Andrade v. Marceno

• Decision Date: 11 January 2023
• Docket Number: 2:19-cv-887-JES-MRM
• Parties: ASHLEY LYNN ANDRADE, Plaintiff, v. CARMINE MARCENO, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County, JOSEPH M. CLARK, in his official and individual capacity, and EARTHEN BROWN in his official and individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

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ASHLEY LYNN ANDRADE, Plaintiff, v. CARMINE MARCENO, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County, JOSEPH M. CLARK, in his official and individual capacity, and EARTHEN BROWN in his official and individual capacity, Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-887-JES-MRM

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division

January 11, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN E. STEELE SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Ashely Lynn Andrade (Plaintiff or Andrade) filed an eleven-count Second Amended Complaint against defendants Carmine Marceno, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County (Sheriff Marceno), and Lee County Sheriff's Office (LCSO) deputies Joseph Clark (Deputy Clark) and Earthen Brown (Deputy Brown) in their official and individual capacities (collectively Defendants). (Doc. #61, ¶¶ 8-10.) This matter comes before the Court on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #78). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #82), which was later amended (Docs ##83-1, 88), and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. #85). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.

I.

Summary judgment is proper where the evidence “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As the Eleventh Circuit recently summarized:

If no reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted. To defeat summary judgment, a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.

At the summary judgment stage, we view the evidence, draw all reasonable factual inferences, and resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the non-movant. But we do so only to the extent supportable by the record. When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Thus, in cases where a video in evidence obviously contradicts the nonmovant's version of the facts, we accept the video's depiction instead of the nonmovant's account and view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.

Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1253 (11th Cir. 2022) . See also Robinson v. Sauls, 46 F.4th 1332 1340 (11th Cir. 2022). If the videos “do not answer all questions or resolve all the details of the encounter, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to” plaintiff. Johnson v. City of Miami Beach, 18 F.4th 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2021).

II.

This case involves the arrest of Plaintiff after a family get-together in Southwest Florida turned out to be anything but a typical day at the beach. For summary judgment purposes, the material relevant facts (subsequently referred to as the “summary judgment facts”) are as follows:^[1]

On July 8, 2018, Plaintiff was at the Lani Kai Island Resort (the Lani Kai) in Fort Myers Beach, Florida, to celebrate her father's birthday. Plaintiff was on the beach with family members, including her cousin Danielle Breehne (Breehne) and her cousin's boyfriend, Jake Oade (Oade). Plaintiff's family members were playing on the beach when Oade ran into the Gulf of Mexico, disappearing from plaintiff's sight for several minutes. Plaintiff next saw Oade on the ground as several LCSO deputies were placing him under arrest. Plaintiff, unaware of what had happened, approached and was informed by a LCSO deputy that Oade had touched a girl.

Plaintiff followed deputies as they brought Oade to a patrol vehicle parked in the front breezeway of the Lani Kai.^[2] Plaintiff watched while Oade was placed into a patrol vehicle, and then stood nearby. A large group of people gathered in the breezeway to witness the arrest. One of the LCSO deputies instructed the crowd to back away from the patrol vehicle and Oade. Deputy Brown approached Plaintiff^[3] and told her to move away from the vehicle. Plaintiff complied by moving to the far end of the Lani Kai's breezeway.

Within seconds, however, Plaintiff and Breehne^[4] re-approached the vicinity of the patrol vehicle in which Oade had been placed. Breehne moved within a few feet of the patrol vehicle. Plaintiff walked up behind Breehne, began pointing her finger at one of the LCSO deputies, cursed at the deputy, and stated “there was going to be a lawsuit.”

Deputy James VanPelt approached Plaintiff and Breehne, waving his arms and repeatedly instructing them to “back up.” Plaintiff, who had her arms wrapped around Breehne's waist, began backing up, as did Breehne. Breehne continued talking while Deputy VanPelt moved towards her. At the same time, Deputy Clark^[5] came up behind Plaintiff (on her left side) and instructed Plaintiff to “back up.” Deputy Brown also approached and yelled “back up.” Deputy Brown briskly approached plaintiff and simultaneously pushed Breehne on her left shoulder. Breehne initially stepped backwards, then recoiled and squared-off with Deputy Brown. A scuffle ensued, and Deputy Brown pulled Breehne in his direction. Plaintiff, who still had her arms around Breehne's waist, was attempting to hold onto Breehne. Deputy Clark intervened at this point, and during the scuffle Plaintiff grabbed Deputy Clark's shirt. (Doc. #84-2, p. 59.) Deputy Clark then grabbed Plaintiff's left arm and pulled Plaintiff towards him while she continued to hold onto Breehne with her right arm.

Plaintiff's ex-husband placed his arm around Plaintiff's waist and began pulling Plaintiff in the opposite direction from Deputy Clark, in a human tug-of-war. Deputy Clark lost his grip on Plaintiff and fell to the ground, as did Plaintiff and her exhusband. Deputy Clark immediately moved to secure Plaintiff, who was partially laying on her ex-husband, by grabbing Plaintiff's arm, flipping her onto her stomach, and pinning her to the ground with his bodyweight, pressing his knee into her butt and his hand behind her neck. Deputy Clark yelled at someone in the crowd to “get back,” and within seconds Deputy Clark placed Plaintiff's hands behind her back, stood her up, handcuffed her. Deputy Clark walked Plaintiff to the parking lot without further incident.

Plaintiff was transported to a local hospital via ambulance. Upon discharge, she was taken to Lee County jail, where she stayed for approximately twelve hours until her mother posted bond. Plaintiff was charged with resisting a police officer without violence pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 843.02. Counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and Waiver of Arraignment. The State Attorney's Office declined to file an Information.

III.

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (SAC) (Doc. #61) is the operative pleading. The SAC asserts eleven claims against various Defendants: (1) false arrest under Florida law against Deputy Clark in his individual capacity and Sheriff Marceno in his official capacity (Count I); (2) false arrest against Deputy Clark in his individual capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II); (3) false imprisonment under Florida law against Deputy Clark in his individual capacity and Sheriff Marceno in his official capacity (Count III); (4) false imprisonment against Deputy Clark in his individual capacity pursuant to § 1983 (Count IV); (5) excessive force against Deputies Clark and Brown in their individual capacities pursuant to § 1983 (Count V); (6) malicious prosecution under Florida law against Deputies Clark and Brown in their individual capacities (Count VI); (7) malicious prosecution against Deputies Clark and Brown in their individual capacities pursuant to § 1983 (Count VII); (8) First Amendment retaliation against Deputy Clark in his individual capacity pursuant to § 1983 (Count VIII); (9) battery under Florida law against Deputy Clark in his individual capacity (Count IX); (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress under Florida law against Deputies Clark and Brown in their individual capacities (Count X); and (11) negligent training and supervision against Sheriff Marceno in his official capacity pursuant to § 1983 (Count XI). All defendants move for summary judgment on all counts, arguing there are no genuine issues of material fact and they are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. (Doc. #78.)

IV.

A. Federal Claims Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Counts II, IV, V, VII, VIII, and XI of the SAC assert various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a private cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, deprives a person of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [plaintiffs] must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2003)(citation omitted.) “A constitutional claim brought pursuant to § 1983 must begin with the identification of a specific constitutional right that has allegedly been infringed.” DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1288 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2019)). Here, Plaintiff identifies the Fourth Amendment and the First Amendment as the constitutional rights at issue in the case.

B. Qualified Immunity Principles

Since defendants assert entitlement to qualified immunity as alternative relief for the individual capacity claims, the Court addresses...