discharge them, either on the request of the sheriff or on its own initiative, when their services were either unsatisfactory or no longer needed. A temporary injunction was granted by the trial court only to the extent that the above-mentioned conclusions were in favor of the sheriff. Upon appeal by the sheriff, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, and granted the temporary injunction in all respects as prayed for by the sheriff, pending a trial on the merits. 143 S.W.2d 96. The Commissioners' Court sued out a writ of error to this court.

We will first discuss the question as to who has the right to employ and discharge the court house engineer, janitor, and elevator operators. The exact question here under consideration does not appear to have ever been judicially determined in this State. Our Constitution, Article V, Section 18, Vernon's Ann.St., provides in part as follows: "The county commissioners so chosen, with the county judge, as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners Court, which shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the Laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed." While under the above constitutional provision the jurisdiction of the Commissioners' Court over county business is not general and all-inclusive, but is limited to such as is specifically conferred by the Constitution and statutes (Mills County v. Lampasas County, 90 Tex. 603, 40 S.W. 403), yet the Commissioners' Court is the acting governing body of the county. Ehlinger v. Clark, 117 Tex. 547, 549, 8 S.W.2d 666; Jernigan v. Finley, 90 Tex. 205, 38 S.W. 24; Anderson v. Parsley, Tex.Civ.App., 37 S.W.2d 358. It is the general business and contracting agency of the county, and it alone has authority to make contracts binding on the county, unless otherwise specifically provided by statute. 11 Tex. Jur. 630; American Disinfecting Co. v. Freestone County, Tex.Civ.App., 193 S.W. 440; Germo Mfg. Co. v. Coleman County, Tex.Civ.App., 184 S.W. 1063; Matthews Lumber Co. v. Van Zandt County, Tex. Civ.App., 77 S.W. 960; Fayette County v. Krause et al., 31 Tex.Civ.App. 569, 73 S. W. 51. Where a right is conferred or obligation imposed on said court, it has implied authority to exercise a broad discretion to accomplish the purposes intended. 11 Tex.Jur. 565; City Nat. Bank v. Presidio County, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S. W. 775; Gussett v. Nueces County, Tex. Com.App., 235 S.W. 857; Dodson v. Marshall, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 621.

On the other hand, a sheriff has no authority to make contracts that are binding on the county, except where he is specially so authorized to do by statute. 11 Tex.Jur. 636; Germo Mfg. Co. v. Coleman County, Tex.Civ.App., 184 S.W. 1063; American Disinfecting Co. v. Freestone County, Tex.Civ.App., 193 S.W. 440; Sparks v. Kaufman County, Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W. 605.

Revised Statutes, Article 2351, imposes on the Commissioners' Court the duty to "Provide and keep in repair court houses, jails and all necessary public buildings." The duty thus imposed is not limited to the furnishing of a bare building and keeping it in repair. It contemplates an inhabitable court house; one that is usable for the purposes intended. This would include the furnishing of heat, elevator service where needed, as well as janitor service to keep it clean and usable. Since it is under the duty of providing these conveniences, the Commissioners' Court has at least the implied power and authority to contract therefor. Dodson v. Marshall, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 621. We think, therefore, that the Commissioners' Court has authority to select, contract with, and discharge the above-mentioned court house employees.

The sheriff relies on Revised Statutes, Article 6872, as giving him authority to hire and discharge such employees. That Article reads as follows: "Sheriffs shall have charge and control of the courthouses of their respective counties, subject to such regulations as the commissioners court may prescribe; and the official bonds shall extend to and include the faithful performance of their duties under this article."

The above statute places the sheriff in charge and control of the court house merely for the purpose of keeping order and preserving the property. These are ministerial duties that are in keeping with the duties of a peace officer. It was not intended to invest the sheriff with discretionary power to contract for and on behalf of the county with employees to keep the building in a usable condition. These are duties that call for the exercise of discretion in the use of the contracting power of the county, such as is vested in the Commissioners' Court.

It is suggested that, since the above statute places the sheriff in charge of the court house, and makes him responsible on his official bond for the faithful performance of his duties, it is unreasonable not to allow him to select the employees who are to do the work necessary to properly keep the court house in a usable condition. This argument, however, erroneously assumes that he is responsible for keeping the building in a usable condition. Since he is responsible only for keeping order and preserving the property, these duties can be discharged by deputies of his own selection. On the contrary, to allow the sheriff to select the janitor and elevator operator, and make him responsible for the faithful performance of their duties, and thereby subject his bondsmen to liability for personal injuries caused by the negligent performance of the duties of such janitor or elevator operator, would be inconsistent with the general purpose of a sheriff's bond. We hold that the Commissioners' Court, and not the sheriff, has the authority to employ, direct, and discharge the above-mentioned court house employees.

The Commissioners' Court conceded in the trial court that the sheriff had the right to select and discharge the jail guards and matrons, and has assigned no error on account of the ruling of the trial court thereon. Consequently, we give no further consideration to that point.

The next point relates to the question of who has the right to employ and discharge county traffic officers. Both parties seem to rely on Acts 1935, 44th Leg., p. 711, ch. 306, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, Art. 6699b, for their authority to appoint the traffic officers in question. Said act reads in part as follows:

"Section 1. The Commissioners Court of each county, acting in conjunction with the sheriff, may employ not more than eight (8) regular deputies nor more than four (4) additional deputies for special emergency to aid said regular deputies, to be known as County Traffic Officers to enforce the Highway Laws of this State regulating the use...

To continue reading

Request your trial
32 cases
  • Judge Carlos Cascos
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 2 Septiembre 2010
    ...its legitimate directives.” Id. (citing Pritchard & Abbott v. McKenna, 162 Tex. 617, 350 S.W.2d 333, 334 (1961); Anderson v. Wood, 137 Tex. 201, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (1941); Galveston County v. Gresham, 220 S.W. 560, 562 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1920, writ ref'd)). “These powers include the......
  • Corporate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Ins.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • 18 Septiembre 1998
    ...intent." Black v. Dallas County Bail Bond Bd., 882 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1994, no writ); see Anderson v. Wood, 137 Tex. 201, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1087 (1941) (concluding that the whole statute was void because the remainder, by reason of its generality, would have given the act......
  • FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 98-0685
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 24 Agosto 2000
    ...quoted Miller's statement of the law. See, e.g., Maple Run, 931 S.W.2d at 945; County of Cameron, 326 S.W.2d at 164; Anderson v. Wood, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1087 (Tex. 1941). Unfortunately, a selective reading of Texas courts' unusual7 reference to a "broad" or "substantial class" could give a m......
  • Guynes v. Galveston County
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • 23 Junio 1993
    ...to accomplish its legitimate directives. Pritchard & Abbott v. McKenna, 162 Tex. 617, 350 S.W.2d 333, 334 (1961); Anderson v. Wood, 137 Tex. 201, 152 S.W.2d 1084, 1085 (1941); Galveston County v. Gresham, 220 S.W. 560, 562 (Tex.Civ.App.--Galveston 1920, writ ref'd). These powers include the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT