Andrade v. City of Hammond
| Decision Date | 21 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:19-CV-430-TLS-JPK |
| Parties | JOSE ANDRADE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, THE HAMMOND BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SAFETY, THOMAS MCDERMOTT, JR., KRISTINA C. KANTAR, KELLY KEARNEY, and KURTIS KOCH, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 59, 68] and two related motions to take judicial notice [ECF Nos. 61, 78]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants both motions to take judicial notice and both motions for summary judgment.
On November 11, 2019, Plaintiff Jose Andrade filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] against Defendants City of Hammond, The Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety, and city employees Mayor Thomas McDermott, Jr., city attorney Kristina Kantar, Code Enforcement Officer Kelly Kearney, and Building Commissioner Kurtis Koch. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his due process rights during proceedings in which the City and the Board investigated his rental home for unsafe conditions. Id. at ¶¶ 31-63.
The Plaintiff alleges that, during the Board proceedings, the Defendants gave intentionally false representations of opinion testimony, id. at ¶ 33; they sought the demolition of his property without complying with the Indiana Unsafe Building Law and applicable municipal ordinances id. at ¶ 35; they made false and unsubstantiated accusations that his property was built as a single-family residence and later unlawfully converted into a multi-family dwelling, id. at ¶ 36; they failed to respond to a subpoena and thereby denied him the opportunity for full and vigorous cross examination, id. at ¶ 37; they deprived him of his valid liberty and property interests in his rental property, id. at ¶ 38; and they engaged in a conspiracy to interfere with due process, which included false and baseless objections to a subpoena before a tribunal, id. at ¶ 56. He claims, therefore, that the Defendants are “liable to [him] under state remedies as well as pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3).” Id. at ¶ 63.
Initially, this Court granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss [ECF Nos. 23, 25], finding that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the related state court judgment in Andrade v. City of Hammond, 114 N.E.3d 507 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), deprived this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See ECF No. 48. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Rooker-Feldman did not divest this Court of jurisdiction over the case. See Andrade v. City of Hammond, 9 F.4th 947, 951 (7th Cir. 2021). The Seventh Circuit explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal courts from reviewing direct challenges to state court judgments but does not preclude federal courts from reviewing challenges to conduct that was independent of a state court judgment, such as the conduct here that preceded the state court review. Id. at 950.
Following the Seventh Circuit's remand to this Court, the Defendants filed the two pending motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 59, 68. The Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to both motions [ECF No. 79], and the Defendants filed separate replies [ECF Nos. 81, 82]. The Defendants City of Hammond, The Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety, and Thomas McDermott, Jr. filed a motion to take judicial notice of filings and decisions from the related state and federal court proceedings. ECF No. 61. The Plaintiff filed a response in opposition [ECF No. 77], and the Defendants filed a reply [ECF No. 80]. The Plaintiff filed a motion to take judicial notice of a transcript of proceedings in the Lake County, Indiana, Superior Court [ECF No. 78], to which the Defendants did not respond.
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant may discharge this burden by “either: (1) showing that there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.” Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). In response, the non-movant “must make a sufficient showing on every element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof; if he fails to do so, there is no issue for trial.” Yeatts v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., 940 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citation omitted). A court's role Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Facts that are outcome determinative under the applicable law are material for summary judgment purposes. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court “may take judicial notice of facts that are (1) not subject to reasonable dispute and (2) either generally known within the territorial jurisdiction or capable of accurate and ready determination through sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned.” Ennenga v. Starns, 677 F.3d 766, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Fed.R.Evid. 201 (). “Courts routinely take judicial notice of the actions of other courts or the contents of filings in other courts.” Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 742 (7th Cir. 2016).
The Court grants both the Defendants' motion for judicial notice of the nine court filings and decisions presented and the Plaintiff's motion to take judicial notice of the transcript of proceedings in the state trial court. The Plaintiff's objection to consideration of the proposed Second Amended Complaint from the related federal case, 2:15-cv-134, see Def. Ex. F, ECF No. 61-6, is moot because the Court does not rely on that pleading in the instant ruling.
The Plaintiff owns a rental property in Hammond, Indiana. Def. Ex. C, Andrade v. City of Hammond, 114 N.E.3d 507 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), p. 4, ECF No. 61-3. In May 2013, Defendant City of Hammond began investigating the rental property for unsafe conditions. Id. Upon inspection, the City found unsafe conditions and violations of local ordinances for which it issued the Plaintiff a Notice of Violation. Id.
Two years later, Defendant The City of Hammond Board of Public Works and Safety held a hearing on the condition of the Plaintiff's rental property, without giving notice to the Plaintiff. Id. The Lake County Superior Court mandated a new hearing because of the lack of notice. Id. Prior to the second hearing and given the time lapse since the 2013 inspection of the Plaintiff's rental property, a new inspector, Defendant Kurtis Koch, reinspected the Plaintiff's property. Id. Then, on January 12, 2017, the Board held the second hearing, during which Defendant Kelly Kearney, the City's Code Enforcement Officer, and Koch, the City's Building Commissioner, testified about the unsafe conditions and original configuration of the rental property. Id. at 4-5. Kearney testified that the property's original building permit described a nine-room frame, which indicated to him that the home was built as a single-family home. Id. at 8. He stated that if the property were to be built as a multi-family residence, the permit would likely have noted that there would be apartments there, which it did not. Id. Koch testified that the property did not have structural elements typical of a 1927 multi-family residence and that it was comparable to many other single-family homes in the area built in 1927. Id.
On March 9, 2017, the Board concluded that the Plaintiff's rental property was unsafe and ordered it restored to a single-family residence. Def. Ex. H, Op. & Order in Case 2:15-cv-134, p. 3, ECF No. 61-8.[1] The Board found that the Plaintiff's property did “not have fire stopping and thus allows heat transfer, fire, and smoke to travel unimpeded through chases and into different floors of the structure.” Id. at 2. The building's “chimney chase was surrounded by open space from the cellar/basement through each floor to the roof deck, thus providing no fire blocking to the rooms upstairs.” Id. The Board continued, “[I]f a fire began in the cellar, it could quickly spread to the upstairs rooms by means of this opening, entrapping occupants and exposing them to the hazards of smoke and flame.” Id. at 2-3. In addition to these and other safety hazards, the Board found that the property “was not erected as a multi-unit structure in 1927 and was never legally converted to a multi-unit apartment building thereafter.” Id. at 3. Ultimately, the Board concluded that “the five unsafe and illegally constructed units cannot lawfully be occupied in the building's present condition.” Id.
The Plaintiff...
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