Andrade v. City of Hammond
| Decision Date | 06 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 2:19-CV-430-TLS-JPK |
| Parties | JOSE ANDRADE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [ECF Nos. 23, 25], filed on January 8, 2020. In pertinent part, the Defendants argue that this Court is without jurisdiction due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court agrees with this argument. As such, the Motions to Dismiss are granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Plaintiff is the owner of a rental property in Hammond, Indiana. See Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1. In May 2013, the Defendants, which include the City of Hammond and various city employees, began investigating the Plaintiff's rental property for alleged safety violations. See id. ¶¶ 26, 28. On January 12, 2017, the Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety (the board) conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding whether the Plaintiff's rental property was in an unsafe condition. Id. ¶ 29; see Ex. C, Tr. of Board Hr'g, p. 4, ECF No. 61-3, Case Number 2:15-CV-134.1 Kurtis Koch, the building commissioner of the City of Hammond, and Kelly Kearney, a former code enforcement commissioner for the City of Hammond, testified at lengthabout the alleged unsafe conditions at the Plaintiff's rental property. See Ex. C, Tr. of Board Hr'g at 14-132.
On March 9, 2017, the board issued an order in which it found that the Plaintiff's rental property Ex. A, Findings of Fact and Decision, p. 9, ECF No. 61-1, Case Number 2:15-CV-134. The board also found that the Plaintiff did not Id. The board also found that the property "was not erected as a multi-unit structure in 1927 and was never legally converted to a multi-unit apartment building thereafter." Id. at 4. The board concluded that "the five unsafe and illegally constructed units cannot lawfully be occupied in the building's present condition." Id. at 10. As such, the board affirmed that the property was unsafe and ordered that the property be restored to a single-family dwelling. Id.
The Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Superior Court of Lake County, Indiana (state trial court). See Ex. D, Tr. of Judicial Review Hr'g, p. 3, ECF No. 61-4, Case Number 2:15-CV-134. On February 8, 2018, the state trial court conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing. Id. Following the presentation of evidence, the Defendants argued that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the board's decision was unreasonable. Id. at 108. The Defendants further argued that the Plaintiff's arguments were irrelevant to the underlying issue of whether the property was an unsafe building. Id. at 104. In response, the Plaintiff essentially argued that (1) the board acted beyond its legal authority, (2) the property was originally built and zoned as a multi-family unit, and (3) the Defendants failed to comply with a subpoena. See id. at 111-16.
On March 28, 2018, the state trial court found that the board's findings of fact were "well-supported by the record." Ex. E, Order of Lake Superior Court, p. 2, ECF No. 61-5, Case Number 2:15-CV-134. The court concluded that the Plaintiff's arguments regarding (1) the Defendants' failure to comply with a subpoena and (2) whether the property was originally a multi-family unit were "not determinative of whether the building is 'unsafe' as defined by Ind. Code § 36-7-9-4(a) and as found by the Safety Board." Id. at 5. By implication, the court also concluded that the board acted with statutory authority. See id. at 4, 6. Accordingly, the court affirmed the board's order. Id. at 5-6.
The Plaintiff then appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals and argued that (1) the board's actions violated the Takings Clause, (2) one of the board members acted improperly or acted from bias, (3) the board exceeded its statutory authority when it ordered him to restore the property to a single-family home, (4) the board's finding that the property was originally built as a single family residence was not supported by substantial evidence, and (5) the Defendants' failure to comply with a subpoena required that the board's decision be reversed. See Andrade v. City of Hammond, 114 N.E.3d 507, 510, 514 n. 1, 516 n. 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that the Plaintiff's Id. at 514 n. 1. The court held that the Plaintiff's claim "of impropriety or bias on the part of one of the Board members . . . was not raised at the trial court level and, therefore, is waived for our review." Id. at 516 n. 5. The court also rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the board did not have the lawful authority to order him to restore the property to a single-family dwelling. Id. at 515-16. The court affirmed the board's finding that the property was originally a single-family dwelling. Id. at516. Finally, the court rejected the Plaintiff's argument regarding the Defendants' failure to comply with the subpoena. Id. at 516-17.
Thus, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. See id. at 518. The Plaintiff appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, but his petition to transfer was denied on March 7, 2019. Andrade v. City of Hammond, 124 N.E.3d 39 (Ind. 2019). The Plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, but his petition for certiorari was denied on October 7, 2019. Andrade v. City of Hammond, Ind., 140 S. Ct. 127 (2019).
On November 11, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages [ECF No. 1] in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. In essence, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants (1) knowingly made false statements before the board and the state trial court, (2) failed to comply with a lawfully-issued subpoena without justification, (3) targeted his property because he rented to low income residents, (4) committed a malicious prosecution against him, and (5) conspired to violate his right to due process. See Compl. ¶¶ 31-63.
LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court may dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "In evaluating a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court must first determine whether a factual or facial challenge has been raised." Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443). Id. (quoting Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 444). Id. (quoting Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443-44). Because the Defendants argue that the Court is without jurisdiction due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Defendants' argument is best understood as a factual challenge. See Commonwealth Plaza Condo. Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 693 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, "[t]he district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2000). Moreover, the district court may take judicial notice of matters of public record—including court documents filed in an earlier lawsuit—without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 492-93 (7th Cir. 2011); Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994).
ANALYSIS
The Defendants argue that this Court is without jurisdiction due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court concludes that this doctrine applies because (1) the Plaintiff's federal claims are inextricably intertwined with a prior state court judgment and (2) the Plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to present his constitutional arguments during the state court proceedings. As such, the Court is without jurisdiction due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). "[U]nder what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldmandoctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments." Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (). "The rationale for the doctrine is that no matter how wrong a state court judgment may be under federal law, only the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction to review it." Sykes v. Cook Cty. Circuit Court Probate Div., 837 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (...
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